π1r

Philosophical Letters:

or,
Modest
Reflections

Upon some Opinions in
Natural Philosophy,
maintained
By several Famous and Learned Authors of
this Age,
Expressed by way of Letters:

By the Thrice Noble, Illustrious, and Excellent
Princess,
The Lady Marchioness of Newcastle.

London, Printed in the Year,16641664.

π1v π2r

To
Her Excellency

The Lady Marchioness
of
Newcastle,

On her Book of
Philosophical Letters.

Tis Supernatural, nay ’tis Divine,

To write whole Volumes ere I can a line.

I ’mplor’d the Lady Muses, those fine things,

But they have broken all their Fidle-strings

And cannot help me; Nay, then I did try

Their Helicon, but that is grown all dry:

Then π2v

Then on Parnassus I did make a sallie,

But that’s laid level, like a Bowling-alley;

Invok’d my Muse, found it a Pond, a Dream,

To your eternal Spring, and running Stream;

So clear and fresh, with Wit and Phansie store,

As then despair did bid me write no more.

W. Newcastle.

To a1r

To
His Excellency
The Lord Marquis of
Newcastle.

My Noble Lord,

Although you have always encouraged me
in my harmless pastime of Writing, yet
was I afraid that your Lordship would be
angry with me for Writing and Publishing
this Book, by reason it is a Book of
Controversies, of which I have heard your Lordship
say, That Controversies and Disputations make Enemies
of Friends, and that such Disputations and Controversies
as these, are a pedantical kind of quarrelling,
not becoming Noble Persons. But your Lordship will
be pleased to consider in my behalf, that it is impossible
for one Person to be of every one’s Opinion, if their
opinions be different, and that my Opinions in Philosophy,
being new, and never thought of, at least not
divulged by any, but myself, are quite different from
others: For the Ground of my Opinions is, that there
is not onely a Sensitive, but also a Rational Life and
Knowledge, and so a double Perception in all Creatures:
And thus my opinions being new, are not so easily understood
as those, that take up several pieces of old opinions,a ons, a1v
of which they patch up a new Philosophy, (if
new may be made of old things,) like a Suit made up
of old Stuff bought at the Brokers: Wherefore to find
out a Truth, at least a Probability in Natural Philosophy
by a new and different way from other Writers,
and to make this way more known, easie and intelligible,
I was in a manner forced to write this Book; for I have
not contradicted those Authors in any thing, but what
concerns and is opposite to my opinions; neither do I
any thing, but what they have done themselves, as being
common amongst them to contradict each other:
which may as well be allowable, as for Lawyers to plead
at the Barr in opposite Causes. For as Lawyers are not
Enemies to each other, but great Friends, all agreeing
from the Barr, although not at the Barr: so it is with
Philosophers, who make their Opinions as their Clients,
not for Wealth, but for Fame, and therefore have no
reason to become Enemies to each other, by being Industrious
in their Profession. All which considered, was
the cause of Publishing this Book; wherein although I
dissent from their opinions, yet doth not this take off
the least of the respect and esteem I have of their Merits
and Works. But if your Lordship do but pardon
me, I care not if I be condemned by others; for
your Favour is more then the World to me, for which
all the actions of my Life shall be devoted and ready to
serve you, as becomes,

My Lord,

Your Lordships
honest Wife, and humble Servant,
M. N.

a2r

To the
Most Famous
University
of
Cambridge

Most Noble, Ingenious, Learned, and Industrious
Students.

Be not offended, that I dedicate to you this weak and
infirm work of mine; for though it be not an offering
worthy your acceptance, yet it is as much as I can present
for this time; and I wish from my Soul, I might be
so happy as to have some means or ways to express my Gratitude
for your Magnificent favours to me, having done
me more honour then ever I could expect, or give sufficient
thanks for: But your is Generosity above all Gratitude,
and your Favours above all Merit, like as your Learning
is above Contradiction: And I pray God your University
may flourish to the end of the World, for the Service of
the Church, the Truth of Religion, the Salvation of
Souls, the Instruction of Youth, the preservation of Health, and a2v and prolonging of Life, and for the increase of profitable
Arts and Sciences: so as your several studies may be, like
several Magistrates, united for the good and benefit of the
whole Common-wealth, nay, the whole World. May
Heaven prosper you, the World magnifie you, and Eternity
record your fame; Which are the hearty wishes and
prayers of,

Your most obliged Servant

M. Newcastle.

A b1r

A
Preface
to the
Reader.

Worthy Readers,

I Did not write this Book out of delight,
love or humour to contradiction; for
I would rather praise, then contradict any
Person or Persons that are ingenious;
but by reason Opinion is free, and may
pass without a pass-port, I took the liberty to declare
my own opinions as other Philosophers do, and to that
purpose I have here set down several famous and learned
Authors opinions, and my answers to them in the form
of Letters, which was the easiest way for me to write;
and by so doing, I have done that, which I would have
bonedone unto me; for I am as willing to have my opinions
contradicted, as I do contradict others: for I love Reason
so well, that whosoever can bring most rational and
probable arguments, shall have my vote, although b against b1v
against my own opinion. But you may say, If contradictions
were frequent, there would be no agreement
amongst Mankind. I answer; It is very true:
Wherefore Contradictions are better in general
Books, then in particular Families, and in Schools
better then in Publick States, and better in Philosophy
then in Divinity. All which considered, I shun,
as much as I can, not to discourse or write of either
Church or State. But I desire so much favour, or
rather Justice of you, Worthy Readers, as not to interpret
my objections or answers any other ways then
against several opinions in Philosophy; for I am confident
there is not any body, that doth esteem, respect
and honour learned and ingenious Persons more then
I do: Wherefore judgjudge me neither to be of a contradicting
humor, nor of a vain-glorious mind for dissenting
from other mens opinions, but rather that it
is done out of love to Truth, and to make my own opinions
the more intelligible, which cannot better be
done then by arguing and comparing other mens opinions
with them. The Authors whose opinions I
mention, I have read, as I found them printed, in my
native Language, except Des Cartes, who being in
Latine, I had some few places translanted to me out
of his works; and I must confess, that since I have
read the works of these learned men, I understand the
names and terms of Art a little better then I did before;
but it is not so much as to make me a Scholar, nor yet
so little, but that, had I read more before I did begin
to write my other Book called Philosophical Opinions,
they would have been more intelligible; for my error
was, I began to write so early, that I had not liv’d so b2r
so long as to be able to read many Authors; I cannot
say, I divulged my opinions as soon as I had conceiv’d
them, but yet I divulged them too soon to have them
artificial and methodical, But since what is past, cannot
be recalled, I must desire you to excuse those faults,
which were committed for want of experience and
learning. As for School-learning, had I applied my
self to it, yet I am confident I should never have arrived
to any; for I am so uncapable of Learning, that I
could never attain to the knowledge of any other Language
but my native, especially by the Rules of Art:
wherefore I do not repent that I spent not my time in
Learning, for I consider, it is better to write wittily then
learnedly; nevertheless, I love and esteem Learning, although
I am not capable of it. But you may say, I have
expressed neither Wit nor Learning in my Writings:
Truly, if not, I am the more sorry for it; but selfconceit,
which is natural to mankind, especially to
our Sex, did flatter and secretly perswade me that my
Writings had Sense and Reason, Wit and Variety; but
Judgment being not called to Counsel, I yielded to Selfconceits
flattery, and so put out my Writings to be
Printed as fast as I could, without being reviewed or
corrected: Neither did I fear any censure, for Selfconceit
had perswaded me, I should be highly applauded;
wherefore I made such haste, that I had three or
four Books printed presently after each other.

But to return to this present Work, I must desire you,
worthy Readers, to read first my Book called Philosophical
and Physical Opinions
, before you censure this,
for this Book is but an explanation of the former, wherein
is contained the Ground of my Opinions, and those that b2v
that will judge well of a Building, must first consider
the Foundation; to which purpose I will repeat some
few Heads and Principles of my Opinions, which are
these following: First, That Nature is Infinite, and
the Eternal Servant of God: Next, That she is Corporeal,
and partly self-moving, dividable and composable;
that all and every particular Creature, as also all
perception and variety in Nature, is made by corporeal
self-motion, which I name sensitive and rational
matter, which is life and knowledg, sense and reason.
Again, That these sensitive and rational parts of matter
are the purest and subtilest parts of Nature, as the active
parts, the knowing, understanding and prudent parts,
the designing, architectonical and working parts, nay,
the Life and Soul of Nature, and that there is not any
Creature or part of nature without this Life and Soul;
and that not onely Animals, but also Vegetables, Minerals
and Elements, and what more is in Nature, are endued
with this Life and Soul, Sense and Reason: and because
this Life and Soul is a corporeal Substance, it is
both dividable and composable; for it divides and removes
parts from parts, as also composes and joyns
parts to parts, and works in a perpetual motion without
rest; by which actions not any Creature can
challenge a particular Life and Soul to it self, but every,
Creature may have by the dividing and composing nature
of this self-moving matter more or fewer natural
souls and lives.

These and the like actions of corporeal Nature or natural
Matter you may find more at large described in
my afore-mentioned Book of Philosophical Opinions,
and more clearly repeated and explained in this present. ’Tis c1r
’Tis true, the way of arguing I use, is common, but
the Principles, Heads and Grounds of my Opinions are
my own, not borrowed or stolen in the least from any;
and the first time I divulged them, was in the year 16531653.
since which time I have reviewed, reformed and reprinted
them twice; for at first, as my Conceptions were
new and my own, so my Judgment was young, and my
Experience little, so that I had not so much knowledge
as to declare them artificially and methodically; for as I
metioned before, I was always unapt to learn by
the Rules of Art. But although they may be defecetive
for want of Terms of Art, and artificial expressions,
yet I am sure they are not defective for want of Sense
and Reason: And if any one can bring more Sense and
Reason to disprove these my opinions, I shall not repine
or grieve, but either acknowledge my errour, if I find
my self in any, or defend them as rationally as I can, if
it be but done justly and honestly, without deceit, spight,
or malice; for I connotcannot chuse but acquaint you, Noble
Readers
, I have been informed, that if I should be
answered in my Writings, it would be done rather under
the name and cover of a Woman, then of a Man,
the reason is, because no man dare or will set his
name to the contradiction of a Lady; and to confirm
you the better herein, there has one Chapter of my
Book called The Worlds Olio, treating of a Monastical
Life, been answer’d already in a little Pamphlet, under
the name of a woman, although she did little towards it;
wherefore it being a Hermaphroditical Book, I judged
it not worthy taking notice of. The like shall I do
to any other that will answer this present work of mine,
or contradict my opinions indirectly with fraud and deceit.c ceit. c1v
But I cannot conceive why it should be a disgrace
to any man to maintain his own or others opinions
against a woman, so it be done with respect and civility;
but to become a cheat by dissembling, and quit
the Breeches for a Petticoat, meerly out of spight and
malice, is base, and not fit for the honour of a man, or the
masculine sex. Besides, it will easily be known; for
a Philosopher or Philosopheress is not produced on a
sudden. Wherefore, although I do not care, nor fear
contradiction, yet I desire it may be done without fraud
or deceit, spight and malice; and then I shall be ready to
defend my opinions the best I can, whilest I live, and after
I am dead, I hope those that are just and honorable will
also defend me from all sophistry, malice spight and
envy, for which Heaven will bless them. In the mean
time, Worthy Readers, I should rejoyce to see that my
Works are acceptable to you, for if you be not partial,
you will easily pardon those faults you find, when you
do consider both my sex and breeding; for which favour
and justice, I shall always remain,

Your most obliged Servant,
M. N.

Phi c2r c2v B1r

Philosophical Letters.

Sect. I.

I

Madam,

You have been pleased to send me the
Works of four Famous and Learned
Authors, to wit, of two most Famous
Philosophers of our Age, Des Cartes,
and Hobbs, and of that Learned
Philosopher and Divine Dr. More,
as also of that Famous Physician and
Chymist Van Helmont. Which Works you have sent
me not onely to peruse, but also to give my judgment
of them, and to send you word by the usual way of our
Correspondence, which is by Letters, how far, and
wherein I do dissent from these Famous Authors, their
Opinions in Natural Philosophy. To tell you truly,
Madam, your Commands did at first much affright
me, for it did appear, as if you had commanded me to
get upon a high Rock, and fling my self into the Sea, B where B1v 2
where neither a Ship, nor a Plank, nor any kind of help
was near to rescue me, and save my life; but that I was
forced to sink, by reason I cannot swim: So I having no
Learning nor Art to assist me in this dangerous undertaking,
thought, I must of necessity perish under the
rough censures of my Readers, and be not onely accounted
a fool for my labour, but a vain and presumptuous
person, to undertake things surpassing the ability of
my performance; but on the other side I considered
first, that those Worthy Authors, were they my censurers,
would not deny me the same liberty they take
themselves; which is, that I may dissent from their Opinions,
as well as they dissent from others, and from amongst
themselves: And if I should express more Vanity
then Wit, more Ignorance then Knowledg, more
Folly then Discretion, it being according to the Nature
of our Sex, I hoped that my Masculine Readers would
civilly excuse me, and my Female Readers could not
justly condemn me. Next I considered with my self,
that it would be a great advantage for my Book called
Philosophical Opinions, as to make it more perspicuous
and intelligible by the opposition of other Opinions,
since two opposite things placed near each other, are the
better discerned; for I must confess, that when I did
put forth my Philosophical Work at first, I was not so
well skilled in the Terms or Expressions usual in Natural
Philosophy
; and therefore for want of their knowledg,
I could not declare my meaning so plainly and
clearly as I ought to have done, which may be a sufficient
argument to my Readers, that I have not read
heretofore any Natural Philosophers, and taken some
Light from them; but that my Opinions did meerly issue B2r 3
issue from the Fountain of my own Brain, without any
other help or assistance. Wherefore since for want of
proper Expressions, my named Book of Philosophy was
accused of obscurity and intricacy, I thought your Commands
would be a means to explain and clear it the better,
although not by an Artificial way, as by Logical Arguments
or Mathematical Demonstrations, yet by expressing
my Sense and Meaning more properly and clearly
then I have done heretofore: But the chief reason of all
was, the Authority of your Command, which did work
so powerfully with me, that I could not resist, although
it were to the disgrace of my own judgment and wit;
and therefore I am fully resovedresolved now to go on as far, and
as well as the Natural strength of my Reason will reach:
But since neither the strength of my Body, nor of my
understanding, or wit, is able to mark every line,
or every word of their works, and to argue upon
them, I shall onely pick out the ground Opinions of the
aforementioned Authors, and those which do directly
dissent from mine, upon which I intend to make some
few Reflections, according to the ability of my Reason;
and I shall meerly go upon the bare Ground of Natural
Philosophy
, and not mix Divinity with it, as many Philosophers
use to do, except it be in those places, where I
am forced by the Authors Arguments to reflect upon it,
which yet shall be rather with an expression of my ignorance,
then a positive declaration of my opinion or judgment
thereof; for I think it not onely an absurdity, but
an injury to the holy Profession of Divinity to draw her
to the Proofs in Natural Philosophy; wherefore I shall
strictly follow the Guidance of Natural Reason, and
keep to my own ground and Principles as much as I can; which B2v 4
which that I may perform the better, I humbly desire
the help and assistance of your Favour, that according
to that real and intire Affection you bear to me, you
would be pleased to tell me unfeignedly, if I should
chance to err or contradict but the least probability of
truth in any thing; for I honor Truth so much, as I
bow down to its shadow with the greatest respect and
reverence; and I esteem those persons most, that love
and honor Truth with the same zeal and fervor, whether
they be Ancient or Modern Writers.

Thus, Madam, although I am destitute of the help of
Arts, yet being supported by your Favour and wise Directions,
I shall not fear any smiles of scorn, or words of
reproach; for I am confident you will defend me against
all the mischievous and poisonous Teeth of malitious
detractors. I shall besides, implore the assistance of the
Sacred Church, and the Learned Schools, to take me
into their Protection, and shelter my weak endeavours:
For though I am but an ignorant and simple Woman,
yet I am their devoted and honest Servant, who shall
never quit the respect and honor due to them, but live
and die theirs, as also,

Madam

Your Ladiships
humble and faithful Servant

M A- C1r 5

II

Madam,

Before I begin my Reflections upon the Opinions
of those Authors you sent me, I will answer
first your Objection concerning the Ground
of my Philosophy, which is Infinite Matter: For
you were pleased to mention, That you could not well
apprehend, how it was possible, that many Infinites
could be contained in one Infinite, since one Infinite
takes up all Place Imaginary, leaving no room for any
other; Also, if one Infinite should be contained in an
other Infinite, that which contains, must of necessity be
bigger then that which is contained, whereby the Nature
of Infinite would be lost; as having no bigger nor
less, but being of an Infinite quantity.

First of all, Madam, there is no such thing as All in
Infinite, nor any such thing as All the Place, for Infinite is
not circumscribed nor limited: Next, as for that one Infinite
cannot be in an other Infinite, I answer, as well as
one Finite can be in another Finite; for one Creature is
not onely composed of Parts, but one Part lies within another,
and one Figure within another, and one Motion
within another. As for example, Animal Kind, have
they not Internal and External Parts, and so Internal and
External Motions? And are not Animals, Vegetables
and Minerals inclosed in the Elements? But as for Infinites,
you must know, Madam, that there are several
kindes of Infinites. For there is first Infinite in quantity C or C1v 6
or bulk, that is such a big and great Corporeal substance,
which exceeds all bounds and limits of measure, and may
be called Infinite in Magnitude. Next there is Infinite
in Number, which exceeds all numeration and account,
and may be termed Infinite in Multitude; Again there
is Infinite in Quality; as for example, Infinite degrees
of softness, hardness, thickness, thinness, heat and cold, &c.
also Infinite degrees of Motion, and so Infinite Creations,
Infinite Compositions, Dissolutions, Contractions,
Dilations, Digestions, Expulsions; also Infinite
degrees of Strength, Knowledg, Power, &c. Besides
there is Infinite in Time, which is properly named Eternal.
Now, when I say, that there is but one Infinite,
and that Infinite is the Onely Matter, I mean infinite in
bulk and quantity. And this Onely matter, because it
is Infinite in bulk, must of necessity be divisible into infinite
Parts, that is, infinite in number, not in bulk or
quantity; for though Infinite Parts in number make
up one infinite in quantity, yet they considered in themselves,
cannot be said Infinite, because every Part is of
a certain limited and circumscribed Figure, Quantity and
Proportion, whereas Infinite hath no limits nor bounds:
besides it is against the nature of a single Part to be Infinite,
or else there would be no difference between the
Part and the whole, the nature of a Part requiring that
it must be less then its whole, but all what is less hath a
determined quantity, and so becomes finite. Therefore
it is no absurdity to say, that an Infinite may have
both Finite and Infinite Parts, Finite in Quantity, Infinite
in Number. But those that say, if there were an
Infinite Body, that each of its Parts must of necessity be
Infinite too, are much mistaken; for it is a contradictiondiction C2r 7
in the same Terms to say One Infinite Part, for
the very Name of a Part includes a Finiteness, but take
all parts of an Infinite Body together, then you may
rightly say they are infinite. Nay Reason will inform
you plainly, for example: Imagine an Infinite number
of grains of Corn in one heap, surely if the number of
Grains be Infinite, you must grant of necessity the
bulk or body, which contains this infinite number of
grains, to be Infinite too; to wit, Infinite in quantity,
and yet you will find each Grain in it self to be Finite.
But you will say, an Infinite Body cannot have parts,
for if it be Infinite, it must be Infinite in Quantity, and
therefore of one bulk, and one continued quantity, but
Infinite parts in number make a discrete quantity. I answer
it is all one; for a Body of a continued quantity
may be divided and severed into so many Parts either
actually, or mentally in our Conceptions or thoughts;
besides nature is one continued Body, for there is no
such Vacuum in Nature, as if her Parts did hang together
like a linked Chain; nor can any of her Parts subsist
single and by it self, but all the Parts of Infinite
Nature, although they are in one continued Piece, yet
are they several and discerned from each other by their
several Figures. And by this, I hope, you will understand
my meaning, when I say, that several Infinites may be
included or comprehended in one Infinite; for by the one
Infinite, I understand Infinite in Quantity, which includes
Infinite in Number, that is Infinite Parts; then
Infinite in Quality, as Infinite degrees of Rarity, Density,
Swiftness, Slowness, Hardness, Softness, &c. Infinite
degrees of Motions, Infinite Creations, Dissolutions,
Contractions, Dilations, Alterations, &c. Infinitefinite C2v 8
degres of Wisdom, Strength, Power, &c. and
lastly Infinite in Time or Duration, which is Eternity,
for Infinite and Eternal are inseparable; All which Infinites
are contained in the Onely Matter as many Letters
are contained in one Word, many Words in one Line,
many Lines in one Book. But you will say perhaps,
if I attribute an Infinite Wisdom, Strength,
Power, Knowledg, &c. to Nature; then Nature is in
all coequal with God, for God has the same Attributes:
I answer, Not at all; for I desire you to understand me
rightly, when I speak of Infinite Nature, and when I
speak of the Infinite Deity, for there is great difference
between them, for it is one thing a Deitical or Divine Infinite,
and another a Natural Infinte; You know, that
God is a Spirit, and not a bodily substance, again that
Nature is a Body, and not a Spirit, and therefore none of
these Infinites can obstruct or hinder each other, as being
different in their kinds, for a Spirit being no Body, requires
no place, Place being an attribute which onely
belongs to a Body, and therefore when I call Nature
Infinite, I mean an Infinite extension of Body, containing
an Infinite number of Parts; but what doth an Infinite
extension of Body hinder the Infiniteness of God,
as an Immaterial Spiritual being? Next, when I do
attribute an Infinite Power, Wisdom, Knowledg, &c.
to Nature, I do not understand a Divine, but a Natural
Infinite Wisdom and Power, that is, such as properly
belongs to Nature, and not a supernatural, as is in
God; For Nature having Infinite parts of Infinite degrees,
must also have an Infinite natural wisdom to order
her natural Infinite parts and actions and consequently
an Infinite natural power to put her wisdom into D1r 9
into act; and so of the rest of her attributes, which are
all natural: But Gods Attributes being supernatural,
transcend much these natural infinite attributes; for God,
being the God of Nature, has not onely Natures Infinite
Wisdom and Power, but besides, a Supernatural
and Incomprehensible Infinite Wisdom and Power;
which in no wayes do hinder each other, but may very
well subsist together. Neither doth Gods Infinite Justice
and his Infinite Mercy hinder each other; for Gods
Attributes, though they be all several Infinites, yet they
make but one Infinite.

But you will say, If Nature’s Wisdom and Power extends
no further then to natural things, it is not Infinite,
but limited and restrained. I answer, That doth not
take away the Infiniteness of Nature; for there may be
several kinds of Infinites, as I related before, and
one may be as perfect an Infinite as the other in its kind.
For example: Suppose a Line to be extended infinitely
in length, you will call this Line Infinite, although it
have not an Infinite breadth: Also, if an infinite length
and breadth joyn together, you will call it, an Infinite
Superficies, although it wants an infinite depth; and
yet every Infinite, in its kinde, is a Perfect Infinite, if
I may call it so: Why then shall not Nature also be said
to have an Infinite Natural Wisdom and Power, although
she has not a Divine Wisdom and Power? Can
we say, Man hath not a free Will, because he hath not
an absolute free Will, as God hath? Wherefore, a
Natural Infinite, and the Infinite God, may well stand
together, without any opposition or hinderance, or without
any detracting or derogating from the Omnipotency
and Glory of God; for God remains still the God of D Na- D1v 10
Nature, and is an Infinite Immaterial Purity, when as
Nature is an Infinite Corporeal Substance; and Immaterial
and Material cannot obstruct each other. And
though an Infinite Corporeal cannot make an Infinite
Immaterial, yet an Infinite Immaterial can make an
Infinite Corporeal, by reason there is as muchmuch difference
in the Power as in the Purity: And the disparity
between the Natural and Divine Infinite is such, as
they cannot joyn, mix, and work together, unless
you do believe that Divine Actions can have allay.

But you may say, Purity belongs onely to natural
things, and none but natural bodies can be said purified,
but God exceeds all Purity. ’Tis true: But if
there were infinite degrees of Purity in Matter, Matter
might at last become Immaterial, and so from an Infinite
Material turn to an Infinite Immaterial, and from Nature
to be God: A great, but an impossible Change.
For I do verily believe, that there can be but one Omnipotent
God, and he cannot admit of addition, or diminution;
and that which is Material cannot be Immaterial,
and what is Immaterial cannot become Material,
I mean, so, as to change their natures; for Nature
is what God was pleased she should be; and will be
what she was, until God be pleased to make her otherwise.
Wherefore there can be no new Creation of
matter, motion, or figure; nor any annihilation of any
matter, motion, or figure in Nature, unless God do create
a new Nature: For the changing of Matter into several
particular Figures, doth not prove an annihilation
of particular Figures; nor the cessation of particular Motions
an annihilation of them: Neither doth the variation
of the Onely Matter produce an annihilation of any part D2r 11
part of Matter, nor the variation of figures and motions
of Matter cause an alteration in the nature of Onely
Matter: Wherefore there cannot be new Lives, Souls
or Bodies in Nature; for, could there be any thing
new in Nature, or any thing annihilated, there would
not be any stability in Nature, as a continuance of every
kind and sort of Creatures, but there would be a
confusion between the new and old matter, motions,
and figures, as between old and new Nature; In
truth, it would be like new Wine in old Vessels, by
which all would break into disorder. Neither can
supernatural and natural effects be mixt together, no
more then material and immaterial things or beings:
Therefore it is probable, God has ordained Nature to
work in her self by his Leave, Will, and Free Gift. But
there have been, and are still strange and erroneous Opinions,
and great differences amongst Natural Philosophers,
concerning the Principles of Natural things; some
will have them Atoms, others will have the first Principles
to be Salt, Sulphur and Mercury; some will have
them to be the four Elements as Fire, Air, Water, and
Earth; and others will have but one of these Elements;
also some will have Gas and Blas, Ferments, Idea’s and
the like; but what they believe to be Principles and
Causes of natural things, are onely Effects; for in all
Probability it appears to humane sense and reason, that
the cause of every particular material Creature is the
onely and Infinite Matter, which has Motions and Figures
inseparably united; for Matter, Motion and Figure,
are but one thing, individable in its Nature. And
as for Immaterial Spirits, there is surely no such thing
in Infinite Nature, to wit, so as to be Parts of Nature; for Nature D2v 12
Nature is altogether Material, but this opinion proceeds
from the separation or abstraction of Motion formfrom Matter,
viz. that man thinks matter and motion to be dividable
from each other, and believes motion to be a thing
by it self, naming it an Imaterial thing, which has a
being, but not a bodily substance: But various and different
effects do not prove a different Matter or Cause,
neither do they prove an unsetled Cause, onely the variety
of Effects hath obscured the Cause from the several
parts, which makes Particular Creatures partly Ignorant,
and partly knowing. But in my opinion, Nature
is material, and not any thing in Nature, what belongs
to her, is immaterial; but whatsoever is Immaterial, is
Supernatural, Therefore Motions, Forms, Thoughts,
Ideas, Conceptions, Sympathies, Antipathies, Accidents,
Qualities, as also Natural Life, and Soul, are
all Material: And as for Colours, Sents, Light, Sound,
Heat, Cold, and the like, those that believe them not
to be substances or material things, surely their brain or
heart (take what place you will for the forming of Conceptions)
moves very Irregularly, and they might as
well say, Our sensitive Organs are not material; for what
Objects soever, that are subject to our senses, cannot in
sense be denied to be Corporeal, when as those things
that are not subject to our senses, can be conceived
in reason to be Immaterial? But some Philosophers
striving to express their wit, obstruct reason; and
drawing Divinity to prove Sense and Reason, weaken
Faith so, as their mixed Divine Philosophy becomes
meer Poetical Fictions, and Romantical expressions, making
material Bodies immaterial Spirits, and immaterial
Spirits material Bodies; and some have conceived some things E1r 13
things neither to be Material nor Immaterial, but between
both. Truly, Madam, I wish their Wits had
been less, and their Judgments more, as not to jumble
Natural and Supernatural things together, but to distinguish
either clearly, for such Mixtures are neither
Natural nor Divine; But as I said, the Confusion comes
from their too nice abstractions, and from the separation
of Figure and Motion from Matter, as not conceiving
them individable; but if God, and his servant
Nature were as Intricate and Confuse in their Works,
as Men in their Understandings and Words, the Universe
and Production of all Creatures would soon be
without Order and Government, so as there would be
a horrid and Eternal War both in Heaven, and in the
World, and so pittying their troubled Brains, and
wishing them the Light of Reason, that they may clearly
perceive the Truth, I rest

Madam

Your real Friend
and faithful Servant

III

Madam

It seems you are offended at my Opinion, that Nature
is Eternal without beginning, which, you say,
is to make her God, or at least coequalcoequal with God;
But, if you apprend my meaning rightly, you will E say, E1v 14
say, I do not: For first, God is an Immaterial and Spiritual
Infinite Being, which Propriety God cannot give away
to any Creature, nor make another God in Essence like
to him, for Gods Attributes are not communicable to any
Creature; Yet this doth not hinder, that God should not
make Infinite and Eternal Matter, for that is as easie to
him, as to make a Finite Creature, Infinite Matter being
quite of another Nature then God, is to wit, Corporeal,
when God is Incorporeal, the difference whereof
I have declared in my former Letter. But as for
Nature, that it cannot be Eternal without beginning,
because God is the Creator and Cause of it, and that the
Creator must be before the Creature, as the Cause before
the Effect, so, that it is impossible for Nature to be
without a beginning; if you will speak natually, as human
reason guides you, and bring an Argument concluding
from the Priority of the Cause before the
Effect, give me leave to tell you, that God is not tied to
Natural Rules, but that he can do beyond our Understanding,
and therefore he is neither bound up to time,
as to be before, for if we will do this, we must not allow,
that the Eternal Son of God is Coeternal with the Father,
because nature requires a Father to exist before
the Son, but in God is no time, but all Eternity; and
if you allow, that God hath made some Creatures, as
Supernatural Spirits, to live Eternally, why should he
not as well have made a Creature from all Eternity? for
Gods making is not our making, he needs no Priority of
Time. But you may say, the Comparison of the Eternal
Generation of the Son of God is Mystical and Divine,
and not to be applied to natural things: I answer,
The action by which God created the World or made Nature E2r 15
Nature, was it natural or supernatual? surely you will
say it was a Supernatural and God-like action, why then
will you apply Natural Rules to a God-like and Supernatural
Action? for what Man knows, how and
when God created Nature? You will say, the Scripture
doth teach us that, for it is not Six thousand years,
when God created this World. I answer, the holy
Scripture informs us onely of the Creation of this
Visible World, but not of Nature and natural Matter;
for I firmly believe according to the Word of
God, that this World has been Created, as is described
by Mosses, but what is that to natural Matter?
There may have been worlds before, as many are of
the opinion that there have been men before Adam, and
many amongst Divines do believe, that after the destruction
of this World God will Create a new World again,
as a new Heaven, and a new Earth; and if this be
probable, or at least may be believed without any prejudice
to the holy Scripture, why may it not be probably
believed that there have been other worlds before this visible
World? for nothing is impossible with God; and
all this doth derogate nothing from the Honour and
Glory of God, but rather increases his Divine Power. But
as for the Creation of this present World, it is related,
that there was first a rude and indigested Heap, or Chaos,
without form, void and dark; and God said, “Let it be
light; Let there be a Firmament in the midst of the Waters,
and let the Waters under the Heaven be gathered
together, and let the dry Land appear; Let the Earth
bring forth Grass, the Herb yielding seed, and the
Fruit-tree yielding Fruit after its own kind; and let there
be Lights in the Firmament, the one to rule the Day, and the E2v 16
the other the Night; and let the Waters bring forth
abundantly the moving Creature that hath life; and let
the Earth bring forth living Creatures after its kinde”
; and
at last God said
, “Let us make Man, and all what was
made, God saw it was good.”
Thus all was made by
Gods Command, and who executed his Command
but the Material servant of God, Nature? which ordered
her self-moving matter into such several Figures as
God commanded, and God approved of them. And
thus, Madam, I verily believe the Creation of the
World, and that God is the Sole and omnipotent Creator
of Heaven and Earth, and of all Creatures therein;
nay, although I believe Nature to have been from
Eternity, yet I believe also that God is the God and
Author of Nature, and has made Nature and natural
Matter in a way and manner proper to his Omnipotency
and Incomprehensible by us: I will pass by natural
Arguments and Proofs, as not belonging to such
an Omnipotent Action; as for example, how the nature
of relative terms requires, that they must both exist
at one point of Time, viz. a Master and his Servant,
and a King and his Subjects; for one bearing relation
to the other, can in no ways be considered as different
from one another in formiliness or laterness of Time;
but as I said, these being meerly natural things, I will
nor cannot apply them to Supernatural and Divine Actions;
But if you ask me, how it is possible that Nature,the
Effect and Creature of God, can be Eternal without beginning?
I will desire you to answer me first, how a
Creature can be Eternal without end, as, for example,
Supernatural Spirits are, and then I will answer you,
how a Creature can be Eternal without beginning; For F1r 17
For Eternity consists herein, that it has neither beginning
nor end: and if it be easie for God to make a Being
without end, it is not difficult for Him to make a Being
without beginning. One thing more I will add, which is,
That if Nature has not been made by God from all
Eternity, then the Title of God, as being a Creator,
which is a Title and action, upon which our Faith is
grounded, (for it is the first Article in our Creed) has
been accessory to God, as I said, not full Six thousand
years ago; but there is not any thing accessory to God,
he being the Perfection himself. But, Madam, all what
I speak, is under the liberty of Natural Philosophy, and
by the Light of Reason onely, not of Revelation; and
my Reason being not infallible, I will not declare my
Opinions for an infallible Truth: Neither do I think,
that they are offensive either to Church or State, for I
submit to the Laws of One, and believe the Doctrine
of the Other, so much, that if it were for the advantage
of either, I should be willing to sacrifice my Life, especcially
for the Church; yea, had I millions of Lives, and
every Life was either to suffer torment or to live in ease,
I would prefer torment for the benefit of the Church;
and therefore, if I knew that my Opinions should give
any offence to the Church, I should be ready every minute
to alter them: And as much as I am bound in all
duty to the obedience of the Church, as much am I particularly
bound to your Ladiship, for your entire love
and sincere affection towards me, for which I shall live
and die,

Madam

Your most faithful Friend,
and humble Servant

F MA-
F1v 18

IV

Madam

I have chosen, in the first place, the Work of that
famous Philosopher Hobbs, called Leviathan, wherein
I find he says, “That the cause of sense or sensitive
perception is the external body or Object, which presses the
Organ proper to each Sense.” INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Part.I.
ch.1.
To which I answer, according
to the ground of my own Philosophical Opinions, That all
things, and therefore outward objects as well as sensitive
organs, have both Sense and Reason, yet neither the
objects nor the organs are the cause of them; for Perception
is but the effect of the Sensitive and rational
Motions, and not the Motions of the Perception; neither
doth the pressure of parts upon parts make Perception;
for although Matter by the power of self-motion is
as much composeable as divideable, and parts do joyn to
parts, yet that doth not make perception; nay, the several
parts, betwixt which the Perception is made, may
be at such a distance, as not capable to press: As for example,
Two men may see or hear each other at a distance,
and yet there may be other bodies between them, that
do not move to those perceptions, so that no pressure can
be made, for all pressures are by some constraint and
force; wherefore, according to my Opinion, the Sensitive
and Rational Free Motions, do pattern out each
others object, as Figure and Voice in each others Eye
and Ear; for Life and Knowledge, which I name Rational
and Sensitive Matter, are in every Creature, and in F2r 19
in all parts of every Creature, and make all perceptions
in Nature, because they are the self-moving parts of
Nature, and according as those Corporeal, Rational,
and Sensitive Motions move, such or such perceptions are
made: But these self-moving parts being of different degrees
(for the Rational matter is purer than the Sensitive)
it causes a double perception in all Creatures, whereof one
is made by the Rational corporeal motions, and the
other by the Sensitive; and though both perceptions are
in all the body, and in every part of the body of a Creature,
yet the sensitive corporeal motions having their proper
organs, as Work-houses, in which they work some
sorts of perceptions, those perceptions are most commonly
made in those organs, and are double again; for the
sensitive motions work either on the inside or on the outside
of those organs, on the inside in Dreams, on the
out-side awake; and although both the Rational and the
Sensitive matter are inseparably joyned and mixed together,
yet do they not always work together, for oftentimes
the Rational works without any sensitive paterns,
and the sensitive again without any rational paterns.
But mistake me not, Madam, for I do not absolutely
confine the sensitive perception to the Organs, nor the
rational to the Brain, but as they are both in the whole
body, so they may work in the whole body according
to their own motions. Neither do I say, that there is no
other perception in the Eye but sight, in the Ear but
hearing, and so forth, but the sensitive organs have
other perceptions besides these; and if the sensitive and
rational motions be irregular in those parts, between
which the perception is made, as for example, in the
two fore-mentioned men, that see and hear each other, then F2v 20
then they both neither see nor hear each other perfectly;
and if one’s motions be perfect, but the
other’s irregular and erroneous, then one sees and
hears better then the other; or if the Sensitive and
Rational motions move more regularly and make perfecter
paterns in the Eye then in the Ear, then they
see better then they hear; and if more regularly and
perfectly in the Ear then in the Eye, they hear better then
they see: And so it may be said of each man singly, for
one man may see the other better and more perfectly,
then the other may see him; and this man may hear the
other better and more perfectly, then the other may hear
him; whereas, if perception were made by pressure,
there would not be any such mistakes; besides the hard
pressure of objects, in my opinion, would rather annoy
and obscure, then inform. But as soon as the object is removed,
the Perception of it, made by the sensitive motions
in the Organs, ceaseth, by reason the sensitive Motions
cease from paterning, but yet the Rational Motions
do not always cease so suddenly, because the sensitive
corporeal Motions work with the Inanimate Matter,
and therefore cannot retain particular figures long,
whereas the Rational Matter doth onely move in its own
substance and parts of matter, and upon none other, as
my Book of Philosophical Opinions will inform you
better. And thus Perception, in my opinion, is not
made by Pressure, nor by Species, nor by matter going
either from the Organ to the Object, or from the
Object into the Organ. By this it is also manifest, that
Understanding comes not from Exterior Objects, or
from the Exterior sensitive Organs; for as Exterior Objects
do not make Perception, so they do neither make Un- G1r 21
Understanding, but it is the rational matter that doth it,
for Understanding may be without exterior objects and
sensitive organs; And this in short is the opinion of

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

V

Madam

Your Authours opinion is, Leviathan,
INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Part.I.c.2.
that “when a thing lies
still, unless somewhat else stir it, it will lie still for
ever; but when a thing is in motion, it will eternally
be in motion, unless somewhat else stay it; the reason
is,”
saith he, “because nothing can change it self”; To tell
you truly, Madam, I am not of his opinion, for if
Matter moveth it self, as certainly it doth, then the
least part of Matter, were it so small as to seem Individable,
will move it self; ’Tis true, it could not desist
from motion, as being its nature to move, and no
thing can change its Nature; for God himself, who
hath more power then self-moving Matter, cannot
change himself from being God; but that Motion
should proceed from another exterior Body, joyning
with, or touching that body which it moves, is in my
opinion not probable; for though Nature is all Corporeal,
and her actions are Corporeal Motions, yet
that doth not prove, that the Motion of particular G Creat- G1v 22
Creatures or Parts is caused by the joining, touching or
pressing of parts upon parts; for it is not the several
parts that make motion, but motion makes them; and
yet Motion is not the cause of Matter, but Matter is
the cause of Motion, for Matter might subsist without
Motion, but not Motion without Matter, onely there
could be no perception without Motion, nor no Variety,
if Matter were not self-moving; but Matter, if it
were all Inanimate and void of Motion, would lie as a
dull, dead and senseless heap; But that all Motion
comes by joining or pressing of other parts, I deny, for
if sensitive and rational perceptions, which are sensitive
and rational motions, in the body, and in the mind,
were made by the pressure of outward objects, pressing
the sensitive organs, and so the brain or interior parts
of the Body, they would cause such dents and holes
therein, as to make them sore and patched in a short time;
Besides, what was represented in this manner, would
always remain, or at least not so soon be dissolved, and
then those pressures would make a strange and horrid
confusion of Figures, for not any figure would be distinct;
Wherefore my opinion is, that the sensitive and
rational Matter doth make or pattern out the figures of
several Objects, and doth dissolve them in a moment of
time; as for example, when the eye seeth the object
first of a Man, then of a Horse, then of another Creature,
the sensitive motions in the eye move first into
the figure of the Man, then straight into the figure of
the Horse, so that the Mans figure is dissolved and altered
into the figure of the Horse, and so forth; but if
the eye sees many figures at once, then so many several
figures are made by the sensitive Corporeal Motions, and G2r 23
and as many by the Rational Motions, which are Sight
and Memory, at once: But in sleep both the sensitive
and rational Motions make the figures without patterns,
that is, exterior objects, which is the cause that
they are often erroneous, whereas, if it were the former
Impressions of the Objects, there could not possibly be
imperfect Dreams or Remembrances, for fading of Figures
requires as much motion, as impression, and impression
and fading are very different and opposite motions;
nay, if Perception was made by Impression,
there could not possibly be a fading or decay of the figures
printed either in the Mind or Body, whereas yet,
as there is also an alteration of figures made by these motions.
But you will say, it doth not follow, if Perception
be made by Impression, that it must needs continue
and not decay; for if you touch and move a string, the
motion doth not continue for ever, but ceaseth by degrees;
I answer, There is great difference between
Prime self-motion, and forced or Artifical Motions;
for Artifical Motions are onely an Imitation of Natural
Motions, and not the same, but caused by Natural
Motions; for although there is no Art that is not made
by Nature, yet Nature is not made by Art; Wherefore
we cannot rationally judgjudge of Perception by comparing
it to the motion of string, and its alteration to
the ceasing of that motion, for Nature moveth not by
force, but freely. ’Tis true, ’tis the freedom in Nature
for one man to give another a box on the Ear, or
to trip up his heels, or for one or more men to fight with
each other; yet these actions are not like the actions of
loving Imbraces and Kissing each other; neither are the actions G2v 24
actions one and the same, when a man strikes himself,
and when he strikes another; and so is likewise the action
of impression, and the action of self-figuring not one
and the same, but different; for the action of impression
is forced, and the action of self-figuring is free;
Wherefore the comparison of the forced motions of a
string, rope, watch, or the like, can have no place here;
for though the rope, made of flax or hemp, may have
the perception of a Vegetable, yet not of the hand, or
the like, that touched or struck it; and although the
hand doth occasion the rope to move in such a manner,
yet it is not the motion of the hand, by which it moveth,
and when it ceases, its natural and inherent power to
move is not lessened; like as a man, that hath left off carving
or painting, hath no less skill then he had before,
neither is that skill lost when he plays upon the Lute or
Virginals, or plows, plant, and the like, but he hath
onely altered his action, as from carving to painting, or
from painting to playing, and so to plowing and planting,
which is not through disability but choice. But
you will say, it is nevertheless a cessation of such a motion.
I grant it: but the ceasing of such a motion is not
the ceasing of self-moving matter from all motions, neither
is cessation as much as annihilation, for the motion
lies in the power of the matter to repeat it, as oft it will, if
it be not overpowred, for more parts, or more strength,
or more motions may over-power the less; Wherefore
forced, or artificial and free Natural motions are different
in their effects, although they have but one Cause,
which is the self-moving matter, and though Matter is
but active and passive, yet there is great Variety, and
so great difference in force and liberty, objects and perceptions,ceptions, H1r 25
sense and reason, and the like. But to conclude,
perception is not made by the pressure of objects,
no more then hemp is made by the Rope-maker, or metal
by the Bell-foundersounder or Ringer, and yet neither
the rope nor the metal is without sense and reason,
but the natural motions of the metal, and the artificail
motions of the Ringer are different; wherefore a natural
effect in truth cannot be produced from an artificial
cause, neither can the ceasing of particular forced
or artificial motions be a proof for the ceasing of general,
natural, free motions, as that matter is self should
cease to move; for there is no such thing as rest in Nature,
but there is an alteration of motions and figures in
self-moving matter, which alteration causeth variety as
well in opinions, as in every thing else; Wherefore in
my opinion, though sense alters, yet it doth not decay,
for the rational and sensitive part of matter is as lasting as
matter it self, but that which is named decay of sense, is
onely the alteration of motions, and not an obscurity of
motions, like as the motions of memory and forgetfulness,
and the repetition of the same motions is called
remembrance. And thus much of this subject for the
present, to which I add no more but rest

Madam

Your faithful Friend,
and Servant.

H Ma- H1v 26

VI

Madam

Your Authour discoursing of Imagination, saith,
“That as soon as any object is removed from our
Eyes, though the Impression that is made in us, remain,
yet other objects more present succeeding and working
on us, the Imagination of the past is obscured and made
weak.” Leviathan,
INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.part.I.c.2.
To which I answer, first, that he conceives Sense
and Imagination to be all one, for he says, “Imagination
is nothing else, but a fading or decaying sense;”
whereas in
my opinion they are different, not onely their matter,
but their motions also being distinct and different;
for Imagination is a rational perception, and sense a sensitive
perception; wherefore as much as the rational matter
differs from the sensitive, as much doth Imagination
differ from Sense. Next I say, that Impressions do not
remain in the body of sensitive matter, but it is in its power
to make or repeat the like figures; Neither is Imagination
less, when the object is absent, then when present,
but the figure patterned out in the sensitive organs,
being altered, and remaining onely in the Rational part
of matter, is not so perspicuous and clear, as when it was
both in the Sense and in the Mind: And to prove that
Imagination of things past doth not grow weaker by distance
of time, as your Authour says, many a man in his
old age, will have as perfect an Imagination of what is past
in his younger years, as if he saw it present. And as
for your Authours opinion, that “Imagination and Memory
are one and the same”
, I grant, that they are made of H2r 27
of one kind of Matter; but although the Matter is
one and the same, yet several motions in the several parts
make Imagination and Memory several things: As for
Example, a Man may Imagine that which never came
into his Senses, wherefore Imagination is not one and
the same thing with Memory. But your Authour
seems to make all Sense, as it were, one Motion, but
not all Motion Sense, whereas surely there is no Motion,
but is either Sensitive or Rational; for Reason is
but a pure and refined Sense, and Sense a grosser Reason.
Yet all sensitive and rational Motions are not one
and the same; for forced or Artificial Motions, though
they proceed from sensitive matter, yet are they so different
from the free and Prime Natural Motions, that
they seem, as it were, quite of another nature: And
this distinction neglected is the Cause, that many make
Appetites and Passions, Perceptions and Objects, and
the like, as one, without any or but little difference.
But having discoursed of the difference of these Motions
in my former Letter, I will not be tedious to you,
with repeating it again, but remain,

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

Ma- H2v 28

VII

Madam

Your Authours opinion, concerning Leviathan,
INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Part.I.c.2.
Dreams,
seemeth to me in some part very rational and probable,
in some part not; For when he sayes, that
“Dreams are onely Imaginations of them that sleep, which
imaginations have been before either totally or by parcels
in the Sense; and that the organs of Sense, as the Brain
and the Nerves, being benumb’d in sleep, as not easily to
be moved by external objects, those Imaginations proceed
onely from the agitation of the inward parts of mans body,
which for the connexion they have with the Brain, and
other organs, when they be distemper’d, do keep the same
in motion, whereby the Imaginations there formerly made,
appear as if a man were waking”
; This seems to my Reason
not very probable: For, first, Dreams are not absolutely
Imaginations, except we do call all Motions and
Actions of the Sensitive and Rational Matter, Imaginations.
Neither is it necessary, that all Imaginations
must have been before either totally or by parcels in the
Sense; neither is there any benumbing of the organs of
Sense in sleep. But Dreams, according to my opinion,
are made by the Sensitive and Rational Corporeal Motions,
by figuring several objects, as awake; onely the
difference is, that the Sensitive motions in Dreams work
by rote and on the inside of the Sensitive organs, when
as awake they work according to the patterns of outward
objects, and exteriously or on the outside of the Sensitive I1r 29
sensitive Organs, so that sleep or dreams are nothing
else but an alteration of motions, from moving exteriously
to move interiously, and from working after a
Pattern to work by rote: I do not say that the body
is without all exterior motions, when asleep, as breathing
and beating of the Pulse (although these motions
are rather interior then exterior,) but that onely the
sensitive organs are outwardly shut, so as not to receive
the patterns of outward Objects, nevertheless the sensitive
Motions do not cease from moving inwardly; or
on the inside of the sensitive Organs; But the rational
matter doth often, as awake, so asleep or in dreams,
make such figures, as the sensitive did never make either
from outward objects, or of its own accord; for
the sensitive hath sometimes liberty to work without
Objects, but the Rational much more, which is not
bound either to the patterns of Exterior objects, or
of the sensitive voluntary Figures. Wherefore it is
not divers distempers, as your Authour sayes, that
cause different Dreams, or Cold, or Heat; neither
are Dreams the reverse of our waking Imaginations,
nor all the Figures in Dreams are not made with their
heels up, and their heads downwards, though some
are; but this error or irregularity proceeds from want
of exterior Objects or Patterns, and by reason the
sensitive Motions work by rote; neither are the Motions
reverse, because they work inwardly asleep, and
outwardly awake, for Mad-men awake see several Figures
without Objects. In short, sleeping and waking
is somewhat after that manner, when men are
called either out of their doors, or stay within their
houses; or like a Ship, where the Mariners work I all I1v 30
all under hatches, whereof you will find more in
my Philosophical Opinions; and so taking my leave,
I rest

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

VIII

Madam

Your Author going on in his discourse of Imaginations,
says, “That, as we have no Imagination,
whereof we have not formerly had sense, in whole or in
parts; so we have not Transition from one Imagination to
another, whereof we never had the like before in our senses.”
Leviathan,
part.I.c.3.
To which my answer is in short, that the Rational
part of Matter in one composed figure, as in Man, or
the like Creature, may make such figures, as the senses
did never make in that composed Figure or Creature;
And though your Authour reproves those that say,
“Imaginations rise of themselves;” INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.part.I. c.2. yet, if the self-moving
part of Matter, which I call Rational, makes Imaginations,
they must needs rise of themselves; for the Rational
part of matter being free and self-moving, depends
upon nothing, neither Sense nor Object, I mean, so, as
not to be able to work without them. Next, when
your Author, defining Understanding, says that it is
nothing else, but “an Imagination raised by words or other I2r 31
other volutary signs,” ibid. c. 3.
My Answer is, that Understanding,
and so Words and Signs are made by self-moving
Matter, that is, Sense and Reason, and not Sense and
Reason by Words and Signs; wherefore Thoughts
are not like “Water upon a plain Table, which is drawn and
guided by the finger this or that way,” ibid.
for every Part of
self-moving matter is not alwayes forced, perswaded or
directed, for if all the Parts of Sense and Reason were ruled
by force or perswasion, not any wounded Creature
would fail to be healed, or any disease to be cured by
outward Applications, for outward Applications to
Wounds and Diseases might have more force, then any
Object to the Eye: But though there is great affinity
and sympathy between parts, yet there is also great difference
and antipathy betwixt them, which is the cause
that many objects cannot with all their endeavours
work such effects upon the Interiour parts, although
they are closely press’d, for Impressions of objects do
not always affect those parts they press. Wherefore,
I am not of your Author’s opinion, that all Parts of
Matter press one another; It is true, Madam, there
cannot be any part single, but yet this doth not prove,
that parts must needs press each other: And as for his
Train of Thoughts, I must confess, that Thoughts for
the most part are made orderly, but yet they do not
follow each other like Geese, for surely, man has sometimes
very different thoughts; as for Example, a man
sometime is very sad for the death of his Friend, and
thinks of his own death, and immediately thinks of a
wanton Mistress, which later thought, surely, the
thought of Death did not draw in; wherefore, though
some thought may be the Ring-leader of others, yet many I2v 32
many are made without leaders. Again, your Authour
in his description of the Mind sayes, that “the discourse
of the mind, when it it is govern’d by design, is nothing
but seeking, or the Faculty of Invention; a hunting
out of the Causes of some Effects, present or past; or
of the Effects of some present or past Cause. Sometimes a
man seeks what he has lost, and from that Place and Time
wherein he misses it, his mind runs back from place to place,
and time to time, to find where and when he had it, that
is to say, to find some certain and limited Time and Place,
in which to begin a method of Seeking. And from thence
his thoughts run over the same places and times to find
what action or other occasion might make him lose it. This
we call Remembrance or calling to mind. Sometimes a man
knows a place determinate, within the compass whereof
he is to seek, and then his thoughtsthoughts run over all the Parts
thereof in the same manner as one would sweep a room
to find a Jewel, or as a Spaniel ranges the field till he find
a sent; or as a Man should run over the Alphabet to
start a Rime.”
Thus far your Author: In which discourse
I do not perceive that he defineth what the Mind
is, but I say, that if, according to his opinion, nothing
moves it self, but one thing moves another, then the
Mind must do nothing, but move backward and forward,
nay, onely forward, and if all actions were
thrusting or pressing of parts, it would be like a crowd
of People, and there would be but little or no motion,
for the crowd would make a stoppage, like water in a
glass, the mouth of the Glass being turned downwards,
no water can pass out, by reason the numerous drops
are so closely press’d, as they cannot move exteriously.
Next, I cannot conceive how the Mind can run back either K1r 33
either to Time or Place, for as for Place, the mind is inclosed
in the body, and the running about in the parts
of the body or brain will not inform it of an Exterior
place or object; besides, objects being the cause of the
minds motion, it must return to its Cause, and so move
until it come to the object, that moved it first, so that
the mind must run out of the body to that object, which
moved it to such a Thought, although that object
were removed out of the World (as the phrase is:) But
for the mind to move backward, to Time past, is more
then it can do; Wherefore in my opinion, Remembrance,
or the like, is onely a repetition of such Figures
as were like to the Objects; and for Thoughts
in Particular, they are several figures, made by the
mind, which is the Rational Part of matter, in its own
substance, either voluntarily, or by imitation, whereof
you may see more in my Book of Philosophical Opinions.
Hence I conclude, that Prudence is nothing
else, but a comparing of Figures to Figures, and of the
several actions of those Figures, as repeating former
Figures, and comparing them to others of the like nature,
qualities, proprieties, as also chances, fortunes, &c.
Which figuring and repeating is done actually, in and
by the Rational Matter, so that all the observation of
the mind on outward Objects is onely an actual repetition
of the mind, as moving in such or such figures and
actions; and when the mind makes voluntary Figures
with those repeated Figures, and compares them together,
this comparing is Examination; and when several
Figures agree and joyn, it is Conclusion or Judgment:
likewise doth Experience proceed from repeating
and comparing of several Figures in the Mind, and K the K1v 34
the more several Figures are repeated and compared, the
greater the experience is. One thing more there is in
the same Chapter, which I cannot let pass without examination;
Your Authour says, That “things Present
onely have a being in Nature, things Past onely a being
in the Memory, but things to come have no being at all;”

Which how it possibly can be, I am not able to conceive;
for certainly, if nothing in nature is lost or annihilated,
what is past, and what is to come, hath as well
a being, as what is present; and if that which is now, had
its being before, why may it not also have its being hereafter?
It might as well be said, that what is once forgot,
cannot be remembred; for whatsoever is in Nature,
has as much a being as the Mind, and there is
not any action, or motion, or figure, in Nature, but
may be repeated, that is, may return to its former Figure,
when it is altered and dissolved; But by reason
Nature delights in variety, repetitions are not so frequently
made, especially of those things or creatures,
which are composed by the sensitive corporeal motions
in the inanimate part of Matter, because they are not so
easily wrought, as the Rational matter can work upon its
own parts, being more pliant in its self, then the Inanimate
matter is; And this is the reason, that there are
so many repetitions of one and the same Figure in the
Rational matter, which is the Mind, but seldom any in
the Gross and inanimate part of Matter, for Nature
loves ease and freedom: But to conclude, Madam, I
perceive your Author confines Sense onely to Animalkind,
and Reason onely to Man-kind: Truly, it is
out of self-love, when one Creature prefers his own Excellency
before another, for nature being endued with self- K2r 35
self-love, all Creatures have self-love too, because they
are all Parts of Nature; and when Parts agree or disagree,
it is out of Interest and Self-love; but Man herein
exceeds all the rest, as having a supernatural Soul, whose
actions also are supernatural; To which I leave him;
and rest,

Madam

Your faithful Friend,
and Servant

IX

Madam

When your Author discourseth of the use of
Speech or Words and Names, he is pleas’d to
say “That their use is to serve for marks and
notes of Remembrance;” Leviathan,
INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.part.I.c.4.
Whereof to give you my opinion,
I say, That Speech is natural to the shape of
Man; and though sometimes it serves for marks or notes
of remembrance, yet it doth not always, for all other
Animals have Memory without the help of Speech, and
so have deaf and dumb men, nay more than those that
hear and speak: Wherefore, though Words are useful
to the mind, and so to the memory, yet both can be
without them, whereas Words cannot be without Memory;
for take a Bird and teach him to speak, if he had
not Memory, before he heard the words, he could never
learn them. You will ask me, Madam, What then, is K2v 36
is Memory the Cause of Speech? I answer, Life and
Knowledg, which is Sense and Reason, as it creates and
makes all sorts of Creatures, so also amongst the rest it
makes Words: And as I said before, that Memory
may be without the help of Speech or Words, so I say
also, that there is a possibility of reckoning of numbers,
as also of magnitudes, of swiftness, of force, and other
things without words, although your Author denies it:
But some men are so much for Art, as they endeavour
to make Art, which is onely a Drudgery-maid of Nature,
the chief Mistress, and Nature her Servant, which
is as much as to prefer Effects before the Cause, Nature
before God, Discord before Unity and Concord.

Again, your Author, in his Chapter of INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Ch.5. Reason,
defines Reason to be nothing else but Reckoning: I answer,
That in my opinion Reckoning is not Reason it
self, but onely an effect or action of Reason; for Reason,
as it is the chiefest and purest degree of animate
matter, works variously and in divers motions, by
which it produces various and divers effects, which are
several Perceptions, as Conception, Imagination, Fancy,
Memory, Remembrance, Understanding, Judgment,
Knowledg, and all the Passions, with many more:
Wherefore this Reason is not in one undivided part,
nor bound to one motion, for it is in every Creature
more or less, and moves in its own parts variously; and
in some Creatures, as for example, in some men, it moves
more variously then in others, which is the cause that
some men are more dull and stupid, then others; neither
doth Reason always move in one Creature regularly,
which is the cause, that some men are mad or foolish:
And though all men are made by the direction of Reason, L1r 37
Reason, and endued with Reason, from the first time
of their birth, yet all have not the like Capacities, Understandings,
Imaginations, Wits, Fancies, Passions, &c.
but some more, some less, and some regular, some irregular,
according to the motions of Reason or Rational
part of animate matter; and though some rational parts
may make use of other rational Parts, as one man of another
mans Conceptions, yet all these parts cannot associate
together; as for example, all the Material parts
of several objects, no not their species, cannot enter or
touch the eye without danger of hurting or loosing it,
nevertheless the eye makes use of the objects by patterning
them out, and so doth the rational matter, by taking
patterns from the sensitive; And thus knowledg or perception
of objects, both sensitive and rational, is taken
without the pressure of any other parts; for though
parts joyn to parts, (for no part can be single) yet this
joining doth not necessarily infer the pressure of objects
upon the sensitive organs; Whereof I have already
discoursed sufficiently heretofore, to which I refer you,
and rest

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

L MA- L1v 38

X

Madam

“Understanding”, says your Author, “is nothing
else but Conception caused by speech, and therefore,
if speech be peculiar to man, (as, for ought I know, it
is) then is understanding peculiar to him also.” Leviathan,
INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.part.I.c.4.
Where he
confineth Understanding onely to speech and to Mankind;
But, by his leave, Madam, I surely believe,
that there is more understanding in Nature, then that,
which is in speech, for if there were not, I cannot conceive,
how all the exact forms in Generations could be
produced, or how there could be such distinct degrees
of several sorts and kinds of Creatures, or distinctions
of times and seasons, and so many exact motions and
figures in Nature: Considering all this, my reason
perswadeth me, that all Understanding, which is a part
of Knowledg, is not caused by speech, for all the motions
of the Celestial Orbs are not made by speech, neither
is the knowledg or understanding which a man
hath, when sick, as to know or understand he is sick,
made by speech, nor by outward objects, especially in
a disease he never heard, nor saw, nor smelt, nor tasted,
nor touched; Wherefore all Perception, Sensation,
Memory, Imagination, Appetite, Understanding,
and the like, are not made nor caused by outward
objects, nor by speech. And as for names of things,
they are but different postures of the figures in our
mind or thoughts, made by the Rational Matter; But reasoning L2r 39
Reasoning is a comparing of the several figures., with
their several postures and actions in the Mind, which
joyned with the several words, made by the sensitive motions,
inform another distinct and separate part, as an
other man, of their minds conceptions, understanding,
opinions, and the like.

Concerning Addition and Substraction, wherein
your Author sayes Reasoning consists, I grant, that it
is an act of Reasoning, yet it doth not make Sense or
Reason, which is Life and Knowledge, but Sense and
Reason which is self-motion, makes addition and substraction
of several Parts of matter; for had matter not
self-motion, it could not divide nor compose, nor make
such varieties, without great and lingring retardments,
if not confusion. Wherefore all, what is made in
Nature, is made by self-moving matter, which self-
moving matter doth not at all times move regularly, but
often irregularly, which causes false Logick, false Arithmetick,
and the like; and if there be not a certainty
in these self-motions or actions of Nature, much less in
Art, which is but a secundary action; and therefore,
neither speech, words, nor exterior objects cause Understanding
or Reason. And although many parts of
the Rational and Sensitive Matter joyned into one, may
be stronger by their association, and over-power other
parts that are not so well knit and united, yet these are
not the less pure; onely these Parts and Motions being
not equal in several Creatures, make their Knowledge
and Reason more or less: For, when a man hath more
Rational Matter well regulated, and so more Wisdom
then an other, that same man may chance to overpower
the other, whose Rational Matter is more irregulargular, L2v 40
, but yet not so much by strength of the united
Parts, as by their subtilty; for the Rational Matter
moving regularly, is more strong with subtilty, then
the sensitive with force; so that Wisdom is stronger
then Life, being more pure, and so more active; for in
my opinion, there is a degree of difference between
Life and Knowledge, as my Book of Philosophical Opinions
will inform you.

Again, your Author sayes, “That Man doth excel all
other Animals in this faculty, that when he conceives any
thing whatsoever, he is apt to enquire the Consequences of
it, and what effects he can do with it: Besides this”
(sayes
he) “Man hath an other degree of Excellence, that he
can by Words reduce the Consequences he finds to General
Rules called Theoremes or Aphorisms, that is, he can
reason or reckon not onely in Number, but in all other
things, whereof one may be added unto, or substracted
from an other.”
To which I answer, That according to
my Reason I cannot perceive, but that all Creatures
may do as much; but by reason they do it not after the
same manner or way as Man, Man denies, they can do
it at all; which is very hard; for what man knows,
whether Fish do not Know more of the nature of Water,
and ebbing and flowing, and the saltness of the
Sea? or whether Birds do not know more of the nature
and degrees of Air, or the cause of Tempests?
or whether Worms do not know more of the nature of
Earth, and how Plants are produced? or Bees of the
several sorts of juices of Flowers, then Men? And
whether they do not make there Aphorismes and Theoremes
by their manner of Intelligence? For, though
they have not the speech of Man, yet thence doth not follow, M1r 41
follow, that they have no Intelligence at all. But the
Ignorance of Men concerning other Creatures is the
cause of despising other Creatures, imagining themselves
as petty Gods in Nature, when as Nature is not capable
to make one God, much less so many as Mankind;
and were it not for Mans supernatural Soul, Man would
not be more Supreme, then other Creatures in Nature,
“But” (says your Author) “this Priviledge in Man is allay’d
by another, which is, No living Creature is subject
to absurdity, but onely Man.”
Certainly, Madam, I
believe the contrary, to wit, that all other Creatures do
as often commit mistakes and absurdities as Man, and if
it were not to avoid tediousness, I could present sufficient
proofs to you: Wherefore I think, not onely
Man but also other Creatures may be Philosophers and
subject to absurdities as aptly as Men; for Man doth,
nor cannot truly know the Faculties, and Abilities or
Actions of all other Creatures, no not of his own
Kind as Man-Kind, for if he do measure all men by
himself he will be very much mistaken, for what he
conceives to be true or wise, an other may conceive to
be false and foolish. But Man may have one way of
Knowledge in Philosophy and other Arts, and other
Creatures another way, and yet other Creatures manner
or way may be as Intelligible and Instructive to
each other as Man’s, I mean, in those things which
are Natural. Wherefore I cannot consent to what
your Author says, “That Children are not endued with
Reason at all, till they have attained to the use of Speech”
;
for Reason is in those Creatures which have not Speech,
witness Horses, especially those which are taught in
the manage, and many other Animals. And as for the M weak M1v 42
weak understanding in Children, I have discoursed
thereof in my Book of Philosophy; The rest of this
discourse, lest I tyre you too much at once, I shall reserve
for the next, resting in the mean time,

Madam

Your faithful Friend,
and Servant

XI

Madam

I sent you word in my last, that your Author’s opinion
is, “That Children are not endued with Reason at
all, until they have attained to the use of Speech”
, in
the same INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Ch.4. Chapter he speaks to the same purpose thus:
“Reason is not as Sense and Memory born with us, nor gotten
by experience onely, as Prudence is, but attained by
industry.”
To which I reply onely this, That it might
as well be said, a Child when new born hath not flesh
and blood, because by taking in nourishment or food,
the Child grows to have more flesh and blood; or, that
a Child is not born with two legs, because he cannot go,
or with two arms and hands, because he cannot help
himself; or that he is not born with a tongue, because
he cannot speak: For although Reason doth not move
in a Child as in a Man, in Infancy as in Youth, in
Youth as in Age, yet that doth not prove that Children
are without Reason, because they cannot run and prate: I M2r 43
I grant, some other Creatures appear to have more
Knowledg when new born then others; as for example,
a young Foal has more knowledg than a young Child,
because a Child cannot run and play; besides a Foal
knows his own Dam, and can tell where to take his food,
as to run and suck his Dam, when as an Infant cannot
do so, nor all beasts, though most of them can, but
yet this doth not prove, that a Child hath no reason at
all; Neither can I perceive that man is a Monopoler of
all Reason, or Animals of all Sense, but that Sense and
Reason are in other Creatures as well as in Man and Animals;
for example, Drugs, as Vegetables and Minerals,
although they cannot slice, pound or infuse, as
man can, yet they can work upon man more subtilly,
wisely, and as sensibly either by purging, vomiting,
spitting, or any other way, as man by mincing, pounding
and infusing them, and Vegetables will as wisely
nourish Men, as Men can nourish Vegetables; Also
some Vegetables are as malicious and mischievous to
Man, as Man is to one another, witness Hemlock,
Nightshade, and many more; and a little Poppy will
as soon, nay sooner cause a Man to sleep, though silently,
then a Nurse a Child with singing and rocking; But
because they do not act in such manner or way as Man,
Man judgeth them to be without sense and reason; and
because they do not prate and talk as Man, Man believes
they have not so much wit as he hath; and because
they cannot run and go, Man thinks they are not
industrious; the like for Infants concerning Reason. But
certainly, it is not local motion or speech the makes
sense and reason, but sense and reason makes them; neither
is sense and reason bound onely to the actions of Man, M2v 44
Man, but it is free to the actions, forms, figures and
proprieties of all Creatures; for if none but Man had
reason, and none but Animals sense, the World could
not be so exact, and so well in order as it is: but Nature
is wiser then Man with all his Arts, for these are
onely produced through the variety of Natures actions,
and disputes through the superfluous varieties of Mans
follies or ignorances, not knowing Natures powerful
life and knowledg: But I wonder, Madam, your Author
says in this place, “That Reason is not born with
Man,”
when as in another In his Elements
of Philosophy,

INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.part.I.c.I.
art.I.
place, he says,
“That every
man brought Philosophy, that is Natural reason with him
into the World”
; Which how it agree, I will leave to others
to judg, and to him to reconcile it, remaining in the
mean time,

Madam

Your Constant Friend
and Faithful Servant

XII

Madam

Two sorts of motions, I find your Author Leviathan,
INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.part.I.c.6.
doth
attribute to Animals, viz. “Vital and Animal, the
Vital motions,”
says he, “are begun in Generation,
and continued without Interruption through their whole life,
and those are the Course of the Blood, the Pulse, the
Breathing, Conviction, Nutrition, Excretion, &c. to which N1r 45
which motions there needs no help of Imaginations; But
the animal Motions, otherwise called voluntary Motions,
are to go, to speak, to move any of our limbs, in such
manner as is first fancied in our minds: And because going,
speaking, and the like voluntary motions, depend always
upon a precedent thought of whither, which way, and what,
it is evident, that the Imagination is the first Internal beginning
of all voluntary Motion”
. Thus far your Author.
Whereof in short I give you my opinion, first concerning
Vital Motions, that it appears improbable if
not impossible to me, that Generation should be the
cause and beginning of Life, because Life must of necessity
be the cause of Generation, life being the Generator
of all things, for without life motion could not be,
and without motion not any thing could be begun, increased,
perfected, or dissolved. Next, that Imagination
is not necessry to Vital Motions, it is probable
it may not, but yet there is required Knowledg, which
I name Reason; for if there were not Knowledg in all
Generations or Productions, there could not any distinct
Creature be made or produced, for then all Generations
would be confusedly mixt, neither would there be any
distinct kinds or sorts of Creatures, nor no different Faculties,
Proprieties, and the like. Thirdly, concerning
Animal Motions, which your Author names “Voluntary
Motions, as to go, to speak, to move any of our limbs,
in such manner as is first fancied in our minds, and that they
depend upon a precedent thought of whither, which way, and
what, and that Imagination is the first Internal beginning
of them”
; I think, by your Authors leave, it doth
imply a contradiction, to call them Voluntary Motions,
and yet to say they are caused and depend upon our N Imagina- N1v 46
Imagination; for if the Imagination draws them this
way, or that way, how can they be voluntary motions,
being in a manner forced and necessitated to move according
to Fancy or Imagination? But when he goes
on in the same place and treats of Endeavour, Appetite,
Desire, Hunger, Thirst, Aversion, Love, Hate, and the
like, he derives one from the other, and treats well as a
Moral Philosopher; but whether it be according to the
truth or probability of Natural Pilosophy, I will leave
to others to judge, for in my opinion Passions and Appetites
are very different, Appetites being made by the
motions of the sensitive Life, and Passions, as also Imagination,
Memory, &c. by the motions of the rational
Life, which is the cause that Appetites belong more to
the actions of the Body then the Mind: ’Tis true, the
Sensitive and Rational self-moving matter doth so much
resemble each other in their actions, as it is difficult to distinguish
them. But having treated hereof at large in
my other Philosophical Work, to cut off repetitions, I
will refer you to that, and desire you to compare our
opinions together: But certainly there is so much variety
in one and the same sort of Passions, and so of Appetites,
as it cannot be easily express’d. To conclude, I do not
perceive that your Author tells or expresses what the
cause is of such or such actions, onely he mentions their
dependance, which is, as if a man should converse with
a Nobleman’s Friend or Servant, and not know the
Lord himself. But leaving him for this time, it is sufficient
to me, that I know your Ladyship, and your Ladyship
knows me, that I am,

Madam

Your faithful Friend, and humble Servant.

MA- N2r 47

XIII

Madam

Having obey’d your Commands in giving you
my opinion of the First Part of the Book of
that famous and learned Author you sent me, I
would go on; but seeing he treats in his following Parts
of the Politicks, I was forced to stay my Pen, because of
these following Reasons. First, That a Woman is not
imployed in State Affairs, unless an absolute Queen.
Next, That to study the Politicks, is but loss of Time,
unless a man were sure to be a Favourite to an absolute
Prince. Thirdly, That it is but a deceiving Profession,
and requires more Craft then Wisdom. All which
considered, I did not read that part of your Author: But
as for his Natural Philosophy, I will send you my opinion
so far as I understand it: For what belongs to Art,
as to Geometry, being no Scholar, I shall not trouble my
self withal. And so I’l take my leave of you, when I
have in two or three words answered the Question you
sent me last, which was, Whether Nature be the Art
of God, Man the Art of Nature, and a Politick Government
the Art of Man? To which I answer, ’Tis
probable it may be so; onely I add this, That Nature
doth not rule God, nor Man Nature, nor Politick Government
Man; for the Effect cannot rule the Cause,
but the Cause doth rule the Effect: Wherefore if men
do not naturally agree, Art cannot make unity amongst
them, or associate them into one Politick Body and so rule N2v 48
rule them; But man thinks he governs, when as it is Nature
that doth it, for as nature doth unite or divide parts
regularly or irregularly, and moves the several minds of
men and the several parts of mens bodies, so war is
made or peace kept: Thus it is not the artificial form
that governs men in a Politick Government, but a natural
power, for though natural motion can make artificial
things, yet artificial things cannot make natural power;
and we might as well say, nature is governed by
the art of nature, as to say man is ruled by the art and invention
of men. The truth is, Man rules an artificial
Government, and not the Government Man, just
like as a Watch-maker rules his Watch, and not the
Watch the Watch-maker. And thus I conclude and
rest,

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

XIV

Madam

Concerning the other Book of that learned Author
Hobbs you sent me, called Elements of Philosophy,
I shall likewise according to your desire,
give you my judgment and opinion of it as I have done
of the former, not that I intend to prejudice him any
ways thereby, but onely to mark those places wherein I O1r 49
I seem to dissent from his opinions, which liberty, I
hope, he will not deny me; And in order to this, I have
read over the first Chapter of the mentioned Book,
treating of Philosophy in General, wherein amongst the
rest, discoursing of the Utility of Natural Philosophy,
and relating the commodities and benefits which proceed
from so many arts and sciences, he is pleased to say,
INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Art.7. that they are “injoyed almost by all people of Europe, Asia,
and some of Africa, onely the Americans, and those
that live neer the Poles do want them: But why”
, says he,
“have they sharper wits then these? Have not all men one
kind of soul, and the same faculties of mind?”
To which,
give me leave, Madam, to add, That my opinion is, that
there is a difference between the Divine and the Natural
soul of man, and though the natural mind or soul
is of one kind, yet being made of rational matter, it is
divideable and composeable, by which division and
composition, men may have more or less wit, or quicker
and slower wit; the like for Judgments, Imaginations,
Fancies, Opinions, &c. For were the natural rational
mind individeable, all men would have the like degree
of wit or understanding, all men would be Philosophers
or fools, which by reason they are not, it proves the
natural rational mind is divideable and composeable, making
variations of its own several parts by self-motion;
for it is not the several outward objects, or forreign instructions,
that make the variety of the mind; neither
is wit or ingenuity alike in all men; for some are natural
Poets, Philosophers, and the like, without learning,
and some are far more ingenious then others, although
their breeding is obscure and mean, Neither will learning
make all men Scholars, for some will continue Dunces O all O1v 50
all their life time; Neither doth much experience make
all men wise, for some are not any ways advanced in
their wisdom by much and long experiences; And as
for Poetry, it is according to the common Proverb, a
“Poet is born, not made;” Indeed learning doth rather hurt
Fancy, for great Scholars are not always good Poets,
nor all States-men Natural Philosophers, nor all Experrienced
Men Wise Men, nor all Judges Just, nor all
Divines Pious, nor all Pleaders or Preachers Eloquent,
nor all Moral Philosophers Vertuous; But all this is
occasioned by the various Motions of the rational self-
moving matter, which is the Natural Mind. And
thus much for the present of the difference of wits and
faculties of the mind; I add no more, but rest,

Madam

Your faithful Friend,
and Servant

XV

Madam

My Discourse for the present shall be of Infinite,
and the question shall be first Whether several
Finite parts, how many soever there be, can make an
Infinite
. Your Author says Elem. of
Philos.
INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.c.7.
a.12.
that several Finite parts
when they are all put together make a whole Finite”
; which,
if his meaning be of a certain determinate number, how
big soever, of finite parts, I do willingly grant, for all what O2r 51
what is determinate and limited, is not Infinite but Finite;
neither is there any such thing, as Whole or All in
Infinite; but if his meaning be, that no Infinite can be
made of finite parts, though infinite in number, I deny it;
Next he says “there can be no such thing as One in Infinite,
because No thing can be said One, except there be another
to compare it withal”
; which in my opinion doth not
follow, for there is but One God, who is Infinite, and
hath none other to be compared withal, and so there
may be but one Onely Infinite in Nature, which is
Matter: But when he says, “there cannot be an Infinite
and Eternal Division”
, is very true, viz, in this sense,
that one single part cannot be actually infinitely divided,
for the Compositions hinder the Divisions in Nature,
and the Divisions the Compositions, so that Nature,
being Matter, cannot be composed so, as not to have
parts, nor divided so, as that her parts should not be
composed, but there are nevertheless infinite divided
parts in Nature, and in this sense there may also be infinite
divisions, as I have declared in my INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.P.I.c.8. Book of Philosophy.
And thus there are Infinite divisions of Infinite
parts in Nature, but not Infinite actual divisions of
one single part; But though Infinite is without end, yet
my discourse of it shall be but short and end here, though
not my affection, which shall last and continue with the
life of

Madam

Your Faithful Friend
and Humble Servant:

MA- O2v 52

XVI

Madam

“An Accident”, says your Author, “is nothing else, but
the manner of our Conception of body,” Elem. of
Philos
INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.c.8.
art.2.
or “that Faculty
of any body, by which it works in us a Conception
of it self;”
To which I willingly consent; but yet
I say, that these qualities cannot be separated from the
body, for as impossible it is that the essnce of Nature
should be separable from Nature, as impossible is it that
the various modes or alterations, either of Figures or
Motions, should be separable from matter or body;
Wherefore when he goes on, and says, “An accident is
not a body, but in a body, yet not so, as if any thing were
contained therein, as if for example, redness were in blood
in the same manner as blood is in a bloody cloth; but as
magnitude is in that which is great, rest in that which resteth,
motion in that which is moved;” INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Art.3.
I answer, that in
my opinion, not any thing in Nature can be without a
body, and that redness is as well in blood, as blood is in
a bloody cloth, or any other colour in any thing else; for
there is no colour without a body, but every colour hath
as well a body as any thing else, and if Colour be a separable
accident, I would fain know, how it can be separated
from a subject, being bodiless, for that which is no
body is nothing, and nothing cannot be taken away
from any thing; Wherefore as for natural Colour it
cannot be taken away from any creature, without the
parts of its substance or body; and as for artificial Colours,lours, P1r 53
when they are taken away, it is a separation of
two bodies, which joyned together; and if Colour, or
Hardness, or Softness do change, it is nothing else but
an alteration of motions and not an annihilation, for all
changes and altertions remain in the power of Corporeal
motions, as I have said in other places; for we might
as well say, life doth not remain in nature, when a body
turns from an animal to some other figure, as believe that
those, they name accidents, do not remain in Corporeal
Motions; Wherefore I am not of your Authors mind;
when he says, INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Art.20. that “when a White thing is made black,
the whiteness perishes”
; for it cannot perish, although it
is altered from white to black, being in the power of the
same matter, to turn it again from black to white, so as
it may make infinite Repetitions of the same thing; but
by reason nature takes delight in variety, she seldom uses
such repetitions; nevertheless that doth not take away
the Power of self-moving matter, for it doth not;
and it cannot, are two several things, and the latter
doth not necessarily follow upon the former; Wherefore
not any, the least thing, can perish in Nature, for
if this were possible, the whole body of nature might
perish also, for if so many Figures and Creatures should
be annihilated and perish without any supply or new
Creation, Nature would grow less, and at last become
nothing; besides it is as difficult for Nature to turn something
into nothing, as to Create something out of nothing;
Wherefore as there is no annihilation or perishing
in Nature, so there is neither any new Creation in
Nature. But your Author makes a difference between
bodies and accidents, saying, “that bodies are things and
not Generated, but accidents are Generated and not things: P1v 54
things.”
Truly, Madam, these accidents seem to me
to be like Van Helmont’s Lights, Gases, Blazes and
Ideas; and Dr More’s Immaterial Substances or Dæmons,
onely in this Dr More’s hath the better, that his
Immaterial Substances, are beings, which subsist of
themselves, whereas accidents do not, but their existence
is in other bodies; But what they call Accidents,
are in my opinion nothing else but Corporeal Motions,
and if these accidents be generated, they must needs be
bodies, for how nothing can be Generated in nature, is
not conceivable, and yet your Author denies, INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Art.22. that
“Accidents are something, namely some part of a natural
thing”
; But as for Generations, they are onely various
actions of self-moving matter, or a variety of Corporeal
Motions, and so are all Accidents whatsoever, so that
there is not any thing in nature, that can be made new,
or destroyed, for whatsoever was and shall be, is in
nature, though not always in act, yet in power, as in the
nature and power of Corporeal motions, which is self-
moving matter, And as there is no new Generation of
Accidents, so there is neither a new Generation of Motions;
wherefore when your Author says, “That, when
the hand, being moved, moveth the pen, the motion doth
not go out of the hand into the pen, for so the writing might
be continued, though the hand stood still, but a new motion
is generated in the pen, and is the pens motion:” INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Art.21.
I am of his
opinion, that the motion doth not go out of the hand
into the pen, and that the motion of the pen, is the pens
own motion; but I deny, that after holding the hand a
little while still, and beginning to write again, a new
motion of the pen is generated; for it is onely a repetition,
and not a new generation, for the Hand, Pen and P2r 55
and Ink, repeat but the same motion or action of
writing: Besides, Generation is made by Connexion
or Conjunction of parts, moving by consent to such
or such Figures, but the motion of the Hand or the
Pen is always one and the same; wherefore it is but
the variation and repetition in and of the same motion
of the Hand, or Pen, which may be continued
in that manner infinitely, just as the same Corporeal
Motions can make infinite variations and repetitions
of one and the same Figure, repeating it as
oft as they please, as also making Copy of Copy;
And although I do not deny, but there are Generations
in Nature, yet not annihilations or perishings,
for if any one motion or figure should perish, the
matter must perish also; and if any one part of matter
can perish, all the matter in nature may perish
also; and if there can any new thing be made or
created in nature, which hath not been before, there
may also be a new Nature, and so by perishings and new
Creations, this World would not have continued an
age; But surely whatsoever is in Nature, hath been existent
always. Wherefore to conclude, it is not the
generation and perishing of an Accident that makes
its subject to be changed, but the production and alteration
of the Form, makes it said to be generated
or destroyed, for matter will change its motions
and figures without perishing or annihilating;
and whether there were words or not, there would
be such causes and effects; But having not the
art of Logick to dispute with artificial words, nor
the art of Geometry to demonstrate my opinions by
Mathematical Figures, I fear they will not be so well P2v 56
well received by the Learned; However, I leave
them to any mans unprejudiced Reason and Judgment,
and devote my self to your service, as becomes,

Madam

Your Ladiships
humble and faithful Servant

XVII

Madam

Your Author concerning Place and Magnitude
says, that “Place is nothing out of the mind, nor
Magnitude any thing within it; for Place is a meer
Phantasme of a body of such quantity and figure, and
Magnitude a peculiar accident of the body;” INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Part 2.0.8
S.
section
5.
But this doth
not well agree with my reason, for I believe that Place,
Magnitude and Body are but one thing, and that
Place is as true an extension as Magnitude, and not a
feigned one; Neither am I of his opinion, “that Place
is Immoveable”
, but that place moves, according as the
body moveth, for not any body wants place, because
place and body is but one thing, and wheresoever is
body, there is also place, and wheresoever is place, there
is body, as being one and the same; Wherefore “Motion
cannot be a relinquishing of one place and acquiring another,”
INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Art.1C.
for there is no such thing as place different from
body, but what is called change of place, is nothing but Q1r 57
but change of corporeal motions; for, say an house
stands in such a place, if the house be gone, the place is
gone also, as being impossible that the place of the house
should remain, when the house is taken away; like as
a man when he is gone out of his chamber, his place is
gone too; ’Tis true, if the ground or foundation do
yet remain, one may say, there stood such an house heretofore,
but yet the place of the house is not there really
at that present, unless the same house be built up again
as it was before, and then it hath its place as before; Nevertheless
the house being not there, it cannot be said
that either place or house are annihilated, viz, when
the materials are dissolved, no not when transformed into
millions of several other figures, for the house remains
still in the power of all those several parts of matter;
and as for space, it is onely a distance betwixt some
parts or bodies; But an Empty place signifies to my opinion
Nothing, for if place and body are one and the
same, and empty is as much as nothing, then certainly
these two words cannot consist together, but are destructive
to one another. Concerning, that your Author
says, “Two bodies cannot be together in the same place, nor
one body in two places at the same time,” INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Art.8.
is very true, for
there are no more places then bodies, nor more bodies
then places, and this is to be understood as well of
the grosser, as the purest parts of nature, of the mind
as well as of the body, of the rational and sensitive animate
matter as well as of the inanimate, for there is no
matter, how pure and subtil soever, but is imbodied,
and all that hath body hath place. Likewise I am of
his opinion, “That one body hath always one and the same
magnitude;” INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Art.5.
for, in my opinion, magnitude, place and Q body Q1v 58
body do not differ, and as place, so magnitude can never
be separated from body. But when he speaks of
Rest, I cannot believe there is any such thing truly in
Nature, for it is impossible to prove, that any thing is
without Motion, either consistent, or composing, or
dissolving, or transforming motions, or the like, although
not altogether perceptible by our senses, for all the
Matter is either moving or moved, and although the
moved parts are not capable to receive the nature of self-
motion from the self-moving parts, yet these self-moving
parts, being joyned and mixt with all other parts of the
moved matter, do always move the same; for the
Moved or Inanimate part of Matter, although it is a
Part of it self, yet it is so intermixt with the self-moving
Animate Matter, as they make but one Body; and
though some parts of the Inanimate may be as pure as
the Sensitive Animate Matter, yet they are never so subtil
as to be self-moving; Wherefore the Sensitive moves
in the Inanimate, and the Rational in the Sensitive, but
often the Rational moves in it self. And, although
there is no rest in nature, nevertheless Matter could
have been without Motion, when as it is impossible that
Matter could be without place or magnitude, no more
then Variety can be without motion; And thus much
at this present: I conclude, and rest,

Madam

Your Faithful Friend
and Servant

Ma- Q2r 59

XVIII

Madam

Passing by those Chapters of your Authors, that
treat of “Power and Act”, IdentyIdentity and Difference”, “Analogisme,”
“Angle and Figure”, “Figures deficient”,
“dimension of Circles”, and several others, most of which
belong to art, as to Geometry, and the like; I am come
to that wherein he discourses of “Sense and Animal Motion,”
saying, “That some Natural bodies have in themselves
the patterns almost of all things, and others of none
at all;” INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.C.25.a.I
Whereof my opinion is, that the sensitive and
rational parts of Matter are the living and knowing parts
of Nature, and no part of nature can challenge them
onely to it self, nor no creature can be sure, that sense is
onely in Animal-kind, and reason in Man-kind; for
can any one think or believe that Nature is ignorant and
dead in all her other parts besides Animals? Truly
this is a very unreasonable opinion; for no man, as wise
as he thinks himself, nay were all Man-kind joyned into
one body, yet they are not able to know it, unless
there were no variety of parts in nature, but onely one
whole and individeable body, for other Creatures may
know and perceive as much as Animals, although they
have not the same Sensitive Organs, nor the same manner
or way of Perception. Next your Author says,
“The cause of Sense or Perception consists herein, that the
first organ of sense is touched and pressed; For when the
uttermost part of the organ is pressed, it no sooner yields, but Q2v 60
but the part next within it is pressed also, and in this manner
the pressure or motion is propagated through all the
parts of the organ to the innermost. And thus also the
pressure of the uttermost part proceeds from the pressure of
some more remote body, and so continually, till we come to
that, from which, as from its fountain, we derive the
Phantasme or Idea, that is made in us by our sense: And
this, whatsoever it be, is that we commonly call the object;
Sense therefore is some Internal motion in the Sentient,
Generated by some Internal motion of the Parts of the object,
and propagated through all the media to the innermost
part of the organ. Moreover there being a resistance or
reaction in the organ, by reason of its internal motion against
the motion propagated from the object, there is also
an endeavour in the organ opposite to the endeavour proceeding
from the object, and when that endeavour inwards
is the last action in the act of sense, then from the
reaction a Phantasme or Idea has its being.” INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Art.2.
This is your
Authors opinion, which if it were so, perception could
not be effected so suddenly, nay I think the sentient by so
many pressures in so many perceptions, would at last
be pressed to death, besides the organs would take a
great deal of hurt, nay totally be removed out of their
places, so as the eye would in time be prest into the centre
of the brain; And if there were any Resistance, Reaction
or Indeavour in the organ, opposite to the Endeavour
of the object, there would, in my opinion, be always
a war between the animal senses and the objects,
the endeavour of the objects pressing one way, and the
senses pressing the other way, and if equal in their
strengths, they would make a stop, and the sensitive organs
would be very much pained; Truly, Madam, in my R1r 61
my opinion, it would be like that Custom which formerly
hath been used at Newcastle, when a man was
married, the guests divided themselves, behind and
before the Bridegroom, the one party driving him back,
the other forwards, so that one time a Bridegroom was
killed in this fashion; But certainly Nature hath a
more quick and easie way of giving intelligence and
knowledg to her Creatures, and doth not use such constraint
and force in her actions; Neither is sense or sensitive
perception a meer Phantasme or Idea, but a Corporeal
action of the sensitive and rational matter, and
according to the variation of the objects or patterns; and
the sensitive and rational motions, the perception also is
various, produced not by external pressure, but by internal
self-motion, as I have declared heretofore; and
to prove, that the sensitive and rational corporeal motions
are the onely cause of perception; I say, if those
motions in an animal move in another way, and
not to such perceptions, then that animal can neither
hear, see, taste, smell, nor touch, although all his sensitive
organs be perfect, as is evident in a man falling into
a swoon, where all the time he is in a swoon, the pressure
of the objects is made without any effect; Wherefore,
as the sensitive and rational corporeal motions
make all that is in nature, so likewise they make perception,
as being perception it self, for all self-motion is
perception, but all perception is not animal perception,
or after an animal way; and therefore sense cannot decay
nor die, but what is called a decay or death, is no
thing else but a change or alteration of those Motions.
But you will say, Madam, it may be, that one body,
as an object, leaves the print of its figure, in the next R ad- R1v 62
adjoyning body, until it comes to the organ of sense, I
answer that then sostsoft bodies onely must be pressed, and
the object must be so hard as to make a print, and as for
rare parts of matter, they are not able to retain a print
without self-motion; Wherefore it is not probable that
the parts of air should receive a print, and print the same
again upon the adjoyning part, until the last part of the
air print it upon the eye; and that the exterior parts of
the organ should print upon the interior, till it come to
the centre of the Brain, without self-motion. Wherefore
in my opinion, Perception is not caused either by
the printing of objects, nor by pressures, for pressures
would make a general stop of all natural motions, especially
if there were any reaction or resistence of sense;
but according to my reason, the sensitive and rational
corporeal motions in one body, pattern out the Figure
of another body, as of an exterior object, which may be
done easily without any pressure or reaction; I will not
say, that there is no pressure or reaction in Nature, but
pressure and reaction doth not make perception, for the
sensitive and rational parts of matter make all perception
and variety of motion, being the most subtil parts of Nature,
as self-moving, as also divideable, and composeable,
and alterable in their figurative motions, for this
Perceptive matter can change its substance into any figure
whatsoever in nature, as being not bound to one
constant figure. But having treated hereof before, and
being to say more of it hereafter, this shall suffice for
the present, remaining always,

Madam

Your constant Friend
and faithful Servant

Ma- R2r 63

XIX

Madam

To discourse the World and Stars, is more then
I am able to do, wanting the art of Astronomy
and Geometry; wherefore passing by that Chapter
of your Author, I am come to INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Ch.27. that wherein he
treats of Light, Heat, and Colours; and to give you my
opinion of Light, I say, it is not the light of the Sun,
that makes an Animal see, for we can see inwardly in
Dreams without the Suns light, but it is the sensitive
and rational Motions in the Eye and Brain that make
such a figure as Light; For if Light did press upon the
Eye, according to your Authors opinion, it might put
the Eye into as much pain as Fire doth, when it sticks
its point into our skin or flesh. The same may be said of
Colours, for the sensitive motions make such a figure,
which is such a Colour, and such a figure, which is
such a Colour; Wherefore Light, Heat and Colour,
are not bare and bodiless qualities, but such figures
made by corporeal self-motions, and are as well real
and corporeal objects as other figures are; and when
these figures change or alter, it is onely that their motions
alter, which may alter and change heat into cold,
and light into darkness, and black colour into white. But
by reason the motions of the Sun are so constant, as the
motions of any other kind of Creatures, it is no more
subject to be altered then all the World, unless Nature
did it by the command of God; for though the Parts of R2v 64
of self-moving Matter be alterable, yet all are not altered;
and this is the reason, that the figure of Light in our eye
and brain is altered, as well as it is alterable, but not the real
figure of the Sun, neither doth the Sun enter our eyes;
and as the Light of the Sun is made or patterned in the
eye, so is the light of Glow-worms-tails, and Cats-eyes,
that shine in the dark, made not by the Sun’s, but their
own motions in their own parts; The like when we
dream of Light, the sensitive corporeal motions working
inwardly, make the figure of light on the inside of
the eye, as they did pattern out the figure of light on the
out side of the eye when awake, and the objects before
them; for the sensitive motions of the eye pattern out the
figure of the object in the eye, and the rational motions
make the same figure in their own substance. But there
is some difference between those figures that perceive
light, and those that are light themselves; for when we
sleep, there is made the figure of light, but not from a
copy; but when the eye seeth light, that figure is made
from a copy of the real figure of the Sun; but those
lights which are inherent, as in Glow-worms-tails, are
original lights, in which is as much difference as between
a Man and his Picture; and as for the swiftness of
the Motions of light, and the violence of the Motions
of fire, it is very probably they are so, but they are a certain
particular kind or sort of swift and violent motions;
neither will all sorts of swift and violent motions make
fire or light, as for example the swift and violent Circular
motion of a Whirlewind neither makes light nor fire;
Neither is all fire light, nor all light fire, for there is a
sort of dead fire, as in Spices, Spirits, Oyles, and the
like; and several sorts of lights, which are not hot, as the S1r 65
the light which is made in Dreams, as also the inherent
lights in Glow-worms, Cats-eyes, Fish-bones, and the
like; all which several fires and lights are made by the
self-moving matter and motions distinguishable by their
figures, for those Motions make such a figure for the
Suns light, such a figure for Glow-worms light, such a
figure for Cats-eyes light, and so some alteration in every
sort of light; The same for Fire, onely Fire-light
is a mixt figure, as partly of the figure of Fire, and partly
of the figure of Light: Also Colours are made after
the like manner, viz. so many several Colours, so many
several Figures; and as these Figures are less or more
different, so are the Colours.

Thus, Madam, whosoever will study Nature, must
consider the Figures of every Creature, as well as their
Motions, and must not make abstractions of Motion
and Figure from Matter, nor of Matter from Motion
and Figure, for they are inseparable, as being but one
thing, viz. Corporeal Figurative Motions; and whosoever
conceives any of them as abstract, will, in my opinion,
very much erre; but men are apt to make more
difficulties and enforcements in nature then nature ever
knew. But to return to Light: There is no better argument
to prove that all objects of sight are figured in the
Eye, by the sensitive, voluntary or self-motions, without
the pressure of objects, but that not onely the pressure
of light would hurt the tender Eye, but that the
eye doth not see all objects according to their Magnitude,
but sometimes bigger, sometimes less: as for example,
when the eye looks through a small passage, as a Prospective-glass,
by reason of the difficulty of seeing a body
through a small hold, and the double figure of the glass hole S being S1v 66
being convex and concave, the corporeal motions use
more force, by which the object is enlarged, like as a
spark of fire by force is dilated into a great fire, and a
drop of water by blowing into a bubble; so the corporeal
motions do double and treble their strength, making
the Image of the object exceeding large in the eye; for
though the eye be contracted, yet the Image in the eye
is enlarged to a great extension; for the sensitive and rational
matter is extremely subtil, by reason it is extreamly
pure, by which is hath more means and ways of magnifying
then the Perspective-glass. But I intend to write
more of this subject in my next, and so I break off here,
resting,

Madam

Your Faithful Friend
and Servant

XX

Madam

Some perhaps will question the truth or probability
of my saying, that Light is a Body, objecting that
if light were a body, when the Sun is absent or retires
under our Horizon, its light would leave an empty
place, or if there were no empty place but all full, the
light of the Sun at its return would not have room to display
it self, especially in so great a compass as it doth, for
two bodies cannot be in one place at one time. I answer, all S2r 67
all bodies carry their places along with them, for body
and place go together and are inseparable, and when the
light of the Sun is gone, darkness succeeds, and when
darkness is gone, light succeeds, so that it is with light and
darkness as with all Creatures else; For you cannot believe,
that if the whole World were removed, there
would be a place of the world left, for there cannot be
an empty nothing, no more then there can be an empty
something; but if the world were annihilated, the place
would be annihilated too, place and body being one and
the same thing; and therefore in my opinion, there be
no more places then there are bodies, nor no more bodies
then there are places.

Secondly, They will think it absurd that I say, the
eye can see without light; but in my opinion it seems
not absurd, but very rational, for we may see in dreams,
and some do see in the dark, not in their fancy or imagination,
but really; and as for dreams, the sensitive
corporeal motions make a light on the inside of the organ
of sight really, as I have declared in my former Letter.
But that we do not see ordinarily without exterior
Light, the reason is, that the sensitive Motions cannot
find the outward objects to pattern out without exterior
light, but all perception doth not proceed from light,
for all other perception besides animal sight requires not
light. Neither in my opinion, doth the Perception of sight
in all Creatures but Animals, but yet Animals do often
see in the dark, and in sleep: I will not say but that the
animate matter which by self-motion doth make the
Perception of light with other perceptive Figures, and so
animal perceptive light may be the presenter or ground
perceptive figure of sight; yet the sensitive corporeal motions S2v 68
motions can make other figures without the help of
light, and such as light did never present: But when
the eye patterns out an exterior object presented by light,
it patterns also out the object of light; for the sensitive
motions can make many figures by one act, not onely
in several organs, but in one organ; as for example,
there is presented to sight a piece of Imbroydery, wherein
is silk, silver and gold upon Sattin in several forms or
figures, as several flowers, the sensitive motions streight
by one and the same act, pattern out all those several figures
of flowers, as also the figures of Silk, Silver, Gold
and Sattin, without any pressure of these objects, or
motions in the medium, for if they all should press, the
eye would no more see the exterior objects, then the
nose, being stopt, could smell a presented perfume;

Thirdly, They may ask me, if sight be made in
the eye, and proceeds not from the outward object, what
is the reason that we do not see inwardly, but outwardly
as from us? I answer, when we see objects outwardly,
as from us, then the sensitive motions work on the outside
of the organ, which organ being outwardly convex,
causes us to see outwardly, as from us, but in
dreams we see inwardly; also the sensitive motions do
pattern out the distance together with the object: But
you will say, the body of the distance, as the air, cannot
be perceived, and yet we can perceive the distance; I
answer, you could not perceive the distance, but by
such or such an object as is subject to your sight; for you
do not see the distance more then the air, or the like rare
body, that is between grosser objects; for if there
were no stars, nor planets, nor clouds, nor earth, nor
water, but onely air, yonyou would not see any space or distance; T1r 69
distance; but light being a more visible body then air,
you might figure the body of air by light, but so, as
in an extensive or dilating way; for when the mind or
the rational matter conceives any thing that hath not
such an exact figure, or is not so perceptible by our senses;
then the mind uses art, and makes such figures,
which stand like to that; as for example, to express infinite
to it self, it dilates itits parts without alteration, and
without limitation or circumference; Likewise, when
it will conceive a constant succession of Time, it draws
out its parts into the figure of a line; and if eternity, it
figures a line without beginning and end: But as for
Immaterial, no mind can conceive that, for it cannot put it
self into nothing, although it can dilate and rarifie it self
to an higher degree, but must stay within the circle of
natural bodies, as I within the circle of your Commands,
to express my self,

Madam

Your faithful Friend,
and obedient Servant

XXI

Madam

Heat and Cold, according to your Authors opinion,
are made by Dilation and Contraction: for
says he, “When the Motion of the ambient æthereal
substance makes the spirits and fluid parts of our bodies tend T outwards T1v 70
outwards, we acknowledg heat, but by the indeavour inwards
of the same spirits and humors we feel cold: so that
to cool is to make the exterior parts of the body endeavour
inwards, by a motion contrary to that of calefaction, by which
the internal parts are called outwards. He therefore that
would know the cause of Cold, must find by what motion
the exterior parts of any body endeavour to retire inwards.” INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.C.28.a.I

But I desire you to consider, Madam, that there be moist
Colds, and dry Heats, as well as dry Colds, and moist
Heats; wherefore all sorts of Cold are not made by the
retyring of parts inwards, which is contraction or attraction;
neither are all sorts of Heat made by parts
tending outwards, which is dilation or rarefaction; for a
moist cold is made by dilation, and a dry heat by contraction,
as well as a moist heat is made by dilation, and
a dry cold by contraction: But your Author makes not
this difference but onely a difference between a dilated
heat, and a contracted cold; but because a cold wind is
made by breath blown thorow pinched or contracted
lips, and an hot wind by breath through opened and
extended lips, should we judg that all heat and cold
must be made after one manner or way? The contracted
mouth makes Wind as well as the dilated, but yet
Wind is not made that way, as heat and cold; for it may
be, that onely the air pressed together makes wind, or it
may be that the corporeal motions in the air may change
air into wind, as they change water into vapour, and vapour
into air; or it may be something else that is invisible
and rare, as air; and there may be several sorts of
wind, air, heat, cold, as of all other Creatures, more
then man is capable to know. As for your Authors
opinion concerning the congealing of Water, and how Ice T2r 71
Ice is made, I will not contradict it, onely I think nature
hath an easier way to effect it, then he describes;
Wherefore my opinion is, that it is done by altering
motions; as for example, the corporeal motions making
the figure of water by dilation in a Circle figure,
onely alter from such a dilating circular figure into a
contracted square, which is Ice, or into such a contracted
triangle, as is snow: And thus water and vapour
may be changed with ease, without any forcing, pressing,
raking, or the like. The same may be said of
hard and bent bodies; and of restitution, as also of air,
thunder and lightning, which are all done by an easie
change of motion, and changing into such or such a figure
is not the motion of Generation, which is to build
a new house with old materials, but onely a Transformation;
I say a new house with old materials; not that
I mean there is any new Creation in nature, of any
thing that was not before in nature; for nature is not
God, to make new beings out of nothing, but any thing
may be called new, when it is altered from one figure
into another. I add no more at this time, but rest,

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

MA- T2v 72

XXII

Madam

The Generation of sound, according to your worthy
Authors opinion, is as follows: “As Vision”,
INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Ch.29.a.I says he, so hearing is Generated by the medium, but
but not in the same manner; for sight is from pressure, that
is, from an endeavour, in which there is no perceptible progression
of any of the parts of the medium, but one part urging
or thrusting on another, propagateth that action successively
to any distance whatsoever; whereas the motion of
the medium, by which sound is made, is a stroke; for when
we hear, the drum of the Ear, which is the first organ of
hearing, is strucken, and the drum being stricken, the Pia
Mater
is also shaken, and with it the arteries inserted into
it, by which the action propagated to the heart it self, by
the reaction of the heart a Phantasme is made which we call
Sound.”
Thus far your Author: To which give me
leave to reply, that I fear, if the Ear was bound to hear
any loud Musick, or another sound a good while, it
would soundly be beaten, and grow sore and bruised
with so many strokes; but since a pleasant sound would
be rendred very unpleasant in this manner, my opinion
is, that like as in the Eye, so in the Ear the corporeal
sensitive motions do pattern out as many several figures,
as sounds are presented to them; but if these motions be
irregular, then the figure of the sound in the ear is not
perfect according to the original; for if it be, that the
motions are tyred with figuring, or the object of sound be V1r 73
be too far distant from the sensitive organ, then they
move slowly and weakly, not that they are tyred or weak
in strength, but with working and repeating one and the
same object, and so through love to variety, change
from working regularly to move irregularly, so as not
to pattern outward objects as they ought, and then there
are no such patterns made at all, which we call to be
deaf; and sometimes the sensitive motions do not so readily
perceive a soft sound near, as a stronger farther off.
But to prove it is not the outward object of sound with
its striking or pressing motion, nor the medium, that
causes this perception of sense, if there be a great solid body,
as a wall, or any other partition betwixt two rooms,
parting the object and the sensitive organ, so, as the
sound is not able to press it, nevertheless the perception
will be made; And as for pipes to convey sounds, the
perception is more fixt and perfecter in united then in
dilated or extended bodies, and then the sensitive motions
can make perfecter patterns; for the stronger the
objects are, the more perfect are the figures and patterns
of the objects, and the more perfect is the perception.
But when the sound is quite out of the ear, then the
sensitive motions have altered the patterning of such figures
to some other action; and when the sound fadeth
by degrees, then the figure or pattern alters by degrees;
but for the most part the sensitive corporeal motions alter
according as the objects are presented, or the perception
patterns out. Neither do they usually make figures
of outward objects, if not perceived by the senses,
unless through Irregularities as in Mad men, which see
such and such things, when as these things are not neer,
and then the sensitive motions work by rote, or after V their V1v 74
their own voluntary invention. As for Reflexion, it is
a double perception, and so a double figure of one object;
like as many pictures of one man, where some are
more perfect then others, for a copy of a copy is not so
perfect as a copy of an original. But the recoyling of
sound is, that the sensitive motions in the ear begin a new
pattern, before they dissolved the former, so as there is
no perfect alteration or change, from making to dissolving,
but pattern is made upon pattern, which causes a
confusion of figures, the one being neither perfectly finished,
nor the other perfectly made. But it is to be
observed, that not always the sensitive motions in the
organs take their pattern from the original, but from copies;
as for example, the sensitive motions in the eye,
pattern out the figure of an eye in a glass, and so do not
take a pattern from the original it self, but by an other pattern,
representing the figure of the eye in a Looking-
glass; The same doth the Ear, by patterning out Ecchoes,
which is but a pattern of a pattern; But when as
a man hears himself speak or make a sound, then the corporeal
sensitive motions in the Ear, pattern out the object
or figure made by the motions of the tongue and the
throat, which is voice; By which we may observe, that
there may be many figures made by several motions
from one original; as for example, the figure of a
word is made in a mans mouth, then the copy of that
figure is made in the ear, then in the brain, and then
in the memory, and all this in one Man: Also a word
being made in a mans mouth, the air takes a copy or
many copies thereof; But the Ear patterns them both
out, first the original coming from the mouth, and
then the copy made in the air, which is called an Eccho, and V2r 75
and yet not any strikes or touches each others parts, onely
perceives and patterns out each others figure. Neither
are their substances the same, although the figures be
alike; for the figure of a man may be carved in wood,
then cut in brass, then in stone, and so forth, where the
figure may be always the same, although the substances
which do pattern out the figure are several, viz. Wood,
Brass, Stone, &c. and so likewise may the figure of a
stone be figured in the fleshy substance of the Eye, or
the figure of light or colour, and yet the substance of the
Eye remains still the same; neither doth the substantial
figure of a stone, or tree, patterned out by the sensitive
corporeal motions, in the flesh of an animal eye, change
from being a vegetable or mineral, to an animal, and if
this cannot be done by nature, much less by art; for if the
figure of an animal be carved in wood or stone, it doth
not give the wood or stone any animal knowledg, nor
an animal substance, as flesh, bones, blood, &c. no
more doth the patterning or figuring of a Tree give a
vegetable knowledg, or the substance of wood to the
eye, for the figure of an outward object doth not alter
the substance that patterns it out or figures it, but the patterning
substance doth pattern out the figure, in it self,
or in its own substance, so as the figure which is pattern’d,
hath the same life and knowledg with the substance
by and in which it is figured or pattern’d, and the
inherent motions of the same substance; and according
as the sensitive and rational self-moving matter moves,
so figures are made; and thus we see, that lives, knowledges,
motions and figures are all material, and all
Creatures are indued with life, knowledg, motion and
figure, but not all alike or after the same manner. But to V2v 76
to conclude this discourse of perception of Sound, the
Ear may take the object of sound afar off, as well as at a
near distance; not onely if many figures of the same
sound be made from that great distance, but if the interposing
parts be not so thick, close, of many as to hinder
or obscure the object from the animal Perception in the
sensitive organ; for if a man lays his Ear near to the
Ground, the Ear may hear at a far distance, as well as
the Eye can see, for it may hear the noise of a troop afar
off, perception being very subtil and active; Also
there may several Copies be made from the Original,
and from the last Copy nearest to the Ear, the Ear may
take a pattern, and so pattern out the noise in the organ,
without any strokes to the Ear, for the subtil matter
in all Creatures doth inform and perceive. But
this is well to be observed, that the figures of objects
are as soon made, as perceived by the sensitive motions
in their work of patterning. And this is my Opinion
concerning the Perception of Sound, which together
with the rest I leave to your Ladyships and others wiser
Judgment, and rest,

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

MA- X1r 77

XXIII

Madam

I perceive by your last, that you cannot well apprehend
my meaning, when I say that the print or figure
of a Body Printed or Carved, is not made by
the motions of the body Printing or Carving it, but by
the motions of the body or substance Printed or Carved;
for say you, Doth a piece of Wood carve it self,
or a black Path of a Lady cut its own figure by its own
motions? Before I answer you, Madam, give me
leave to ask you this question, whether it be the motion
of the hand, or the Instrument, or both, that print or
carve such or such a body? Perchance you will say,
that the motion of the hand moves the Instrument, and
the Instrument moves the Wood which is to be carved:
Then I ask, whether the motion that moves the Instrument,
be the Instruments, or the Hands? Perchance you
will say the Hands; but I answer, how can it be the
Hands motion, if it be in the Instrument? You will
say, perhaps, the motion of the hand is tranferredtransferred out
of the hand into the instrument, and so from the instrument
into the carved figure; but give me leave to ask
you, was this motion of the hand, that was transferred,
Corporeal or Incorporeal? If you say, Corporeal,
then the hand must become less and weak, but if Incorporeal,
I ask you, how a bodiless motion can have force
and strength to carve and cut? But put an Impossible
proposition, as that there is an Immaterial motion, and X that X1v 78
that this Incorporeal motion could be transferred out of
one body into another; then I ask you, when the hand
and instrument cease to move, what is become of the
motion? Perhaps you will say, the motion perishes
or is annihilated, and when the hand and the instrument
do move again, to the carving or cutting of the
figure, then a new Incorporeal Motion is created; Truly
then there will be a perpetual creation and annihilation
of Incorporeal motions, that is, of that which naturally
is nothing; for an Incorporeal being is as much as a natural
No-thing, for Natural reason cannot know nor
have naturally any perception or Idea of an Incorporeal
being: besides, if the motion be Incorporeal, then
it must needs be a supernatural Spirit, for there is not
any thing else Immaterial but they, and then it will be
either an Angel or a Devil, or the Immortal Soul of
man; but if you say it is the supernatural Soul, truly I
cannot be perswaded that the supernatural Soul should
not have any other imployment then to carve or cut
prints, or figures, or move in the hands, or heels, or
legs, or arms of a Man; for other animals have the
same kind of Motions, and then they might have a
Supernatural Soul as well as Man, which moves in
them. But if you say, that these transferrable motions
are material, then every action whereby the hand
moves to the making or moving of some other body,
would lessen the number of the motions in the hand, and
weaken it, so that in the writing of one letter, the hand
would not be able to write a second letter, at least not
a third. But I pray, Madam, consider rationally,
that though the Artificer or Workman be the occasion
of the motions of the carved body, yet the motions of the X2r 79
the body that is carved, are they which put themselves
into such or such a figure, or give themselves such or such
a print as the Artificer intended; for a Watch, although
the Artist or Watch-maker be the occasional cause that
the Watch moves in such or such an artificial figure, as
the figure of a Watch, yet it is the Watches own motion
by which it moves; for when you carry the Watch
about you, certainly the Watch-makers hand is not
then with it as to move it; or if the motion of the Watch-
makers hand be transferred into the Watch, then certainly
the Watch-maker cannot make another Watch,
unless there be a new creation of new motions made
in his hands; so that God and Nature would be as much
troubled and concerned in the making of Watches, as in
the making of a new World; for God created this
World in six days, and rested the seventh day, but this
would be a perpetual Creation; Wherefore I say that
some things may be Occasional causes of other things,
but not the Prime or Principal causes; and this distinction
is very well to be considered, for there are no frequenter
mistakes then to confound these two different
causes, which make so many confusions in natural Philosophy;
and this is the Opinion of,

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

MA- X2v 80

XXIV

Madam

In answer to your question, What makes Eccho, I
say, it is that which makes all the effects of Nature,
viz. self-moving matter; I know, the common opinion
is, that Eccho is made like as the figure of a Face,
or the like, in a Looking-glass, and that the Reverberation
of sound is like the Reflection of sight in a Looking-glass;
But I am not of that opinion, for both Eccho,
and that wichwhich is called the Reflection in a Looking-
glass, are made by the self-moving matter, by way of
patterning and copying out. But then you will ask me,
whether the glass takes the copy of the face, or the face
prints its copy on the glass, or whether it be the medium
of light and air that makes it? I answer, although many
Learned men say, that as all perception, so also the
seeing of ones face in a Looking-glass, and Eccho, are
made by impression and reaction; yet I cannot in my
simplicity conceive it, how bodies that come not near,
or touch each other, can make a figure by impression
and reaction: They say it proceeds from the motions of
the Medium of light, or air, or both, viz. that the Medium
is like a long stick with two ends, whereof one
touches the object, the other the organ of sense, and
that one end of it moving, the other moves also at the
same point of Time, by which motions it may make
many several figures; But I cannot conceive, how this
motion of pressing forward and backward should make so Y1r 81
so many figures, wherein there is so much variety and
curiosity. But, say light and air are as one figure,
and like as a seal do print another body; I answer, if
any thing could print, yet it is not probable, that so soft
and rare bodies as light and air, could print such solid
bodies as glass, not could air by reverberation make such a
sound as Eccho. But mistake me not, for, I do not say,
that the Corporeal motions of light or air, cannot,
or do not pencil, copie, or pattern out any figure,
for both light and air are very active in such sorts of
Motions, but I say, they cannot do it on any other bodies
but their own. But to cut off tedious and unnecessary
disputes, I return to the expressing of my own opinion,
and believe, that the glass in its own substance
doth figure out the copy of the face, or the like, and
from that copy the sensitive motions in the eyes take another
copy, and so the rational from the sensitive; and
in this manner is made both rational and sensitive perception,
sight and knowledg. The same with Ecchoes;
for the air patterns out the copy of the sound, and then
the sensitive corporeal motions in the ear pattern again
this copy from the air, and so do make the perception and
sense of hearing. You may ask me, Madam, if it be so, that
the glass and the air copy out the figure of the face and
of sound, whether the Glass may be said to see and the Air
to speak? I answer, I cannot tell that; for though I say, that
the air repeats the words, and the glass represents the face,
yet I cannot guess what their perceptions are, onely this
I may say, that the air hath an elemental, and the glass
a mineral, but not an animal perception. But if these
figures were made by the pressures of several objects or
parts, and by reaction, there could not be such variety Y as Y1v 82
as there is, for they could but act by one sort of motion:
Likewise is it improbable, that sounds, words or voices,
should like a company of Wild-Geese fly in the air,
and so enter into the ears of the hearers, as they into
their nests: Neither can I conceive, how in this manner
a word can enter so many ears, that is, be divided
into every ear, and yet strike every ear with an undivided
vocal sound; You will say, as a small fire doth
heat and warm all those that stand by; for the heat issues
from the fire, as the light from the Sun. I answer, all
what issues and hath motion, hath a Body, and yet
most learned men deny that sound, light and heat have
bodies: But if they grant of light that it has a body, they
say it moves and presses the air, and the air the eye, and
so of heat; which if so, then the air must not move to
any other motion but light, and onely to one sort of
light, as the Suns light; for if it did move in any other
motion, it would disturb the light; for if a Bird did but
fly in the air, it would give all the region of air another
motion, and so put out, or alter the light, or at
least disturb it; and wind would make a great disturbance
in it. Besides, if one body did give another body
motion, it must needs give it also substance, for motion
is either something or nothing, body or no body,
substance or no substance; if nothing, it cannot enter
into another body; if something, it must lessen the bulk
of the body it quits, and increase the bulk of the body it
enters, and so the Sun and Fire with giving light and
heat, would become less, for they cannot both give and
keep at once, for this is as impossible, as for a man to
give to another creature his human Nature, and yet to
keep it still. Wherefore my opinion is for heat, that when Y2r 83
when many men stand round about a fire, and are heated
and warmed by it, the fire doth not give them any
thing, nor do they receive something from the fire, but
the sensitive motions in their bodies pattern out the object
of the fires heat, and so they become more or less
hot according as their patterns are numerous or perfect;
And as for air, it patterns out the light of the Sun, and
the sensitive motions in the eyes of animals pattern out
the light in the air. The like for Ecchoes, or any other
sound, and for the figures which are presented in a
Looking-glass. And thus millions of parts or creatures
may make patterns of one or more objects, and the
objects neither give nor loose any thing. And this I
repeat here, that my meaning of Perception may be the
better understood, which is the desire of,

Madam

Your faithful Friend,
and Servant

XXIV

Madam

I perceive you are not fully satisfied with my former
Letter concerning Eccho, and a figure presented in a
Looking-glass; for you say, how is it possible, if
Eccho consists in the ears patterning out of a voice or
sound, but that it will make a confusion in all the parts of
the air? My answer is, that I doe not say that Eccho is onely Y2v 84
onely made by the patterning out of the voice or sound,
but by repeating the same voice or sound, which repetition
is named an Eccho, for millions of ears in animals may
pattern out a voice or words, and yet never repeat them,
and so may millions of parts of the air; wherefore Eccho
doth not consist in the bare patterning out, but in
the repetition of the same sound or words, which are
pattern’d out; and so some parts of the air may at one
and the same time pattern out a sound and not repeat
it, and some may both pattern out, and repeat it,
but some may neither pattern out, nor repeat it, and therefore
the Repetition, not the bare Patterning out is called
Eccho: Just as when two or more men do answer or mock
each other, and repeat each others words, it is not necessary,
if there were a thousand standers by, that they
should all do the same. And as for the figure presented
in a Looking-glass, I cannot conceive it to be made by
pressure and reaction; for although there is both pressure
and reaction in nature, and those very frequent amongst
natures Parts, yet they do neither make perception
nor production. althoughAlthough both pressure and reaction
are made by corporeal self-motions; Wherefore the
figure presented in a Looking-glass, or any other smooth
glassie body, is, in my opinion, onely made by the motions
of the Looking-glass, which do both pattern out,
and present the figure of an external object in the Glass;
But you will say, why do not the motions of other bodies
pattern out, and present the figures of external objects,
as well as smooth glassie bodies do? I answer, they
may pattern out external objects, for any thing I know;
but the reason that their figures are not presented to our
eyes, lies partly in the presenting subject it self, partly in Z1r 85
in our sight; for it is observed, that two things are
chiefly required in a subject that will present the figure of
an external object; first it must be smooth, even and
glassie, next it must not be transparent: the first is manifest
by experience; for the subject being rough and
uneven, will never be able to present such a figure; as
for example, A piece of steel rough and unpolished, although
it may perhaps pattern out the figure of an external
object, yet it will never present its figure, but as soon
as it is polished, and made smooth and glassie, the figure
is presently perceived. But this is to be observed,
that smooth and glassie bodies do not always pattern out
exterior objects exactly, but some better, some worse;
like as Painters have not all the same ingenuity; neither
do all eyes pattern out all objects exactly; which
proves that the perception of sight is not made by pressure
and reaction, o:herwiseotherwise, there would be no difference,
but all eyes would see alike, Next I say, it is
observed, that the subject which will present the figure
of an external object, must not be transparent; the reason
is, that the figure of Light being a substance of a
piercing and penetrating quality, hath more force on
transparent, then on other solid dark bodies, and so
disturbs the figure of an external object pattern’d out
in a transparent body, and quite over-masters it. But
you wil say, you have found by experience, that if
you hold a burning Candle before a Transparent-
glass, although it be in an open Sun-light, yet the figure
of light and flame of the Candle will clearly be
seen in the Glass. I answer, that it is an other thing with
the figure of Candle-light, then of a duskish or dark
body; for a Candle-light, though it is not of the same Z sort Z1v 86
sort as the Suns light, yet it is of the same nature, and quality,
and therefore the Candle-light doth resist and oppose
the light of the Sun, so that it cannot have so much
power over it, as over the figures of other bodies patterned
out and presented in Transparent-glass. Lastly,
I say, that the fault often-times lies in the perceptive motions
of our sight, which is evident by a plain and Concave-glass;
for in a plain Looking-glass, the further
you go from it, the more your figure presented in the
glass seems to draw backward; and in a Concave-glass,
the nearer you go to it, the more seems your figure to
come forth: which effects are like as an house or tree
appears to a Traveler; for, as the man moves from the
house or tree, so the house or tree seems to move from
the man; or like one that sails upon a Ship, who imagines
that the Ship stands still, and the Land moves;
when as yet it is the Man and the Ship that moves, and
not the House, or Tree, or the Land: so when a Man
turns round in a quick motion, or when his head is dizzie,
he imagines the room or place, where he is, turns round.
Wherefore it is the Inherent Perceptive motions in the
Eye, and not the motions in the Looking-glass, which
cause these effects. And as for several figures that are
presented in one glass, it is absurd to imagine that so
many several figures made by so many several motions
should touch the eye; certainly this would make such a
disturbance, if all figures were to enter or but to touch
the eye, as the eye would not perceive any of them, at
least not distinctly; Wherefore it is most probable that
the glass patterns out those figures, and the sensitive corporeal
motions in the eye take again a pattern from
those figures patterned out by the glass, and so make copies Z2r 87
copies of copies; but the reason why several figures
are presented in one glass in several places, is, that
two perfect figures cannot be in one point, nor made
by one motion, but by several corporeal motions.
Concerning a Looking-glass, made in the form or
shape of a Cylinder, why it represents the figure of
an external object in an other shape and posture then
the object is, the cause is the shape and form of the
Glass, and not the patterning motions in the Glass. But
this discourse belongs properly to the Opticks, wherefore
I will leave it to those that are versed in that Art, to
enquire and search more after the rational truth thereof.
In the mean time, my opinion is, that though the object
is the occasion of the figure presented in a Looking-
glass, yet the figure is made by the motions of the glass
or body that presents it, and that the figure of the glass
perhaps may be patterned out as much by the motions
of the object in its own substance, as the figure of the
object is patterned out and presented by the motions of
the glass in its own body or substance. And thus I conclude
and rest,

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

MA- Z2v 88

XXVI

Madam

Since I mentioned in my last that Light did disturb
the figures of External objects presented in Transparent
bodies; you were pleased to ask, Whether
light doth penetrate transparent bodies? I answer,
for any thing I know, it may; for when I consider the
subtil, piercing and penetrating nature of light, I believe
it doth; but again, when I consider that light is
presented to our sight by transparent bodies onely, and
not by duskish and dark bodies, and yet that those
duskish bodies are more porous then the transparent bodies,
so that the light hath more passage to pass through
them, then through transparent bodies; but that on the
contrary, those dark bodies, as Wood, and the like, do
quite obscure the light, when as transparent bodies, as
Glass, &c. transmit it, I am half perswaded that the
transparent bodies, as Glass, rather present the Light by
patterning it out, then by giving it passage: Also I
am of a mind, that the air in a room may pattern out the
Light from the Glass, for the Light in a room doth not
appear so clear as in the Glass, also if the Glass be any
way defective, it doth not present the Light so perfectly,
whereas, if it were the penetration of light through
the glass, the light would pass through all sorts of glass
alike, which it doth not, but is more clearly seen through
some, and more obscurely through others, according
to the goodness or purity of the glass. But you may say, that Aa1r 89
that the light divulges the imperfection or goodness of
the glass; I answer, so it doth of any other objects perceived
by our sight; for light is the presenter of objects
to the sense and perception of sight, and for any thing
I know, the corporeal optick motions make the figure of
light, the ground figure of all other figures patterned out
by the corporeal optick motions, as in dreams, or when
as some do see in the dark, that is, without the help of
exterior light. But you may say, That if the glass and the
air in a room did pattern out the figure of light, those
patterns of light would remain when the light is absent: I
answer, That is not usual in nature; for when the object
removes, the Pattern alters; I will not say but that the
corporeal optick motions may work by rote without objects,
but that is irregular, as in some distempers. And
thus, Madam, I have given you my opinion also to
this your question; if you have any more scruples, I
pray let me know of them, and assure your self that I
shall be ready upon all occasions to express my self,

Madam

Your humble and faithful Servant.

XXVII

Madam

Your desire is to know, why sound is louder in a
Vault, and in a large Room then in a less? I answer,
A Vault or arched Figure is the freest from
obstruction, as being without corners and points, so as Aa the Aa1v 90
the sensitive and rational corporeal motions of the Ear
can have a better perception; like as the Eye can see
farthest from a hill then being upon a level ground,
because the prospect is freer from the hill, as without
obstruction, unless it be so cloudy that the clouds do hinder
the perception; And as the eye can have a better
prospect upon a hill, so the ear a stronger perception
in a Vault; And as for sound, that it is better perceived
in a large, then in a little close room or place, it is
somewhat like the perception of sent, for the more the
odorous parts are bruised, the stronger is that perception
of sent, as being repeated double or treble, which makes
the perception stronger, like as a thick body is stronger
then a thin one; So likewise the perception of sound
in the air; for though not all the parts of the air make
repetitions, yet some or many make patterns of the
sound; the truth is, Air is as industrious to divulge
or present a sound, by patterns to the Ear, as light
doth objects to the Eye. But then you may ask
me, Why a long hollow pipe doth convey a voice to
the ear more readily, then any large and open place?
My answer is, That the Parts of the air in a long pipe
are more Composed and not at liberty to wander, so
that upon necessity they must move onely to the patterning
out of the sound, having no choice, which
makes the sound much stronger, and the perception of
the Ear perfecter; But as for Pipes, Vaults, Prospects,
as also figures presented in a room through a little
hole, inverted, and many the like, belongs more to
Artists then to my study, for though Natural Philosophy
gives or points out the Ground, and shews the
reason, yet it is the Artist that Works; Besides it is Aa2r 91
is more proper for Mathematicians to discourse of, which
study I am not versed in; and so leaving it to them,
I rest,

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

XXVIII

Madam

From Sound I am come to Sent, in the discourse
whereof, your Author INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Ch.29
art.I2.
is pleased to set down these
following propositions:

  • “1. That smelling is hindred
    by cold and helped by heat:
  • 2. That when the Wind
    bloweth from the object, the smell is the stronger, and when it
    blowes from the sentient towards the obiectobject, the weaker,
    which by experience is found in dogs, that follow the track
    of beasts by the Sent:
  • 3. That such bodies as are last
    pervious to the fluid medium, yield less smell then such as
    are more pervious:
  • 4. That such bodies as are of their
    own nature odorous, become yet more odorous, when they are
    bruised:
  • 5. That when the breath is stopped (at least in
    man) nothing can be smelt:
  • 6. That the Sense of smelling
    is also taken away by the stopping of the Nostrils,
    though the mouth be left open.”
To begin from the last,
I say, that the nose is like the other sensitive organs,
which if they be stopt, the corporeal sensitive motions
cannot take copies of the exterior objects, and therefore must Aa2v 92
must alter their action of patterning to some other, for
when the eye is shut and cannot perceive outward objects
then it works to the Sense of Touch, or on the
inside of the organ to some phantasmes; and so do the
rest of the Senses. As for the stopping of breath,
why it hinders the Sent, the cause is, that the nostrils
and the mouth are the chief organs, to receive air and
to let out breath: but though they be common passages
for air and breath, yet taste is onely made in the mouth
and tongue, and sent in the nose; not by the pressure of
meat, and the odoriferous object, but by patterning
out the several figures or objects of sent and taste, for
the nose and the mouth will smell and taste one, nay several
things at the same time, like as the eye will see light,
colour, and other objects at once, which I think can
hardly be done by pressures; and the reason is, that the
sensitive motions in the sensitive organs make patterns of
several objects at one time, which is the cause, that when
flowers, and such like odoriferous bodies are bruised,
there are as many figures made as there are parts bruised
or divided, and by reason of so many figures the sensitive
knowledg is stronger; but that stones, minerals, and
the like, seem not so strong to our smell, the reason is,
that their parts being close and united, the senssitive motions
in the organ cannot so readily perceive and pattern
them out, as those bodies which are more porous and
divided. But as for the wind blowing the sent either to
or from the sentient, it is like a window or door that by
the motion of opening and shutting, hinders or disturbeth
the sight; for bodies coming between the object
and the organ, make a stop of that perception. And as
for the Dogs smelling out the track of Beasts, the cause is Bb1r 93
is, that the earth or ground hath taken a copy of that
sent, which copy the sensitive motions in the nose of
the Dog do pattern out, and so long as that figure
or copy lasts, the Dog perceives the sent, but if he
doth not follow or hunt readily, then there is either
no perfect copy made by the ground, or otherwise
he cannot find it, which causes him to seek and smell
about until he hath it; and thus smell is not made
by the motion of the air, but by the figuring motions
in the nose: Where it is also to be observed,
that not onely the motions in one, but in millions of
noses, may pattern out one little object at one time,
and therefore it is not, that the object of sent fills a
room by sending out the sent from its substance, but
that so many figures are made of that object of sent
by so many several sensitive motions, which pattern
the same out; and so the air, or ground, or any other
creature, whose sensitive motions pattern out
the object of sent, may perceive the same, although
their sensitive organs are not like to those of animal
creatures; for if there be but such sensitive motions
and perceptions, it is no matter for such organs.
Lastly, it is to be observed, That all Creatures have
not the same strength of smelling, but some smell
stronger, some weaker, according to the disposition
of their sensitive motions: Also there be other parts
in the body, which pattern out the object of sent,
besides the nose, but those are interior parts, and
take their patterns from the nose as the organ properly
designed for it; neither is their resentment the
same, because their motions are not alike, for the
stomack may perceive and pattern out a sent with aversion,Bb version, Bb1v 94
when the nose may pattern it out with pleasure.
And thus much also of Sent; I conclude and
rest,

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

XXIX

Madam

Concerning your Learned Authors discourse of
Density and Rarity, he defines “Thick to be that,
which takes up more parts of a space given; and
thin, which containes fewer parts of the same magnitude:
not that there is more matter in one place then in an other
equal place, but a greater quantity of some named body;
wherefore the multitude and paucity of the parts contained
within the same space do constitute density and rarity.” INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.C.30. a.1.

Whereof my opinion is, That there is no more nor less
space or place then body according to its dilation or
contraction, and that space and place are dilated and
contracted with the body, according to the magnitude
of the body, for body, place and magnitude are
the same thing, only place is in regard of the several
parts of the body, and there is as well space betwixt
things distant a hairs breadth from one another, as betwixt
things distant a million of miles, but yet this space is
nothing from the body; but it makes, that the body has Bb2r 95
has not the same place with this body, that is, that this
body is not that body, and that this bodies place is not
that bodies place. Next your Author sayes, “He
hath already clearly enough demonstrated, that there
can be no beginning of motion, but from an external and
moved body, and that heavy bodies being once cast upwards
cannot be cast down again, but by external motion.” INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Art.2.

Truly, Madam, I will not speak of your Authors demonstrations,
for it is done most by art, which I have
no knowledg in, but I think I have probably declared,
that all the actions of nature are not forced by one
part, driving, pressing, or shoving another, as a man
doth a wheel-barrow, or a whip a horse; nor by reactions,
as if men were at foot-ball or cuffs, or as men
with carts meeting each other in a narrow lane. But
to prove there is no self-motion in nature, he goes on
and says; “To attribute to created bodies the power to
move themselves, what is it else, then to say that there be
creatures which have no dependance upon the Creator?”

To which I answer, That if man (who is but a single
part of nature) hath given him by God the power and
a free will of moving himself, why should not God
give it to Nature? Neither can I see, how it can take
off the dependance upon God, more then Eternity; for
if there be an Eternal Creator, there is also an Eternal
Creature, and if an Eternal Master, an Eternal Servant,
which is Nature; and yet Nature is subject to
Gods Command, and depends upon him; and if all
Gods Attributes be Infinite, then his Bounty is Infinite
also, which cannot be exercised but by an Infinite Gift,
but a Gift doth not cause a less dependance. I do not
say, That man hath an absolute Free-will, or power to Bb2v 96
to move, according to his desire; for it is not conceived,
that a part can have an absolute power: nevertheless
his motion both of body and mind is free and self-
motion, and such a self-motion hath every thing in
Nature according to its figure or shape; for motion and
figure, being inherent in matter, matter moves figuratively.
Yet I do not say, That there is no hindrance,
obstruction and opposition in nature; but as there is
no particular Creature, that hath an absolute power of
self-moving; so that Creature which hath the advantage
of strength, subtilty, or policy, shape, or figure,
and the like, may oppose and over-power another
which is inferior to it, in all this; yet this hinderance
and opposition doth not take away self-motion. But I
perceive your Author is much for necessitation, and against
free-will, which I leave to Moral Philosophers
and Divines. And as for the ascending of light, and
descending of heavy bodies, there may be many causes,
but these four are perceiveable by our senses, as bulk,
or quantity of body, grossness of substance, density,
and shape or figure, which make heavy bodies descend:
But little quantity, purity of substance, rarity, and figure
or shape make light bodies ascend. Wherefore I
cannot believe, that there are “certain little bodies as atoms,
and by reason of their smallness, invisible, differing
from one another in consistence, figure, motion and magnitude,
intermingled with the air,” INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Art.3.
which should be the
cause of the descending of heavy bodies. And concerning
air, “whether it be subject to our senses or not,” INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Art.14. I say,
that if air be neither hot, nor cold, it is not subject; but
if it be, the sensitive motions will soon pattern it out, and
declare it. I’le conclude with your Authors question, “What the Cc1r 97
the cause is, that a man doth not feel the weight of Water
in Water?” INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Art.6.
and answer, it is the dilating nature of Water.
But of this question and of Water I shall treat
more fully hereafter, and so I rest,

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

XXX

Madam

I am reading now the works of that Famous and
most Renowned Author, Des Cartes, out of which
I intend to pick out onely those discourses which I
like best, and not to examine his opinions, as they go
along from the beginning to the end of his books; And
in order to this, I have chosen in the first place, his Philos. INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.p.2. dis
course of motion, and do not assent to his opinion,
when he defines “Motion to be onely a Mode of a thing,
and not the thing or body it selfe;” INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Art.25.
for, in my opinion,
there can be no abstraction made of motion from body,
neither really, nor in the manner of our conception, for
how can I conceive that which is not, nor cannot be
in nature, that is, to conceive motion without body?
Wherefore Motion is but one thing with body, without
any separation or abstraction soever. Neither doth
it agree with my reason, that “one body can give or transferr
motion into another body; and as much motion it gives Cc or Cc1v 98
or transferrs into that body, as much loses it: As for example,
in two hard bodies thrown against one another,
where one, that is thrown with greater force, takes the
other along with it, and loses as much motion as it gives it.” INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Art.40.

For how can motion, being no substance, but onely a
mode, quit one body, and pass into another? One
body may either occasion, or imitate anothers motion,
but it can neither give nor take away what belongs to its
own or another bodies substance, no more then matter
can quit its nature from being matter; and therefore
my opinion is, that if motion doth go out of one body
into another, then substance goes too; for motion, and
substance or body, as afore-mentioned, are all one
thing, and then all bodies that receive motion from other
bodies, must needs increase in their substance and
quantity, and those bodies which impart of transferr motion,
must decrease as much as they increase: Truly,
Madam, that neither Motion nor Figure should subsist
by themselves, and yet be transferrable into other
bodies, is very strange, and as much as to prove them
to be nothing, and yet to say they are something. The
like may be said of all others, which they call accidents,
as skill, learning, knowledge, &c. saying, they are
no bodies, because they have no extension, but inherent
in bodies or substances as in their subjects; for although
the body may subsist without them, yet they being always
with the body, body and they are all one thing:
And so is power and body, for body cannot quit power,
nor power the body, being all one thing. But to return
to Motion, my opinion is, That all matter is partly
animate, and partly inanimate, and all matter is moving
and moved, and that there is no part of Nature that Cc2r 99
that hath not life and knowledg, for there is no Part that
has not a comixture of animate and inanimate matter;
and though the inanimate matter has no motion, nor
life and knowledg of it self, as the animate has, nevertheless
being both so closely joyned and commixed as in
one body, the inanimate moves as well as the animate,
although not in the same manner; for the animate
moves of it self, and the inanimate moves by the help of
the animate, and thus the animate is moving and the
inanimate moved; not that the animate matter transfers,
infuses, or communicates its own motion to the
inanimate; for this is impossible, by reason it cannot
part with its own nature, nor alter the nature of inanimate
matter, but each retains its own nature; for the
inanimate matter remains inanimate, that is, without
self-motion, and the animate loses nothing of its self-
motion, which otherwise it would, if it should impart
or transferr its motion into the inanimate matter; but
onely as I said heretofore, the inanimate works or moves
with the animate, because of their close union and commixture;
for the animate forces or causes the inanimate
matter to work with her; and thus one is moving, the
other moved, and consequently there is life and knowledg
in all parts of nature, by reason in all parts of nature
there is a commixture of animate and inanimate
matter: and this Life and Knowledg is sense and reason,
or sensitive and rational corporeal motions, which are all
one thing with animate matter without any distinction
or abstraction, and can no more quit matter, then matter
can quit motion. Wherefore every creature being
composed of this commixture of animate and inanimate
matter, has also selfe-motion, that is life and knowledg, sense Cc2v 100
sense and reason, so that no part hath need to give or
receive motion to or from another part; although it
may be an occasion of such a manner of motion to another
part, and cause it to move thus or thus: as for
example, A Watch-maker doth not give the watch its
motion, but he is onely the occasion, that the watch
moves after that manner, for the motion of the watch
is the watches own motion, inherent in those parts ever
since that matter was, and if the watch ceases to move
after such a manner or way, that manner or way of motion
is never the less in those parts of matter, the watch
is made of, and if several other figures should be made
of that matter, the power of moving in the said manner
or mode, would yet still remain in all those parts of
matter as long as they are body, and have motion in
them. Wherefore one body may occasion another
body to move so or so, but not give it any motion, but
every body (though occasioned by another, to move
in such a way) moves by its own natural motion; for
self-motion is the very nature of animate matter, and is
as much in hard, as in fluid bodies, although your
Author denies it, saying, “The nature of fluid bodies consists
in the motion of those little insensible parts into which
they are divided, and the nature of hard bodies, when those
little particles joyned closely together, do rest;” Philos. INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.part.
2. a.54.
for there
is no rest in nature; wherefore if there were a World of
Gold, and a World of Air, I do verily believe, that
the World of Gold would be as much interiously active,
as the World of Air exteriously; for Natures motions
are not all external or perceptible by our senses, neither
are they all circular, or onely of one sort, but there is
an infinite change and variety of motions; for though I Dd1r 101
I say in my Philosophical opinions, “As there is but one
onely Matter, so there is but one onely Motion;” INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Part.I.C.5.
yet I do
not mean, there is but one particular sort of motions, as
either circular, or straight, or the like, but that the nature
of motion is one and the same, simple and intire in
it self, that is, it is meer motion, or nothing else but
corporeal motion; and that as there are infinite divisions
or parts of matter, so there are infinite changes and
varieties of motions, which is the reason that I call motion
as well infinite as matter; first that matter and motion
are but one thing, and if matter be infinite, motion
must be so too; and secondly, that motion is infinite in
its changes and variations, as matter is in its parts. And
thus much of motion for this time; I add no more, but
rest,

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

XXXI

Madam

I observe your Author in his discourse of Place
makes a difference betwixt an “Interior and Exterior
place,” Philos. INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.p. 2.
a.10,11,12,
13,14
and that according to this distinction, “one
body may be said to change, and not to change its place at
the same time, and that one body may succeed into anothers
place.”
But I am not of this opinion, for I believe Dd not Dd1v 102
not that there is any more place then body; as for example,
Water being mix’d with Earth, the water doth
not take the Earths place, but as their parts intermix,
so do their places, and as their parts change, so do their
places, so that there is no more place, then there is water
and earth; the same may be said of Air and Water,
or Air and Earth, or did they all mix together; for as
their bodies join, so do their places, and as they are
separated from each other, so are their places. Say a
man travels a hundred miles, and so a hundred thousand
pacesplaces; but yet this man has not been in a hundred thousand
places, for he never had any other place but his
own, he hath joined and separated himselfe from a
hundred thousand, nay millions of parts, but he has left
no places behind him. You will say, if he travel the
same way back again, then he is said to travel thorow
the same places. I answer, It may be the vulgar way
of expression, or the common phrase; but to speak properly,
after a Philosophical way, and according to the
truth in nature, he cannot be said to go back again
thorow the same places he went, because he left none
behind him, or els all his way would be nothing but
place after place, all the hundred miles along; besides
if place should be taken so, as to express the joyning to
the neerest bodies which compass him about, certainly
he would never find his places again; for the air being
fluid, changes or moves continually, and perchance the
same parts of the air, which compassed him once, will
never come near him again. But you may say, If a
man be hurt, or hath some mischance in his body, so as
to have a piece of flesh cut out, and new flesh growing
there; then we say, because the adjoyning parts do not Dd2r 103
not change, that a new piece of flesh is grown in the
same place where the former flesh was, and that the
place of the former flesh cut or fallen out, is the
same of this new grown flesh. I answer, In my opinion,
it is not, for the parts being not the same, the places are
not, but every one hath its own place. But if the
wound be not filled up or closed up with other new flesh,
you will say, that according to my opinion there is no
place then at all. I say, Yes, for the air or any thing else
may be there, as new parts joyning to the other parts;
nevertheless, the air, or that same body which is there,
hath not taken the fleshes place, which was there before,
but hath its own; but, by reason the adjoyning parts
remain, man thinks the place remains there also which is
no consequence. ’Tis true, a man may return to the
same adjoining bodies, where he was before, but then he
brings his place with him again, and as his body, so his
place returnes also, and if a mans arm be cut off, you
may say, there was an arm heretofore, but you cannot
say properly, this is the place where the arm was.
But to return to my first example of the mixture of Water,
and Earth or Air; Suppose water is not porous,
but onely dividable, and hath no other place but what
is its own bodies’, and that other parts of water intermix
with it by dividing and composing; I say, there is no
more place required, then what belongs to their own
parts, for if some contract, others dilate, some divide,
others joyn, the places are the same according to the
magnitude of each part or body. The same may be
said of all kinds or sorts of mixtures, for one body hath
but one place; and so if many parts of the same nature
joyn into one body and increase the bulk of the body, the Dd2v 104
the place of that same body is accordingly; and if they
be bodies of different natures which intermix and joyne,
each several keeps its place; And so each body and each
particular part of a body hath its place, for you cannot
name body or part of a body, but you must also understand
place to be with them, and if a point should dilate
to a world, or a world contract to a point, the place
would always be the same with the body. And thus
I have declared my opinion of this subject, which I
submit to the correction of your better judgment, and
rest,

Madam

Your Ladiships
faithful Friend and humble Servant

XXXII

Madam

In my last, I hope, I have sufficiently declared my
opinion, That to one body belongs but one place,
and that no body can leave a place behind it, but
wheresoever is body, there is place also. Now give
me leave to examine this question: when a bodies
figure is printed on snow, or any other fluid or soft
matter, as air, water, and the like; whether it be the
body, that prints its own figure upon the snow, or
whether it be the snow, that patterns the figure of the
body? My answer is, That it is not the body, which prints Ee1r 105
prints its figure upon the snow, but the snow that
patterns out the figure of the body; for if a seal be
printed upon wax, ’tis true, it is the figure of the seal,
which is printed on the wax, but yet the seal doth not
give the wax the print of its own figure, but it is the wax
that takes the print or pattern from the seal, and patterns
or copies it out in its own substance, just as the sensitive
motions in the eye do pattern out the figure of an
object, as I have declared heretofore. But you will say,
perhaps, A body being printed upon snow, as it leaves
its print, so it leaves also its place with the print in the
snow. I answer, That doth not follow; For the place
remains still the bodies place, and when the body removes
out of the snow, it takes its place along with it:
Just like a man, whose picture is drawn by a Painter,
when he goes away, he leaves not his place with his
picture, but his place goes with his body; and as the
place of the picture is the place of the colour or paint,
and the place of the copie of an exterior object patterned
out by the sensitive corporeal motions is the place of
the sensitive organ, so the place of the print in snow, is
the snows place; or else, if the print were the bodies place
that is printed, and not the snow’s, it might as well be
said, that the motion and shape of a watch were not the
motion and shape of the watch, but of the hand of him
that made it. And as it is with snow, so it is with air,
for a mans figure is patterned out by the parts and
motions of the air, wheresoever he moveth; the difference
is onely, that air being a fluid body doth not retain
the print so long, as snow or a harder body doth,
but when the body removes, the print is presently dissolved.
But I wonder much, your Author denies, Ee that Ee1v 106
that there can be two bodies in one place, and yet makes
two places for one body, when all is but the motions of
one body: Wherefore a man sailing in a Ship, cannot
be said to keep place, and to change his place; for
it is not place he changes, but onely the adjoyning
parts, as leaving some, and joyning to others; and it is
very improper, to attribute that to place which belongs
to parts, and to make a change of place out of
change of parts. I conclude, repeating once again,
that figure and place are still remaining the same with
body; For example; let a stone be beat to dust, and
this dust be severally dispersed, nay, changed into numerous
figures; I say, as long as the substance of the
stone remains in the power of those dispersed and
changed parts, and their corporeal motions, the place
of it continues also; and as the corporeal motions
change and vary, so doth place, magnitude and
figure, together with their parts or bodies, for they are
but one thing. And so I conclude, and rest,

Madam

Your Faithful Friend
and Servant

MA- Ee2r 107

XXXIII

Madam

I am absolutely of your Authors opinion, when he
sayes, “That all bodies of this Universe are of one and
the same matter, really divided into many parts, and
that these parts are diversly moved:” Philos. INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.part.
3. a.46.
But that these motions
should be circular more then of any other sort, I
cannot believe, although he thinks that this is the most
probable way, to find out the causes of natural effects:
for nature is not bound to one sort of motions more
then to another, and it is but in vain to indeavour to
know how, and by what motions God did make the
World, since Creation is an action of God, and
Gods actions are incomprehensible; Wherefore his
æthereal Whirlpooles, and little particles of matter,
which he reduceth to three sorts and calls them the
three elements of the Universe, their circular motions,
several figures, shavings, and many the like, which
you may better read, then I rehearse to you, are to my
thinking, rather Fancies, then rational or probable
conceptions: for how can we imagine that the Universe
was set a moving as a Top by a Whip, or a Wheele
by the hand of a Spinster, and that the vacuities were
fill’d up with shavings? for these violent motions would
rather have disturbed and disordered Nature; and
though Nature uses variety in her motions or actions,
yet these are not extravagant, nor by force or violence,
but orderly, temperate, free, and easie, which causes me to Ee2v 108
to believe, the Earth turns about rather then the Sun;
and though corporeal motions for variety make
Whirl-winds, yet Whirl-winds are not constant,
Neither can I believe that the swiftness of motion could
make the matter more subtil and pure then it was by
nature, for it is the purity and subtilty of the matter,
that causes motion, and makes it swifter or slower,
and not motion the subtilty and purity of matter; motion
being onely the action of matter; and the self-moving
part of matter is the working part of nature, which is
wise, and knows how to move and form every creature
without instruction; and this self-motion is as much her
own as the other parts of her body, matter and figure,
and is one and the same with her self, as a corporeal,
living, knowing, and inseparable being, and a part of
her self. As for the several parts of matter, I do believe,
that they are not all of one and the same bigness, nor
of one and the same figure, neither do I hold their
figures to be unalterable; for if all parts in nature be
corporeal, they are dividable, composable, and intermixable,
and then they cannot be always of one and
the same sort of figure; besides nature would not have
so much work if there were no change of figures: and
since her onely action is change of motion, change
of motion must needs make change of figures: and thus
natural parts of matter may change from lines to points,
and from points to lines, from squares to circles, and so
forth, infinite ways, according to the change of motions;
but though they change their figures, yet they
cannot change their matter; for matter as it has been, so it
remaines constantly in each degree, as the Rational, Sensitive
and Inanimate, none becomes purer, none grosser then Ff1r 109
then ever it was, notwithstanding the infinite changes
of motions, which their figures undergo; for Motion
changes onely the figure, not the matter it self, which
continues still the same in its nature, and cannot be altered
without a confusion or destruction of Nature.
And this is the constant opinion of,

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and humble Servant

XXXIV

Madam

That “Rarefaction” Philos. INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.part.
2. a.0,7.
is onely a “change of figure”, according
to your Authors opinion, is in my reason
very probable; but when he sayes, that “in rarified
bodies are little intervals or pores filled up with some other
subtil matter”
, if he means that all rarified bodies are
porous, I dissent from him; for it is not necessary that
all rarified bodies should be porous, and all hard bodies
without pores: but if there were a probability of pores,
I am of opinion, it would be more in dense and hard,
than in rare and soft bodies; as for example, rarifying
and dilating motions are plaining, smoothing, spreading
and making all parts even, which could not well be, if
there were holes or pores; Earth is dense and hard, and
yet is porous, and flame is rare and dilating, and yet is not
porous; and certainly Water is not so porous as Earth. Ff Where- Ff1v 110
Wherefore pores, in my opinion, are according to the
nature or form of the figure, and not according to the
rarity or thinness, and density or thickness of the substance.
As for his thin and subtil matter filling up the
pores of porous bodies, I assent to your Author so farr,
that I meane, thin and thick, or rare and dense substances
are joyned and mixed together. As for plaining,
smoothing and spreading, I do not mean so
much artificial plaining and spreading; as for example,
when a piece of gold is beaten into a thin plate, and a
board is made plain and smooth by a Joyners tool, or a
napkin folded up is spread plain and even, although,
when you observe these arts, you may judge somewhat
of the nature of natural dilations; for a folded cloth is
fuller of creases then when plain, and the beating of a
thin plate is like to the motion of dilation, which is to
spread out, and the forme of rarifying is thinning and
extending. I add onely this, that I am not of your
Authors opinion, that Rest is the Cause or Glue which
keeps the parts of dense or hard bodies together, but it
is retentive motions. And so I conclude, resting,

Madam

Your Faithful Friend
and Servant

Ma- Ff2r 111

XXXV

Madam

“That the Mind”, according to your Authors opinion,
“is a substance really distinct from the body, and
may be actually separated from it and subsist without
it”
: If he mean the natural mind and soul of Man, not
the supernatural or divine, I am far from his opinion;
for though the mind moveth onely in its own parts, and
not upon, or with the parts of inanimate matter, yet it
cannot be separated from these parts of matter, and subsist
by its self, as being a part of one and the same matter
the inanimate is of, (for there is but one onely matter,
and one kind of matter, although of several degrees,)
onely it is the self-moving part; but yet this
cannot impower it, to quit the same natural body, whose
part it is. Neither can I apprehend, that the Mind’s
or Soul’s seat should be in the Glandula or kernel of the
Brain, and there sit like a Spider in a Cobweb, to
whom the least motion of the Cobweb gives intelligence
of a Flye, which he is ready to assault, and that the
Brain should get intelligence by the animal spirits as his
servants, which run to and fro like Ants to inform it;
or that the Mind should, according to others opinions,
be a light, and imbroidered all with Ideas, like a Heraulds
Coat; and that the sensitive organs should have
no knowledg in themselves, but serve onely like peeping-
holes for the mind, or barn-dores to receive bundles of
pressures, like sheaves of Corn; For there being a thorowrow Ff2v 112
mixture of animate, rational and sensitive, and inanimate
matter, we canot assign a certain seat or place to
the rational, another to the sensitive, and another to
the inanimate, but they are diffused and intermixt
throughout all the body; And this is the reason, that
sense and knowledg cannot be bound onely to the
head or brain: But although they are mixt together,
nevertheless they do not lose their interior natures by
this mixture, nor their purity and subtilty, nor their
proper motions or actions, but each moves according
to its nature and substance, without confusion; The
actions of the rational part in Man, which is the Mind
or Soul, are called Thoughts, or thoughtful perceptions,
which are numerous, and so are the sensitive perceptions;
for though Man, or any other animal hath
but five exterior sensitive organs, yet there be numerous
perceptions made in these sensitive organs, and in
all the body; nay, every several Pore of the flesh is a
sensitive organ, as well as the Eye, or the Ear. But
both sorts, as well the rational as the sensitive, are different
from each other, although both do resemble another,
as being both parts of animate matter, as I have
mentioned before: Wherefore I’le add no more, onely
let you know, that I constantly remain,

Madam

Your faithful Friend,
and humble Servant

Ma- Gg1r 113

XXXVI

Madam

That all other animals, besides man, want reason,
your Author endeavours to prove in his discourse
of method
, where his chief argument is,
That other animals cannot express their mind, thoughts
or conceptions, either by speech or any other signs, as
man can do: For, sayes he, “it is not for want of the organs
belonging to the framing of words, as we may observe
in Parrats and Pies, which are apt enough to express
words they are taught, but understand nothing of them.”

My answer is, That one man expressing his mind by
speech or words to an other, doth not declare by it his
excellency and supremacy above all other Creatures,
but for the most part more folly, for a talking man is
not so wise as a contemplating man. But by reason other
Creatures cannot speak or discourse with each other
as men, or make certain signs, whereby to express themselves
as dumb and deaf men do, should we conclude,
they have neither knowledge, sense, reason, or intelligence?
Certainly, this is a very weak argument;
for one part of a mans body, as one hand, is not less
sensible then the other, nor the heel less sensible then
the heart, nor the legg less sensible then the head, but
each part hath its sense and reason, and so consequently
its sensitive and rational knowledg; and although
they cannot talk or give intelligence to each other by
speech, nevertheless each hath its own peculiar and Gg particular Gg1v 114
particular knowledge, just as each particular man has
his own particular knowledge, for one man’s knowledge
is not another man’s knowledge; and if there
be such a peculiar and particular knowledg in every several
part of one animal creature, as man, well may there
be such in Creatures of different kinds and sorts: But
this particular knowledg belonging to each creature,
doth not prove that there is no intelligence at all betwixt
them, no more then the want of humane Knowledg
doth prove the want of Reason; for reason is the rational
part of matter, and makes perception, observation,
and intelligence different in every creature, and every
sort of creatures, according to their proper natures, but
perception, observation and intelligence do not make
reason, Reason being the cause, and they the effects.
Wherefore though other Creatures have not the speech,
nor Mathematical rules and demonstrations, with other
Arts and Sciences, as Men; yet may their perceptions
and observations be as wise as Men’s, and they
may have as much intelligence and commerce betwixt
each other, after their own manner and way, as men
have after theirs: To which I leave them, and Man to
his conceited prerogative and excellence, resting,

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

Ma- Gg2r 115

XXXVII

Madam

Concerning Sense and Perception, your Authors
opinion is, That it is made by a “motion or
impression from the object upon the sensitive organ,
which impression, by means of the nerves, is brought to
the brain, and so to the mind or soul, which onely perceives
in the brain;” Philos. INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.part.
4. a. I89.
Explaining it by the Diopt. INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.C.I.a.
2,3. &c. 4.
a.I.
example of a
Man being blind, or walking in dark, who by the help
of his stick can perceive when he touches a Stone, a
Tree, Water, Sand, and the like; which example he
brings to make a comparison with the perception of
Light; “For”, says he, “Light in a shining body, is nothing
else but a quick and lively motion or action, which through
the air and other transparent bodies tends towards the eye,
in the same manner as the motion or resistance of the bodies,
the blind man meets withal, tends thorow the stick towards
the hand; wherefore it is no wonder that the Sun can display
its rays so far in an instant, seeing that the same action,
whereby one end of the stick is moved, goes instantly
also to the other end, and would do the same if the stick
were as long as Heaven is distant from the Earth.”
To which
I answer first, That it is not onely the Mind that perceives
in the kernel of the Brain, but that there is a double
perception, rational and sensitive, and that the mind
perceives by the rational, but the body and the sensitive
organs by the sensitive perception; and as there is a double
perception, so there is also a double knowledg, rationaltional Gg2v 116
and sensitive, one belonging to the mind, the other
to the body; for I believe that the Eye, Ear, Nose,
Tongue, and all the Body, have knowledg as well as
the Mind, onely the rational matter, being subtil and
pure, is not incumbred with the grosser part of matter, to
work upon, or with it, but leaves that to the sensitive,
and works or moves onely in its own substance, which
makes a difference between thoughts, and exterior
senses. Next I say, That it is not the Motion or Reaction
of the bodies, the blind man meets withal, which
makes the sensitive perception of these objects, but the
sensitive corporeal motions in the hand do pattern out
the figure of the Stick, Stone, Tree, Sand, and the
like. And as for comparing the perception of the hand,
when by the help of the stick it perceives the objects,
with the perception of light, I confess that the sensitive
perceptions do all resemble each other, because all sensitive
parts of matter are of one degree, as being sensible
parts, onely there is a difference according to the figures
of the objects presented to the senses; and there is
no better proof for perception being made by the sensitive
motions in the body, or sensitive organs, but that
all these sensitive perceptions are alike, and resemble one
another; for if they were not made in the body of the
sentient, but by the impression of exterior objects, there
would be so much difference betwixt them, by reason
of the diversity of objects, as they would have no resemblance
at all. But for a further proof of my own opinion,
did the perception proceed meerly from the motion,
impression and resistance of the objects, the hand
could not perceive those objects, unless they touched
the hand it self, as the stick doth; for it is not probable, that Hh1r 117
that the motions of the stone, water, sand, &c. should
leave their bodies and enter into the stick, and so into
the hand; for motion must be either something or nothing;
if something, the stick and the hand would
grow bigger, and the objects touched less, or else the
touching and the touched must exchange their motions,
which cannot be done so suddenly, especially between
solid bodies; But if motion has no body, it is nothing,
and how nothing can pass or enter or move some body,
I cannot conceive. Tis true there is no part that can
subsist singly by it self, without dependance upon each
other, and so parts do always joyn and touch each other,
which I am not against; but onely I say perception
is not made by the exterior motions of exterior parts
of objects, but by the interior motions of the parts of
the body sentient. But I have discoursed hereof before,
and so I take my leave, resting,

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

XXXVIII

Madam

I cannot conceive why your Author is so much for little
and insensible parts, out of which the Elements
and all other bodies are made; for though Nature is
divideable, yet she is also composeable; and I think there Hh is Hh1v 118
is no need to dissect every creature into such little parts,
to know their nature, but we can do it by another way
as well; for we may dissect or divide them into never so
little parts, and yet gain never the more knowledg by it.
But according to these principles he describing amongst
the rest the nature of Water, says, “That those little
parts, out of which Water consists, are in figure somewhat
long, light and slippery like little Eeles, which are never
so closely joyned and entangled, but may easily be separated.”
Of Meteor.
INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched..I.a.3.
To which I answer, That I observe the nature
and figure of water to be flowing, dilating, divideable
and circular; for we may see, in Tides, overflowings,
and breaking into parts, as in rain, it will always move
in a round and circular figure; And I think, if its parts
were long and entangled like a knot of Eeles, it could
never be so easily contracted and denced into snow or
ice. Neither do I think, That “Salt-water hath a mixture
of somewhat grosser parts, not so apt to bend;” INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.C.3.a.I.
for to
my observation and reason, the nature of salt-water consists
herein, that its circle-lines are pointed, which sharp
and pointed figures makes it so penetrating; yet may
those points be separated from the circle lines of water,
as it is seen in the making of Salt. But I am not of your
Authors opinion, That those little points do stick so fast
in flesh, as little nails, to keep it from putrefaction; for
points do not always fasten; or else fire, which certainly
is composed of sharp-pointed parts, would harden,
and keep other bodies from dissolving, whereas on
the contrary, it separates and divides them, although after
several manners. But Putrefaction is onely a dissolving
and separating of parts, after the manner of dilation;
and the motion of salt is contracting as well as penetrating, Hh2r 119
penetrating, for we may observe, what flesh soever is
dry-salted, doth shrink and contract close together; I
will not say, but the pointed parts of salt may fasten like
nayls in some sorts of bodies, but not in all they work
on. And this is the reason also, that Sea-water is of
more weight then fresh-water, for being composed of
points, those points stick within each other, and so become
more strong; But yet do they not hinder the circular
dilating motion of water, for the circle-lines are
within, and the points without, but onely they make
it more strong from being divided by other exterior bodies
that swim upon it. And this is the cause that Salt-
water is not so easily forced or turned to vapour, as
Fresh, for the points piercing into each other, hold it
more strongly together; but this is to be considered, that
the points of salt are on the outside of the watry Circle,
not on the inside, which causes it to be divideable from
the watry Circles. I will conclude, when I have given
the reason why water is so soon suckt up by sand,
lime, and the like bodies, and say that it is the nature
of all spongy, dry and porous bodies, meeting with liquid
and pliable bodies as water, do draw and suck them
up, like as animal Creatures being thirsty, do drink:
And so I take my leave, and rest,

Madam

Your Faithful Friend
and Servant

MA- Hh2v 120

XXXIX

Madam

Concerning Vapour, Clouds, Wind and Rain,
I am of your Authors opinion, That “Water is
changed into Vapour, and Vapour into Air, and that
dilated Vapours make Wind, and condensed Vapours, Clouds
and Mists;” Of Meteor
INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.c.2,4,5,6.
But I am not for his little particles, “whereof”,
he says, “Vapours are made, by the motion of a rare and subtil
matter in the pores of terrestrial bodies”
; which certainly
I should conceive to be loose atoms, did he not
make them of several figures and magnitude: for, in
my opinion, there are no such things in nature, which
like little Flyes or Bees do fly up into the air; and although
I grant, that in Nature are several parts, whereof
some are more rare, others more dense, according to
the several degrees of matter, yet they are not single, but
all mixt together in one body, and the change of motions
in those joyned parts, is the cause of all the changes of
figures whatever, without the assistance of any forreign
parts: And thus Water of it self is changed to Snow,
Ice, or Hail, by its inherent figurative Motions; that
is, the circular dilation of Water by contraction, changes
into the figure of Snow, Ice, or Hail; or by rarifying
motions it turns into the figure of Vapour, and
this Vapour again by contracting motions into the figure
of hoar-frost; and when all these motions change
again into the former, then the figure of Ice, Snow,
Hail, Vapour and Frost, turns again into the figure of Water; Ii1r 121
Water: And this in all sense and reason is the most
facil and probable way of making Ice, Snow, Hail, &c.
As for rarefaction and condensation, I will not say that
they may be forced by forreign parts, but yet they are
made by change and alteration of the inherent motions
of their own parts, for though the motions of forreign
parts, may be the occasion of them, yet they are not the
immediate cause or actors thereof. And as for Thunder,
that clouds of Ice and Snow, the uppermost being
condensed by heat, and so made heavy, should fall
upon another and produce the noise of thunder, is very
improbable; for the breaking of a little small string, will
make a greater noise then a huge shower of snow with
falling, and as for Ice being hard, it may make a great
noise, one part falling upon another, but then their
weight would be as much as their noise, so that the clouds
or roves of Ice would be as soon upon our heads, if not
sooner, as the noise in our Eares; like as a bullet shot
out of a Canon, we may feel the bullet as soon as we
hear the noise. But to conclude, all densations are not
made by heat, nor all noises by pressures, for sound is
oftener made by division then pressure, and densation
by cold then by heat: And this is all for the present,
from,

Madam

Your faithful Friend,
and Servant

Ii Ma- Ii1v 122

XL

Madam

I cannot perceive the Rational Truth of your Authors
opinion, concerning Colours, made “by the agitation
of little spherical bodies of an Æthereal matter,
transmitting the action of Light”
; for if colours were
made after this manner, there would, in my opinion,
not be any fixed or lasting colour, but one colour would
be so various, and change faster then every minute; the
truth is, there would be no certain or perfect colour at
all: wherefore it seems altogether improbable, that
such liquid, rare and disunited bodies should either
keep or make inherent and fixed colours; for liquid
and rare bodies, whose several parts are united
into one considerable bulk of body, their colours are
more apt to change then the colours of those bodies
that are dry, solid and dense; the reason is, that rare
and liquid bodies are more loose, slack, and agil, then
solid and dry bodies, in so much, as in every alteration
of motion their colours are apt to change: And if united
rare and liquid bodies be so apt to alter and change,
how is it probable, that those bodies, which are small
and not united, should either keep or make inherent
fixed colours? I will not say, but that such little bodies
may range into such lines and figures, as make colours,
but then they cannot last, being not united into
a lasting body, that is, into a solid, substantial body,
proper to make such figures as colours. But I desire you Ii2r 123
you not to mistake me, Madam, for I do not mean, that
the substance of colours is a gross thick substance, for the
substance may be as thin and rare as flame or light, or
in the next degree to it; for certainly the substance of
light, and the substance of colours come in their degrees
very neer each other; But according to the contraction
of the figures, colours are paler or deeper, or more or
less lasting. And as for the reason, why colours will
change and rechange, it is according as the figures alter
or recover their forms; for colours will be as animal
Creatures, which sometimes are faint, pale, and sick,
and yet recover; but when as a particular colour is, as
I may say, quite dead, then there is no recovering of it.
But colours may seem altered sometimes in our eyes, and
yet not be altered in themselves; for our eyes, if perfect,
see things as they are presented; and for proof, if
any animal should be presented in an unusual posture
or shape, we could not judg of it; also if a Picture,
which must be viewed side-wards, should be looked
upon forwards, we could not know what to make of it;
so the figures of colours , if they be not placed rightly
to the sight, but turned topsie-turvie as the Phrase is, or
upside-down, or be moved too quick, and this quick
motion do make a confusion with the lines of Light, we
cannot possibly see the colour perfectly. Also several
lights or shades may make colours appear otherwise
then in themselves they are, for some sorts of
lights and shades may fall upon the substantial figures
of colours in solid bodies, in such lines and figures, as
they may over-power the natural or artificial inherent
colours in solid bodies, and for a time make other
colours, and many times the lines of light or of Ii2v 124
of shadows will meet and sympathize so with inherent
colours, and place their lines so exactly, as they
will make those inherent colours more splendorous
then in their own nature they are, so that light and
shadows will add or diminish or alter colours very
much. Likewise some sorts of colours will be altered
to our sight, not by all, but onely by some sorts of light,
as for example, blew will seem green, and green blew
by candle light, when as other colours will never appear
changed, but shew constantly as they are; the
reason is, because the lines of candle light fall in such
figures upon the inherent colours, and so make them
appear according to their own figures; Wherefore it
is onely the alteration of the exterior figures of light and
shadows, that make colours appear otherwise, and not a
change of their own natures; And hence we may rationally
conclude, that several lights and shadows by
their spreading and dilating lines may alter the face or
out-side of colours, but not suddenly change them, unless
the power of heat, and continuance of time, or
any other cause, do help and assist them in that work
of metamorphosing or transforming of colours; but
if the lines of light be onely, as the phrase is, Skin-deep;
that is, but lightly spreading and not deeply penetrating,
they may soon wear out or be rubbed of;
for though they hurt, yet they do not kill the natural
colour, but the colour may recover and reassume its
former vigour and lustre: but time and other accidental
causes will not onely alter, but destroy particular
colours as well as other creatures, although not all
after the same manner, for some will last longer
then others. And thus, Madam, there are three sorts Kk1r 125
sorts of Colours, Natural, Artificial, and Accidental;
but I have discoursed of this subject more at large
in my Philosophical Opinions, to which I refer you,
and rest,

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

XLI

Madam

My answer to your Authors question, “Why flame
ascends in a pointed figure?” INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.P.4.art..97.
is, That the figure
of fire consists in points, and being dilated into
a flame, it ascends in lines of points slope-wayes from
the fired fuel; like as if you should make two or more
sticks stand upright and put the upper ends close together,
but let the lower ends be asunder, in which
posture they will support each other, which, if both
their ends were close together, they could not do.
The second question is, “Why fire doth not alwayes flame?” INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Art..107
I answer, Because all fuel is not flameable, some being
so moist, as it doth oppose the fires dryness, and
some so hard and retentive, as fire cannot so soon dissolve
it; and in this contest, where one dissipates, and the
other retains, a third figure is produced, viz. smoak,
between the heat of one, and the moisture of the other; Kk and Kk1v 126
and this smoak is forced by the fire out of the fuel, and
is nothing else but certain parts of fuel, raised to such a
degree of rarefaction; and if fire come near, it forces
the smoak into flame, the smoak changing it self by its
figurative motions into flame; but when smoak is above
the flame, the flame cannot force the smoak to fire or enkindle
it self, for the flame cannot so well encounter it;
which shews, as if smoak had a swifter motion then
flame, although flame is more rarified then smoak; and
if moisture predominate, there is onely smoak, if fire,
then there is flame: But there are many figures, that do
not flame, until they are quite dissolved, as Leather,
and many other things. Neither can fire work upon
all bodies alike, but according to their several natures,
like as men cannot encounter several sorts of creatures after
one and the same manner; for not any part in nature
hath an absolute power, although it hath self-motion;
and this is the reason, that wax by fire is melted, and
clay hardened. The third question is, “Why some few
drops of water sprinkled upon fire, do encrease its flame?”

I answer, by reason of their little quantity, which being
over-powred by the greater quantity and force of
fire, is by its self-motions converted into fire; for water
being of a rare nature, and fire, for the most part, of a
rarifying quality, it cannot suddenly convert it self into
a more solid body then its nature is, but following its
nature by force it turns into flame. The fourth question
is, “Why the flame of spirit of Wine doth consume the
Wine, and yet cannot burn or hurt a linnen cloth?”
I
answer, The Wine is the fuel that feeds the flame,
and upon what it feeds, it devoureth, and with the
food, the feeder; but by reason Wine is a rarer body Kk2r 127
body then Oyle, or Wood, or any other fuel, its
flame is also weaker. And thus much of these questions,
I rest,

Madam

Your Faithful Friend
and Servant

XLII

Madam

To conclude my discourse upon the Opinions of
these two famous and learned Authors, which I
have hitherto sent you in several Letters, I could
not chuse but repeat the ground of my own opinions in
this present; which I desire you to observe well, lest
you mistake any thing, whereof I have formerly discoursed.
First I am for self-moving matter, which I
call the sensitive and rational matter, and the perceptive
and architectonical part of nature, which is the life and
knowledg of nature. Next I am of an opinion, That all
Perception is made by corporeal, figuring self-motions,
and that the perception of forreign objects is made by patterning
them out: as for example, The sensitive perception
of forreign objects is by making or taking copies
from these objects, so as the sensitive corporeal motions
in the eyes copy out the objects of sight, and the sensitive
corporeal motions in the ears copy out the objects
of sound; the sensitive corporeal motions in the nostrils, copy Kk2v 128
copy out the objects of sent; the sensitive corporeal motions
in the tongue and mouth, copy out the objects of
taste, and the sensitive corporeal motions in the flesh and
skin of the body copy out the forreign objects of touch;
for when you stand by the fire, it is not that the fire, or
the heat of the fire enters your flesh, but that the sensitive
motions copy out the objects of fire and heat. As
for my Book of Philosophy, I must tell you, that it
treats more of the production and architecture of Creatures
then of their perceptions, and more of the causes
then the effects, more in a general then peculiar way,
which I thought necessary to inform you of, and so I
remain,

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

XLIII

Madam

I received your questions in your last: the first was,
“Whether there be more body compact together in a
heavy then in a light thing?”
I answer, That
purity, rarity, little quantity, exteriour shape, as
also motion cause lightnesse; and grossness of bulk,
density, much quantity, exterior figure and motion
cause heaviness, as it may be confirmed by many examples:
but lightness and heaviness are onely conceptionstions Ll1r 129
of man, as also ascent and descent; and it may be
questioned, whether there be such things really in nature;
for change of motions of one and the same body will
make lightness, and heaviness, as also rarity and density:
besides, the several figures and compositions of
bodies will cause them to ascend or descend, for Snow
is a light body and yet descends fronfrom the clouds, and
Water is a heavie body, and yet ascends in springs out
of the Earth; Dust is a dense body and yet is apt to ascend,
Rain or Dew is a rare body and yet is apt to
descend; Also a Bird ascends by his shape, and a small
worm although of less body and lighter will fall down;
and there can be no other prof of light and heavy bodies
but by their ascent and descent; But as really there is no
such thing as heavie or light in nature more then words,
and comparisons of different corporeal motions, so there
is no such thing, as high or low, place or time, but
onely words to make comparisons and to distinguish
different corporeal motions. The second question
was, “When a Bason with water is wasted into smoak,
which fills up a whole Room, Whether the air in the
room doth, as the sensitive motions of the eye, pattern
out the figure of the smoak; or whether all the room is
really fill’d with the vapour or smoak?”
I answer, If it be
onely the pattern or figure of smoak or vapour, the extension
and dilation is not so much as man imagines; but
why may not the air, which in my opinion hath self-motion,
pattern out the figure of smoak as well as the eye? for
that the eye surely doth it, may be proved; because smoak,
if it enter the eye, makes it not onely smart and water
much, but blinds it quite for the present; wherefore
smoak doth not enter the eye, when the eye seeth it, but L the Ll1v 130
the eye patterns out the figure of smoak, and this is
perception; In the same manner may the air pattern
out the figure of smoak. The third question was,
“Whether all that they name qualities of bodies, as thickness,
thinness, hardness, softness, gravity, levity, transparentness,
and the like, be substances?”
I answer, That
all those, they call qualities, are nothing else but change
of motion and figure of the same body, and several
changes of motions are not several bodies, but several
actions of one body; for change of motion doth not
create new matter or multiply its quantity: for though
corporeal motions may divide and compose, contract
and dilate, yet they cannot create new matter, or make
matter any otherwise then it is by nature, neither can
they add or substract any thing from its nature. And
therefore my opinion is, not that they are things subsisting
by themselves without matter, but that there can
no abstraction be made of motion and figure from matter,
and that matter and motion being but one thing
and inseparable, make but one substance. Wherefore
density and rarity, gravity and levity, &c. being
nothing else but change of motions, cannot be without
matter, but a dense or rare, heavie or light matter is but
one substance or body; And thus having obeyed your
commands, I rest,

Madam

Your faithful Friend,
and Servant

Ma- Ll2r 131

XLIV

Madam

I am very ready to give you my opinion of those two
questions you sent me, whereof the first was, “Whether
that, which is rare and subtil, be not withal pure?”

To which I answer, That all rare bodies are not subtil,
nor pure, and that all which is dense is not gross and
dull: As for example, Puddle-water, or also clear water,
is rarer then Quicksilver, and yet not so subtil and
pure as Quicksilver; the like of Gold; for Quicksilver
and Gold may be rarified to a transparentness,
and yet be so dense, as not to be easily dissolved; and
Quicksilver is very subtil and searching, so as to be
able to force other bodies to divide as well as it can divide
and compose its own parts. Wherefore my opinion
is, that the purest and subtilest degree of matter in
nature, is that degree of matter which can dilate and
contract, compose and divide into any figure by corporeal
self-motion. Your second question was, “Why a man’s
hand cannot break a little hard body, as a little nail, whereas
yet it is bigger then the nail?”
I answer, It is not because the
hand is softer then the nail, for one hard body will not
break suddenly another hard body, and a man may
easily break an iron nail with his hand, as I have bin informed;
but it is some kind of motion which can easier
do it, then another: for I have seen a strong cord
wound about both a man’s hands, who pulled his hands
as hard and strongly asunder as he could, and yet was not Ll2v 132
not able to break it; when as a Youth taking the same
cord, and winding it about his hands as the former did,
immediately broke it; the cause was, that he did it with
another kind of motion or pulling, then the other did,
which though he used as much force and strength, as
he was able, yet could not break it, when the boy did
break it with the greatest ease, and turning onely his
hands a little, which shews, that many things may be
done by a slight of motion, which otherwise a great
strength and force cannot do. This is my answer and
opinion concerning your proposed questions; if you
have any more, I shall be ready to obey you, as,

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and humble Servant

XLV

Madam

I understand by your last, that you are very desirous
to know, “Whether there be not in nature such animal
creatures both for purity and size, as we are not capable
to perceive by our sight”
. Truly, Madam, in my opinion
it is very probable there may be animal creatures
of such rare bodies as are not subject to our exterior senses,
as well, as there are elements which are not subject
to all our exterior senses: as for example, fire is onely
subject to our sight and feeling, and not to any other sense; Mm1r 133
sense, water is subject to our sight, taste, touch and
hearing, but not to smelling; and earth is subject to our
sight, taste, touch and smelling, but not to our hearing;
and vapour is onely subject to our sight, and wind onely
to our hearing; but pure air is not subject to any of our
senses, but onely known by its effects: and so there may
likewise be animal creatures which are not subject to any
of our senses both for their purity and life; as for example,
I have seen pumpt out of a water pump small
worms which could hardly be discerned but by a bright
Sun-light, for they were smaller then the smallest hair,
some of a pure scarlet colour and some white, but
though they were the smallest creatures that ever I did
see, yet they were more agil and fuller of life, then many
a creature of a bigger size, and so small they were,
as I am confident, they were neither subject to tast,
smell, touch nor hearing, but onely to sight, and that
neither without dificulty, requiring both a sharp sight
and a clear light to perceive them; and I do verily believe
that these small animal creatures may be great in
comparison to others which may be in nature. But if
it be probable that there may be such small animal creatures
in nature, as are not subject to our exterior senses,
by reason of their littleness; it is also probable, that
there may be such great and big animal creatures in
nature as are beyond the reach and knowledg of our exterior
senses; for bigness and smallness are not to be judged
by our exterior senses, onely; but as sense and reason
inform us, that there are different degrees in Purity
and Rarity, so also in shapes, figures, and sizes in all
natural creatures. Next you desired to know, “Whether
there can be an artificial Life, or a Life made by Art?”
Mm My Mm1v 134
My answer is, Not; for although there is Life in all
natures parts, yet not all the parts of life, for there is
one part of natural matter which in its nature is inanimate
or without life, and though natural Life doth produce
Art, yet Art cannot produce natural Life, for though
Art is the action of Life, yet it is not Life it self: not but
that there is Life in Art, but not art in life, for Life is natural,
and not articifial; and thus the several parts of a
watch may have sense and reason according to the
nature of their natural figure, which is steel, but not
as they have an artificial shape, for Art cannot put Life
into the watch, Life being onely natural, not artificial.
Lastly your desire was to know, “Whether a part of matter
may be so small, as it cannot be made less?”
I answer,
there is no such thing in nature as biggest or least, nature
being Infinite as well in her actions as in her substance;
and I have mentioned in my book of Philosophy, and
in a letter, I sent you heretofore concerning Infinite,
that there are several sorts of Infinites, as Infinite in
quantity or bulk, Infinite in number, Infinite in quality,
as Infinite degrees of hardness, softness, thickness,
thinness, swiftness, slowness, &c. as also Infinite compositions,
divisions, creations, dissolutions, &c. in nature;
and my meaning is, that all these Infinite actions
do belong to the Infinite body of nature, which being
infinite in substance must also of necessity be infinite in
its actions; but although these Infinite actions are
inherent in the power of the Infinite substance of nature,
yet they are never put in act in her parts, by reason
there being contraries in nature, and every one of
the aforementioned actions having its opposite, they
do hinder and obstruct each other so, that none can actually Mm2r 135
actually run into infinite; for the Infinite degrees of
compositions hinder the infinite degrees of divisions; and
the infinite degrees of rarity, softness, swiftness, &c.
hinder the infinite degrees of density, hardness, slowness,
&c. all which nature has ordered with great wisdom
and Prudence to make an amiable combination between
her parts; for if but one of these actions should run
into infinite, it would cause a horrid confusion between
natures parts, nay an utter destruction of the whole
body of nature, if I may call it whole: as for example,
if one part should have infinite compositions, without
the hinderance or obstruction of division, it would at
last mount and become equal to the Infinite body of
nature, and so from a part change to a whole, from
being finite to infinite, which is impossible; Wherefore,
though nature hath an Infinite natural power,
yet she doth not put this power in act in her particulars;
and although she has an infinite force or strength, yet
she doth not use this force or strength in her parts.
Moreover when I speak of Infinite divisions and compositions,
creations and dissolutions, &c. in nature, I
do not mean so much the infinite degrees of compositions
and divisions, as the actions themselves to be infinite
in number; for there being infinite parts in nature,
and every one having its compositions and divisions,
creations and dissolutions, these actions must of necessity
be infinite too, to wit, in number, according to
the Infinite number of parts, for as there is an Infinite
number of parts in nature, so there is also an infinite
number and variety of motions which are natural actions.
However let there be also infinite degrees of these
natural actions, in the body or substance of infinite nature; Mm2v 136
nature; yet, as I said, they are never put in act, by
reason every action hath its contrary or opposite, which
doth hinder and obstruct it from running actually into
infinite. And thus I hope, you conceive cleerly now,
what my opinion is, and that I do not contradict my self
in my works, as some have falsly accused me, for they
by misapprehending my meaning, judge not according
to the truth of my sense, but according to their own
false interpretation, which shews not onely a weakness
in their understandings and passions, but a great injustice
and injury to me, which I desire you to vindicate
when ever you chance to hear such accusations and blemishes
laid upon my works, by which you will Infinitely
oblige,

Madam

Your humble and faithful Servant

Sect. II. Nn1r 137

Sect. II.

I.

Madam

Being come now to the Perusal of
the Works of that learned Author
Dr. Moor, I find that the onely design
of his Book called Antidote, is
to prove the Existence of a God, and
to refute, or rather convert Atheists;
which I wonder very much at, considering,
he says himself, Antidote,
INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Book I. C. 10.
a.5
That “there is no man
under the cope of Heaven but believes a God”
; which if so,
what needs there to make so many arguments to no
purpose? unless it be to shew Learning and wit; In my
opinion, it were better to convert Pagans to be Christians,
or to reform irregular Christians to a more pious
life, then to prove that, which all men believe, which
is the way to bring it into question. For certainly,
according to the natural Light of Reason, there is a
God, and no man, I believe, doth doubt it; for though Nn there Nn1v 138
there may be many vain words, yet I think there is no
such atheistical belief amongst man-kind, nay, not onely
amongst men, but also, amongst all other creatures,
for if nature believes a God, all her parts, especially
the sensitive and rational, which are the living and
knowing parts, and are in all natural creatures, do the
like, and therefore all parts and creatures in nature do
adore and worship God, for any thing man can
know to the contrary; for no question, but natures
soule adores and worships God as well as man’s soule;
and why may not God be worshipped by all sorts and
kinds of creatures as well, as by one kind or sort? I will
not say the same way, but I believe there is a general
worship and adoration of God; for as God is an Infinite
Deity, so certainly he has an Infinite Worship and Adoration,
and there is not any part of nature, but adores and
worships the only omnipotent God, to whom belongs
Praise and Glory from and to all eternity: For it is very
improbable, that God should be worshipped onely in
part, and not in whole, and that all creatures were made to
obey man, and not to worship God, onely for man’s
sake, and not for God’s worship, for man’s use, and not
God’s adoration, for mans spoil and not God’s blessing.
But this Presumption, Pride, Vain-glory and Ambition
of man, proceeds from the irregularity of nature,
who being a servant, is apt to commit errors; and cannot
be so absolute and exact in her devotion, adoration and
worship, as she ought, nor so well observant of God as
God is observing her: Nevertheless, there is not any
of her parts or creatures, that God is not acknowledged
by, though not so perfectly as he ought, which is
caused by the irregularities of nature, as I said before. And Nn2r 139
And so God of his mercy have mercy upon all Creatures;
To whose protection I commend your Ladiship,
and rest,

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

II

Madam

Since I spake in my last of the adoration and worship
of God, you would faine know, whether we
can have an Idea of God? I answer, That naturally
we may, and really have a knowledge of the existence
of God, as I proved in my former letter, to wit, that
there is a God, and that he is the Author of all things,
who rules and governs all things, and is also the God of
Nature: but I dare not think, that naturally we can
have an Idea of the essence of God, so as to know what
God is in his very nature and essence; for how can
there be a finite Idea of an Infinite God? You may say,
As well as of Infinite space. I answer, Space is relative,
or has respect to body, but there is not any thing that
can be compared to God; for the Idea of Infinite nature
is material, as being a material creature of Infinite
material Nature. You will say, How can a finite
part have an Idea of infinite nature? I answer, Very
well, by reason the Idea is part of Infinite Nature, and so Nn2v 140
so of the same kind, as material; but God being an Eternal,
Infinite, Immaterial, Individable Being, no
natural creature can have an Idea of him. You will
say, That the Idea of God in the mind is immaterial;
I answer, I cannot conceive, that there can be any immaterial
Idea in nature; but be it granted, yet that Immaterial
is not a part of God, for God is individable, and
hath no parts; wherefore the Mind cannot have an
Idea of God, as it hath of Infinite nature, being a part
of nature; for the Idea of God cannot be of the essence
of God, as the Idea of nature is a corporeal part of
nature: and though nature may be known in some parts,
yet God being Incomprehensible, his Essence can by
no wayes or means be naturally known; and this is
constantly believed, by

Madam

Your faithful Friend,
and Servant

III

Madam

Although I mentioned in my last, that it is impossible
to have an Idea of God, yet your Author is
pleased to say, That “he will not stick to affirm,
that the Idea or notion of God is as easie, as any notion else
whatsoever, and that we may know as much of him as
of any thing else in the world.” Of the Immortality
of
the Soul
,INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.l.I.
c.4.
To which I answer, That in Oo1r 141
in my opinion, God is not so easily to be known by any
creature, as man may know himself; nor his attributes
so well, as man can know his own natural proprieties:
for Gods Infinite attributes are not conceivable, and
cannot be comprehended by a finite knowledg and understanding,
as a finite part of nature; for though nature’s
parts may be Infinite in number, and as they have a
relation to the Infinite whole, if I may call it so, which
is Infinite nature, yet no part is infinite in it self, and
therefore it cannot know so much as whole nature: and
God being an Infinite Deity, there is required an Infinite
capacity to conceive him; nay, Nature her self although
Infinite, yet cannot posibly have an exact notion
of God, by reason of the disparity between God and her
self; and therefore it is not probable, if the Infinite servant
of God is not able to conceive him, that a finite part
or creature of nature, of what kind or sort soever, whether
Spiritual, as your Author is pleased to name it, or
Corporeal, should comprehend God. Concerning
my belief of God, I submit wholly to the Church,
and believe as I have bin informed out of the Athanasian
Creed
, that the Father is Incomprehensible, the Sonne
Incomprehensible, and the Holy Ghost Incomprehensible;
and that there are not three, but one Incomprehensible
God; Wherefore if any man can prove (as I
do verily believe he cannot) that God is not Incomprehensible,
he must of necessity be more knowing then
the whole Church, however he must needs dissent
from the Church. But perchance your Author may
say, I raise new and prejudicial opinions, in saying that
matter is eternal. I answer, The Holy Writ doth not
mention Matter to be created, but onely Particular Oo Creatures, Oo1v 142
Creatures, as this Visible World, with all its Parts, as
the history or description of the Creation of the World
in Genesis plainly shews; For “God said, Let it itit be
Light, and there was Light; Let there be a Firmament
in the midst of the Waters, and let it divide the Waters
from the Waters; and Let the Waters under the Heaven
be gathered together unto one place, and let the dry Land
appear; and let the Earth bring forth Grass, the Herb
yielding Seed, and the Fruit-tree yielding Fruit after his
kind; and let there be Lights in the Firmament of the
Heaven, to divide the Day from the Night, &c.”
Which
proves, that all creatures and figures were made and produced
out of that rude and desolate heap or chaos
which the Scripture mentions, which is nothing else
but matter, by the powerful Word and Command of
God, executed by his Eternal Servant, Nature; as I
have heretofore declared it in a Letter I sent you in the
beginning concerning Infinite Nature. But least I
seem to encroach too much upon Divinity, I submit this
Interpretation to the Church; However, I think it not
against the ground of our Faith; for I am so far from
maintaining any thing either against Church or State,
as I am submitting to both in all duty, and shall do so as
long as I live, and rest,

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

MA- Oo2r 143

IV

Madam

Since your Worthy and Learned Author is pleased
to mention, That an “ample experience both of Men
and Things doth enlarge our Understanding,” Antid. INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Book.
2. Ch.2.a.I.
I have
taken occasion hence to enquire, how a mans Understanding
may be encreased or inlarged. The Understanding
must either be in Parts, or it must be Individable
as one; if in Parts, then there must be so many
Understandings as there are things understood; but if
Individable, and but one Understanding, then it must
dilate it self upon so many several objects. I for my
part, assent to the first, That Understanding increases
by Parts, and not by Dilation, which Dilation must
needs follow, if the Mind or Understanding of man be
Indivisible and without parts; but if the Mind or Soul
be Individable, then I would fain know, how Understanding,
Imagination, Conception, Memory, Remembrance,
and the like, can be in the mind? You
will say, perhaps, they are so many faculties or properties
of the Incorporeal Mind, but, I hope, you do
not intend to make the Mind or Soul a Deity, with so
many attributes, Wherefore, in my opinion, it is
safer to say, That the Mind is composed of several active
Parts: but of these Parts I have treated in my Philosophy,
where you will find, that all the several Parts of Nature
are Living and Knowing, and that there is no part
that has not Life and Knowledg, being all composed of Oo2v 144
of rational and sensitive matter, which is the life and
soul of Nature; and that Nature being Material, is
composable and dividable, which is the cause of so many
several Creatures, where every Creature is a part of
Nature, and these Infinite parts or creatures are Nature
her self; for though Nature is a self-moving substance,
and by self-motion divides and composes her self several
manners or ways into several forms and figures, yet being
a knowing, as well as a living substance, she knows
how to order her parts and actions wisely; for as she
hath an Infinite body or substance, so she has an Infinite
life and knowledg; and as she hath an Infinite life and
knowledg, so she hath an infinite wisdom: But mistake
me not, Madam; I do not mean an Infinite Divine Wisdom,
but an Infinite Natural Wisdom, given her by
the Infinite bounty of the Omnipotent God; but yet
this Infinite Wisdom, Life and Knowledg in Nature
make but one Infinite. And as Nature hath in degrees
of matter, so she has also degrees and variety of corporeal
motions; for some parts of matter are self-moving,
and some are moved by these self-moving parts of matter;
and all these parts, both the moving and moved, are
so intermixed, that none is without the other, no not in
any the least Creature or part of Nature we can conceive;
for there is no Creature or part of Nature, but
has a comixture of those mentioned parts of animate and
inanimate matter, and all the motions are so ordered by
Natures wisdom, as not any thing in Nature can be
otherwise, unless by a Supernatural Command and
Power of God; for no part of corporeal matter and
motion can either perish, or but rest; one part may
cause another part to alter its motions, but not to quit motion, Pp1r 145
motion, no more then one part of matter can annihilate
or destroy another; and therefore matter is not meerly
Passive, but always Active, by reason of the thorow
mixture of animate and inanimate matter; for although
the animate matter is onely active in its nature, and the
inanimate passive, yet because they are so closely united
and mixed together that they make but one body,
the parts of the animate or self-moving matter do bear
up and cause the inanimate parts to move and work with
them; and thus there is an activity in all parts of matter
moving and working as one body, without any fixation
or rest, for all is moveable, moving and moved. All
which, Madam, if it were well observed, there would
not be so many strange opinions concerning nature and
her actions, making the purest and subtillest part of matter
immaterial or incorporeal, which is as much, as to
extend her beyond nature, and to rack her quite to nothing.
But I fear the opinion of Immaterial substances
in Nature will at last bring in again the Heathen Religion,
and make us believe a god Pan, Bacchus, Ceres,
Venus, and the like, so as we may become worshippers
of Groves and shadows, Beans and Onions, as our
Forefathers. I say not this, as if I would ascribe any
worship to Nature, or make her a Deity, for she is onely
a servant to God, and so are all her parts or creatures,
which parts or creatures, although they are transformed,
yet cannot be annihilated, except Nature her self
be annihilated, which may be, whensoever the Great
God pleases; for her existence and resolution, or total
destruction, depends upon Gods Will and Decree,
whom she fears, adores, admires, praises and prayes
unto, as being her God and Master; and as she adores Pp God, Pp1v
God, so do all her parts and creatures, and amongst the
rest Man, so that there is no Atheist in Infinite Nature,
at least not in the opinion of,

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

V

Madam

I cannot well conceive what your Author means
by the “Common Laws of Nature;” Antid. INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Book.
2. C.2.
But if you desire
my opinion how many Laws Nature hath, and what
they are; I say Nature hath but One Law, which is a
wise Law, viz. to keep Infinite matter in order, and to
keep so much Peace, as not to disturb the Foundation
of her Government: for though Natures actions are
various, and so many times opposite, which would seem
to make wars between several Parts, yet those active
Parts, being united into one Infinite body, cannot
break Natures general Peace; for that which Man
names War, Sickness, Sleep, Death, and the like, are
but various particular actions of the onely matter; not,
as your Author imagines, in a confusion, like Bullets,
or such like things juggled together in a mans Hat, but
very orderly and methodical: And the Playing motions
of nature are the actions of Art, but her serious actions
are the actions of Production, Generation, and Transformationformation Pp2r 147
in several kinds, sorts and particulars of her
Creatures, as also the action of ruling and governing
these her several active Parts. Concerning the Preeminence
and Prerogative of Man, whom your Author
calls “The flower and chief of all the products of nature
upon this Globe of the earth;” INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.C.3.
I answer, That Man cannot
well be judged of himself, because he is a Party, and
so may be Partial; But if we observe well, we shall
find that the Elemental Creatures are as excellent as
Man, and as able to be a friend or foe to Man, as Man
to them, and so the rest of all Creatures; so that I cannot
perceive more abilities in Man then in the rest of natural
Creatures; for though he can build a stately House,
yet he cannot make a Honey-comb; and though he
can plant a Slip, yet he cannot make a Tree; though
he can make a Sword, or Knife, yet he cannot make
the Mettal. And as Man makes use of other Creatures,
so other Creatures make use of Man, as far as
he is good for any thing: But Man is not so useful to
his neighbour or fellow-creatures, as his neighbour or
fellow-creatures to him, being not so profitable for use,
as apt to make spoil. And so leaving him, I rest,

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

Ma- Pp2v 148

VI

Madam

Your Author demands, “Whether there was ever any
man, that was not mortal, and whether there be any
mortal that had not a beginning?” Antid. INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.l.3.
c.15.a.3.
Truly, if nature
be eternal, all the material figures which ever were,
are, and can be, must be also eternal in nature; for the
figures cannot be annihilated, unless nature be destroyed;
and although a Creature is dissolved and transformed
into numerous different figures, yet all these
several figures remain still in those parts of matter,
whereof that creature was made, for matter never changes,
but is always one and the same, and the figure is nothing
else but matter transposed or transformed by motion
several modes or ways. But if you conceive Matter
to be one thing, Figure another, and Motion a third,
several, distinct and dividable from each other, it will
produce gross errors, for, matter, motion, and figure,
are but one thing. And as for that common question,
whether the Egg was before the Chick, or the Chick
before the Egg, it is but a thred-bare argument, which
proves nothing, for there is no such thing as First in Eternity,
neither doth Time make productions or generations,
but Matter; and whatsoever matter can produce
or generate, was in matter before it was produced;
wherefore the question is, whether Matter, which is
Nature, had a beginning, or not? I say not: for
put the case, the figures of Earth, Air, Water, and Fire, Light Qq1r 149
Light and Colours, Heat and Cold, Animals, Vegetables
and Minerals, &c. were not produced from all
Eternity, yet those figures have nevertheless been in
Matter, which is Nature, from all eternity, for these
mentioned Creatures are onely made by the corporeal
motions of Matter, transforming Matter into
such several figures; Neither can there be any perishing
or dying in Nature, for that which Man
calls so, is onely an alteration of Figure. And as
all other productions are but a change of Matters
sensitive motions, so all irregular and extravagant
opinions are nothing but a change of Matters rational
motions; onely productions by rational motions
are interior, and those by sensitive motions exterior.
For the Natural Mind is not less material
then the body, onely the Matter of the Mind is
much purer and subtiller then the Matter of the
Body. And thus there is nothing in Nature but
what is material; but he that thinks it absurd to
say, the World is composed of meer self-moving
Matter, may consider, that it is more absurd to
believe Immaterial substances or spirits in Nature,
as also a spirit of Nature, which is the Vicarious
power of God upon Matter; For why should it not
be as probable, that God did give Matter a self-
moving power to her self, as to have made another
Creature to govern her? For Nature is
not a Babe, or Child, to need such a Spiritual
Nurse, to teach her to go, or to move; neither
is she so young a Lady as to have need of a Governess,
for surely she can govern her self; she
needs not a Guardian for fear she should run away Qq with Qq1v 150
with a younger Brother, or one that cannot make her a
Jointure. But leaving those strange opinions to the
fancies of their Authors, I’le add no more, but that
I am,

Madam

Your faithful Friend,
and Servant

VII

Madam

Your Author being very earnest in arguing against
those that maintain the opinion of Matter
being self-moving, amongst the rest of his arguments
brings in this: “Suppose,” Of the Immortality
of
the Soul
, INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.l.I.
C.I 2.
says he, “Matter could
move it self, would meer Matter with self-motion amount
to that admirable wise contrivance of things which we see
in the World?—All the evasion I can imagine, our adversaries
may use here, will be this: That Matter is capable
of sense, and the finest and most subtil of the most refined
sense; and consequently of Imagination too, yea happily
of Reason and Understanding.”
I answer, it is very
probable, that not onely all the Matter in the World,
or Universe hath Sense, but also Reason; and that the
sensitive part of matter is the builder, and the rational
the designer; whereof I have spoken of before, and you
may find more of it in my Book of Philosophy. “But,”
says your Author, “Let us see, if all their heads laid together Qq2r 151
together can contrive the anatomical Fabrick of any Creature
that liveth?”
I answer, all parts of Nature are not
bound to have heads or tayls; but if they have, surely
they are wiser than many a man’s. “I demand”, says he,
“Has every one of these Particles, that must have a hand
in the framing of the body of an animal, the whole design
of the work by the Impress of some Phantasme upon it?
or as they have several offices, so have they several parts
of the design?”
I answer, All the actions of self-moving
Matter are not Impresses, nor is every part a hand-
labourer, but every part unites by degrees into such or
such a Figure. Again, says he, “How is it conceiveable
that any one Particle of Matter, or many together, (there
not existing, yet in Nature and animal) can have the Idea
Impressed of that Creature they are to frame?”
I answer,
all figures whatsoever have been, are, or can be in Nature,
are existent in nature. “How”, says he, “can they
in framing several parts confer notes? by what language
or speech can they communicate their Counsels one to another?”
I answer, Knowledg doth not always require
speech, for speech is an effect and not a cause, but
knowledg is a cause and not an effect; and nature hath
infinite more ways to express knowledg then man can
imagine, “Wherefore”, he concludes, “that they should
mutually serve one another in such a design, is more impossible,
then that so many men, blind and dumb from their
nativity, should joyn their forces and wits together to build
a Castle, or carve a statue of such a Creature, as none of
them knew any more in several, then some one of the smallest
parts thereof, but not the relation it bore to the whole.”
I
answer, Nature is neither blind nor dumb, nor any
ways defective, but infinitely wise and knowing; for blindness Qq2v 152
blindness and dumbness are but effects of some of her
particular actions, but there is no defect in self-moving
matter, nor in her actions in general; and it is absurd to
conceive the Generality of wisdom according to an Irregular
effect or defect of a particular Creature; for the
General actions of Nature are both life and knowledg,
which are the architects of all Creatures, and know
better how to frame all kinds and sorts of Creatures
then man can conceive; and the several parts of Matter
have a more easie way of communication, then Mans
head hath with his hand, or his hand with pen, ink, and
paper, when he is going to write; which later example
will make you understand my opinion the better, if you
do but compare the rational part of Matter to the head,
the sensitive to the hand, the inanimate to pen, ink and
paper, their action to writing, and their framed figures
to those figures or letters which are written; in all which
is a mutual agreement without noise or trouble. But
give me leave, Madam, to tell you, That self-moving
Matter may sometimes erre and move irregularly, and
in some parts not move so strong, curious, or subtil at
sometimes, as in other parts, for Nature delights in variety;
Nevertheless she is more wise then any Particular
Creature or part can conceive, which is the cause that
Man thinks Nature’s wife, subtil and lively actions, are
as his own gross actions, conceiving them to be constrained
and turbulent, not free and easie, as well as wise
and knowing; Whereas Nature’s Creating, Generating
and Producing actions are by an easie connexion
of parts to parts, without Counterbuffs, Joggs and
Jolts, producing a particular figure by degrees, and in
order and method, as humane sense and reason may well Rr1r 153
well perceive: And why may not the sensitive and rational
part of Matter know better how to make a Bee,
then a Bee doth how to make Honey and Wax? or
have a better communication betwixt them, then Bees
that fly several ways, meeting and joyning to make their
Combes in their Hives? But pardon, Madam, for I
think it a Crime to compare the Creating, Generating
and producing CoporealCorporeal Life and Wisdom of Nature
unto any particular Creature, although every particular
Creature hath their share, being a part of Nature.
Wherefore those, in my opinion, do grosly err, that
bind up the sensitive matter onely to taste, touch, hearing,
seeing, and smelling; as if the sensitive parts of
Nature had not more variety of actions, then to make
five senses; for we may well observe, in every Creature
there is difference of sense and reason according
to the several modes of self-motion; For the Sun, Stars,
Earth, Air, Fire, Water, Plants, Animals, Minerals;
although they have all sense and knowledg, yet
they have not all sense and knowledg alike, because sense
and knowledg moves not alike in every kind or sort of
Creatures, nay many times very different in one and the
same Creature; but yet this doth not cause a general
Ignorance, as to be altogether Insensible or Irrational,
neither do the erroneous and irregular actions of sense
and reason prove an annihilation of sense and reason; as
for example, a man may become Mad or a Fool
through the irregular motions of sense and reason, and
yet have still the Perception of sense and reason, onely
the alteration is caused through the alteration of the sensitive
and rational corporeal motions or actions, from
regular to irregular; nevertheless he has Perceptions, Rr Thoughts, Rr1v 154
Thoughts, Ideas, Passions, and whatsoever is made
by sensitive and rational Matter, neither can Perception
be divided from Motion, nor Motion from Matter;
for all sensation is Corporeal, and so is Perception.
I can add no more, but take my leave, and rest,

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

VIII

Madam

Your Author is pleased to say, that “Matter is a Principle
purely passive, and no otherwise moved or modified,
then as some other thing moves and modifies
it, but cannot move it self at all; which is most demonstrable
to them that contend for sense and perception in it: For
if it had any such perception, it would, by vertue of its
self-motion withdraw its self from under the knocks of
hammers, or fury of the fire; or of its own accord approach
to such things as are most agreeable to it, and pleasing, and
that without the help of muscles, it being thus immediately
endowed with a self-moving power.” Of the Immortality
of
the Soul
, INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.l.2.
s.I.a.3.
By his leave, Madam,
I must tell you, that I see no consequence in this
argument; Because some parts of matter cannot withdraw
themselves from the force and power of other
parts, therefore they have neither sense, reason, nor
perception: For put the case, a man should be overpowr’dpowr’d Rr2r 155
by some other men, truely he would be forced
to suffer, and no Immaterial Spririts, I think, would
assist him. The very same may be said of other Creatures
or parts of Nature; for some may over-power
others, as the fire, hammer and hand doth over-power
a Horse-shooe, which cannot prevail over so much
odds of power and strength; And so likewise it is with
sickness and health, life and death; for example, some
corporeal motions in the body turning Rebels, by moving
contrary to the health of an animal Creature, it
must become sick; for not every particular creature
hath an absolute power, the power being in the Infinite
whole, and not in single divided parts: Indeed,
to speak properly, there is no such thing as an absolute
power in Nature; for though Nature hath power to
move it self, yet not beyond it self. But mistake me
not, for I mean by an absolute Power; not a circumscribed
and limited, but an unlimited power, no ways
bound or confined, but absolutely or every way Infinite,
and there is not any thing that has such an absolute
power but God alone: neither can Nature be undividable,
being Corporeal or Material; nor rest from
motion being naturally self-moving, and in a perpetual
motion. Wherefore though Matter is self-moving,
and very wise, (although your Author denies it, calling
those Fools that maintain this In the Append.
to the
Antid. INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.c. 3.
a. 10.
opinion) yet it cannot
go beyond the rules of its Nature, no more then
any Art can go beyond its Rules and Principles: And
as for what your Author says, That every thing would
approach to that, which is agreeable and pleasant; I
think I need no demonstration to prove it; for we may
plainly see it in all effects of Nature, that there is Sympathypathy Rr2v 156
and Antipathy, and what is this else, but approaching
to things agreeable and pleasant, and withdrawing
it self from things disagreeable, and hurtful or
offensive? But of this subject I shall discourse more
hereafter, wherefore I finish here, and rest,

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

IX

Madam

Your Authors opinion is, That “Matter being once
actually divided as far as possibly it can, it is a perfect
contradiction it should be divided any further.” In the Preface
before
the Imm. of
the Soul.

I answer, Though Nature is Infinite, yet her actions
are not all dilative nor separative, but some divide and
some compose, some dilate and some contract, which
causes a mean betwixt Natures actions or motions. Next
your Author says, That “as Infinite Greatness has no
Figure, so Infinite Littleness hath none also.”
I answer,
Whatsoever hath a body, has a figure; for it is
impossible that substance, or body, and figure, should be
separated from each other, but wheresoever is body or
substance, there is also figure, and if there be an infinite
substance, there must also be an infinite figure,
although not a certain determined or circumscribed figure,
for such a figure belongs onely to finite particulars; and Sſ1r 157
and therefore I am of your Authors mind, That it is a
contradiction to say an Infinite Cube or Triangle, for
a Cube and a Triangle is a perfect circumscribed figure,
having its certain compass and circumference, be it never
so great or little; wherefore to say an Infinite Cube,
would be as much as to say a Finite Infinite. But as
for your Authors example of “Infinite matter, space or
duration, divided into three equal parts, all which he says
must needs be Infinite, or else the whole wil not be so, and then
the middle part of them will seem both Finite and Infinite.”

I answer, That Matter is not dividable into three equal
parts, for three is a finite number and so are three equal
parts; but I say that Matter being an Infinite body, is
dividable into Infinite parts, and it doth not follow, as
your Author says, That one of those infinite parts must
be infinite also, for else there would be no difference
betwixt the whole and its parts; I say whole for distinctions
and better expressions sake, and do not mean
such a whole which hath a certain number of parts,
and is of a certain and limited figure, although never so
great; but an Infinite whole, which expression I must
needs use, by reason I speak of Infinite parts; and that
each one of these Infinite parts in number may be finite
in substance or figure, is no contradiction, but very
probable and rational; nay, I think it rather absurd
to say that each part is infinite; for then there would
be no difference betwixt parts and whole, as I said before.
Onely this is to be observed, that the Infinite
whole is Infinite in substance or bulk, but the parts are
Infinite in number, and not in bulk, for each part is
circumscribed, and finite in its exterior figure and substance.
But mistake me not, when I speak of circumscribedSs scribed Sſ1v 158
and finite single parts; for I do not mean, that each
part doth subsist single and by it self, there being no such
thing as an absolute single part in Nature, but Infinite
Matter being by self-motion divided into an infinite
number of parts, all these parts have so near a relation
to each other, and to the infinite whole, that one cannot
subsist without the other; for the Infinite parts in
number do make the Infinite whole, and the Infinite
whole consists in the Infinite number of parts; wherefore
it is onely their figures which make a difference betwixt
them; for each part having its proper figure different
from the other, which is circumscribed and limited, it
is called a finite single part; and such a part cannot be
said Infinitely dividable, for infinite composition and
division belong onely to the Infinite body of Nature,
which being infinite in substance may also be infinitely
divided, but not a finite and single part: Besides, Infinite
composition doth hinder the Infinite division, and
Infinite division hinders the Infinite composition; so
that one part cannot be either infinitely composed, or
infinitely divided; and it is one thing to be dividable,
and another to be divided. And thus, when your Author
mentions in another place, That “if a body be divisible
into Infinite Parts, it hath an Infinite number of extended
parts:” Antid. INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Book
2. c.4.
If by extension he mean corporeal dimension,
I am of his opinion; for there is no part, be it never
so little in Nature, but is material; and if material,
it has a body; and if a body, it must needs have a bodily
dimension; and so every part will be an extended
part: but since there is no part but is finite in its self,
it cannot be divisible into infinite parts; neither can any
part be infinitely dilated or contracted; for as compositionsition Sſ2r 159
and division do hinder and obstruct each other
from running into Infinite, so doth dilation hinder the
Infinite contraction, and contraction the Infinite dilation,
which, as I said before, causes a mean betwixt Nature’s
actions; nevertheless, there are Infinite dilations
and contractions in Nature, because there are Infinite
contracted and dilated parts, and so are infinite divisions
because there are infinite divided parts; but contraction,
dilation, extension, composition, division, and
the like, are onely Nature’s several actions; and as
there can be no single part in Nature that is Infinite, so
there can neither be any single Infinite action. But
as for Matter, Motion and Figure, those are Individable
and Inseparable, and make but one body or substance;
for it is as impossible to divide them, as impossible
it is to your Author to separate the essential proprieties,
which he gives, from an Immortal Spirit; And as
Matter, Motion and Figure are inseparable; so is likewise
Matter, Space, Place and Duration; For Parts,
Motion, Figure, Place and Duration, are but one Infinite
body; onely the Infinite parts are the Infinite divisions
of the Infinite body, and the Infinite body is a
composition of the Infinite parts; but figure, place and
body are all one, and so is time, andand duration, except
you will call time the division of duration, and duration
the composition of time; but infinite time, and infinite
duration is all one in Nature: and thus Nature’s Principal
motions and actions are dividing, composing, and
disposing or ordering, according to her Natural wisdom,
by the Omnipotent God’s leave and permission.
Concerning the Sun, which your Author speaks of in
the same place, and denies him to be a “Spectator of our Particular Sſ2v 160
Particular affairs upon Earth”
; saying, there is no such
divine Principle in him, whereby he can do it. I will
speak nothing against, nor for it; but I may say, that
the Sun hath such a Principle as other Creatures have,
which is, that he has sensitive and rational corporeal
motions, as well as animals or other Creatures, although
not in the same manner, nor the same organs;
and if he have sensitive and rational motions, he may also
have sensitive and rational knowledg or perception,
as well as man, or other animals and parts of Nature
have, for ought any body knows; for it is plain to humane
sense and reason, that all Creatures must needs
have rational and sensitive knowledg, because they
have all sensitive and rational matter and motions. But
leaving the Sun for Astronomers to contemplate upon,
I take my leave, and rest,

Madam

Your faithful Friend,
and Servant

X

Madam

Your Author in his arguments against Motion, being
a “Principle of Nature,” Append. to
the Antid.
INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.c.11
endeavours to prove,
that Beauty, Colour, Symmetry, and the like,
in Plants, as well as in other Creatures, are no result
from the meer motion of the matter; and forming this objection, Tt1r 161
objection, “It may be said”, says he, “That the regular
motion of the matter made the first plant of every kind; but
we demand, What regulated the motion of it, so as to guide
it, to form it self into such a state?”
I answer, The Wisdom
of Nature or infinite Matter did order its own
actions so, as to form those her Parts into such an exact
and beautiful figure, as such a Tree, or such a Flower,
or such a Fruit, and the like; and some of her Parts are
pleased and delighted with other parts, but some of her
parts are afraid or have an aversion to other parts; and
hence is like and dislike, or sympathy and antipathy,
hate and love, according as nature, which is infinite
self-moving matter, pleases to move; for though Natural
Wisdom is dividable into parts, yet these parts are
united in one infinite Body, and make but one Being
in it self, like as the several parts of a man make up but
one perfect man; for though a man may be wise in several
causes or actions, yet it is but one wisdom; and
though a Judg may shew Justice in several causes, yet it
is but one Justice; for Wisdom and Justice, though
they be practised in several causes, yet it is but one Wisdom,
and one Justice; and so, all the parts of a mans
body, although they move differently, yet are they
but one man’s bodily actions; Just as a man, if he carve
or cut out by art several statues, or draw several Pictures,
those statues or pictures are but that one man’s
work. The like may be said of Natures Motions and
Figures; all which are but one self-active or self-moving
Material Nature. But Wise Nature’s Ground
or Fundamental actions are very Regular, as you may
observe in the several and distinct kinds, sorts and particulars
of her Creatures, and in their distinct Proprieties,Tt prieties Tt1v 162
Qualities, and Faculties, belonging not onely
to each kind and sort, but to each particular Creature
and since man is not able to know perfectly all those proprieties
which belong to animals, much less will he be
able to know and judg of those that are in Vegetables,
Minerals and Elements; and yet these Creatures, for any
thing Man knows, may be as knowing, understanding,
and wise as he; and each as knowing of its kind or
sort, as man is of his; But the mixture of ignorance
and knowledg in all Creatures proceeds from thence,
that they are but Parts; and there is no better proof, that
the mind of man is dividable, then that it is not perfectly
knowing; nor no better proof that it is composeable,
then that it knows so much: but all minds are not alike,
but some are more composed then others, which is the
cause, some know more then others; for if the mind in
all men were alike, all men would have the same Imaginations,
Fancies, Conceptions, Memories, Remembrances,
Passions, Affections, Understanding, and so
forth: The same may be said of their bodies; for if all
mens sensitive parts were as one, and not dividable and
composeable, all their Faculties, Proprieties, Constitutions,
Complexions, Appetites, would be the same
in every man without any difference; but humane sense
and reason doth well perceive, that neither the mind,
life nor body are as one piece, without division and composition.
Concerning the divine Soul, I do not treat
of it; onely this I may say, That all are not devout alike,
nor those which are, are not at all times alike devout.
But to conclude: some of our modern Philosophers
think they do God good service, when they endeavour
to prove Nature, as Gods good Servant, to be Tt2r 163
be stupid, ignorant, foolish and mad, or any thing
rather then wise, and yet they believe themselves wise,
as if they were no part of Nature; but I cannot imagine
any reason why they should rail on her, except
as she hath given to others; for children in this case do
often rail at their Parents, for leaving their Brothers and
Sisters more then themselves. However, Nature can
do more then any of her Creatures: and if Man can
Paint, Imbroider, Carve, Ingrave curiously; why
may not Nature have more Ingenuity, Wit and Wisdom
then any of her particular Creatures? The same
may be said of her Government. And so leaving Wise
Nature, I rest,

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

XI

Madam

To your Authors argument, That “if Motion belong
naturally to Matter, Matter being Uniform,
it must be alike moved in every part or particle imaginable
of it, by reason this Motion being natural and essential
to Matter, is alike every way.” Antid. INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.l. 2.
c. I.
I answer, That
this is no more necessary, then that the several actions
of one body, or of one part of a body should be alike;
for though Matter is one and the same in its Nature, and Tt2v 164
and never changes, yet the motions are various, which
motions are the several actions of one and the same Natural
Matter; and this is the cause of so many several
Creatures; for self-moving matter by its self-moving
power can act several ways, modes or manners; and
had not natural matter a self-acting power, there could
not be any variety in Nature; for Nature knows of no
rest, there being no such thing as rest in Nature; but
she is in perpetual motion, I mean self-motion, given
her from God: Neither do I think it Atheistical (as
your Author deems) to maintain this opinion of self-
motion, as long as I do not deny the Omnipotency of
God; but I should rather think it Irreligious to make
so many several Creatures as Immaterial Spirits, like so
many severall Deities, to rule and govern Nature and
all material substances in Nature; for what Atheism
doth there lie in saying, that natural matter is naturally
moving, and wise in her self? Doth this oppose
the omnipotency and Infinite wisdom of God? It rather
proves and confirms it; for all Natures free power
of moving and wisdom is a gift of God, and proceeds
from him; but I must confess, it destroys the power of
Immaterial substances, for Nature will not be ruled nor
governed by them, and to be against Natural Immaterial
substances, I think, is no Atheisme, except we make
them Deities; neither is it Atheisme to contradict the
opinion of those, that believe such natural incorporeal
Spirits, unless man make himself a God. But although
Nature is wise, as I said before, and acts methodically,
yet the variety of motions is the cause of so many Irregularities
in Nature, as also the cause of Irregular opinions;
for all opinions are made by self-moving matters motions, Vu1r 165
motions, or (which is all one) by corporeal self-motion,
and some in their opinions do conceive Nature according
to the measure of themselves, as that Nature can, nor
could not do more, then they think, nay, some believe
they can do as much as Nature doth; which opinions,
whether they be probable or regular, I’le let any man
judg; adding onely this, that to humane sense and reason
it appears plainly, that as God has given Nature a
power to act freely, so he doth approve of her actions,
being wise and methodical in all her several Productions,
Generations, Transformations and Designs: And so I
conclude for the present, onely subscribe my self, as really
I am,

Madam

Your faithful Friend,
and Servant

XII

Madam

I am of your Authors opinion, concerning self-activity
or self-motion, That “what is Active of it self, can
no more cease to be active then to be:” Of the Immortality
of
the Soul
, INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.l.I.
c. 7.
And I have been
always of this opinion, even from the first begining of
my conceptions in natural Philosophy, as you may see
in my first Treatise of Natural Philosophy, which I put
forth eleven years since; where I say, That self-moving
Matter is in a Perpetual motion; But your Author endeavorsVu deavors Vu1v 166
from thence to conclude, That “Matter is not
self active, because it is reducible to rest.”
To which I
answer, That there is no such thing as Rest in Nature:
Not do I say, that all sorts of motions are subject to
our senses, for those that are subject to our sensitive Perceptions,
are but gross Motions, in comparison to those
that are not subject to our exterior senses: as for example;
We see some bodies dilate, others consume, others
corrupt; yet we do not see how they dilate, nor how
they consume, nor how they corrupt: Also we see some
bodies contract, some attract, some condense, some
consist, &c. yet we do not see their contracting, attracting,
condensing, consisting or retenting motions; and
yet we cannot say, they are not corporeal motions, because
not subject to our exterior senses; for if there were
not contracting, attracting, retenting or consistent corporeal
self-motions, it had been impossible that any
creature could have been composed into one united figure,
much less stayed and continued in the same figure
without a general alteration. But your Author
says, “If Matter, as Matter, had Motion, nothing would
hold together, but Flints, Adamants, Brass, Iron, yea,
this whole Earth, would suddenly melt into a thinner substance
then the subtil Air, or rather it never had been condensated
together to this consistency we find it.”
But I
would ask him, what reason he can give, that corporeal
self-motion should make all matter rare and fluid,
unless he believe there is but one kind of motion in Nature,
but this, human sense and reason will contradict;
for we may observe there are Infinite changes of Motion,
and there is more variety and curiosity in corporeal
motions, then any one single Creature can imagine, much Vu2r 167
much less know, but I suppose he conceives all corporeal
matter to be gross, and that not any corporeal motion
can be subtil, penetrating, contracting and dilating;
and that whatsoever is penetrating, contracting
and dilating, is Individable: But by his leave, Madam,
this doth not follow; for though there be gross degrees
of Matter, and strong degrees of Corporeal Motions,
yet there are also pure and subtil degrees of Matter and
Motions; to wit, that degree of Matter, which I name
sensitive and rational Matter, which is natural Life and
Knowledg, as sensitive Life and rational Knowledg.
Again, your Author askes, “What glue or cement holds the
parts of hard matter in Stones and Metals together?”

I answer, Consistent or retentive corporeal motions,
by an agreeable union and conjunction in the several
parts of Metal or Stone; and these retentive or consistent
motions, are as strong and active, if not more,
then some dilative or contractive motions; for I have
mentioned heretofore, that, as sensitive and rational
corporeal motions are in all Creatures, so also in Stone,
Metal, and any other dense body whatsoever; so that
not any one Creature or part of Matter is without Motion,
and therefore not any thing is at rest. But,
Madam, I dare say, I could bring more reason and
sense to prove, that sensitive and rational Matter is fuller
of activity, and has more variety of motion, and
can change its own parts of self-moving Matter more
suddenly, and into more exterior figures, then Immaterial
Spirits can do upon natural Matter. But your
Author says, That Immaterial Spirits are endued with
Sense and Reason; I say, My sensitive and rational
corporeal Matter is Sense and Reason it self, and is the Architect Vu2v 168
Architect or Creator of all figures of Natural matter;
for though all the parts of Matter are not self-moving,
yet there is not any part that is not moving or moved, by
and with the mover, which is animate matter. And thus
I conclude, and rest constantly,

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

XIII

Madam

That Matter is uncapable of Sense, your Author
proves by the example of dead Carcasses; “For,” Of the Immortality
of
the Soul.
INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.l.2.
c.2.

says he, “Motion and Sense being really one and the
same thing, it must needs follow, that where there is motion,
there is also sense and perception; but on the contrary,
there is Reaction in dead Carkasses, and yet no Sense.”

I answer shortly, That it is no consequence, because
there is no animal sense nor exterior perceptible local
motion in a dead Carcass, therefore there is no
sense at all in it; for though it has not animal sense, yet
it may nevertheless have sense according to the nature of
that figure, into which it did change from being an animal.
Also he says, “If any Matter have sense, it will
follow, that upon reaction all shall have the like; and that a
Bell while it is ringing and a Bow while it is bent, and every
Jack-in-a-box, that School-boys play with, shall be living Xx1r 169
living animals.”
I answer, It is true, if reaction made
sense; but reaction doth not make sense, but sense
makes reaction; and though the Bell hath not an animal
knowledg, yet it may have a mineral life and
knowledg, and the Bow, and the Jack-in-a-box a vegetable
knowledg; for the shape and form of the Bell,
Bow, and Jack-in-a-box, is artificial; nevertheless each
in its own kind may have as much knowledg as an animal
in his kind; onely they are different according to
the different proprieties of their Figures: And who
can prove the contrary that they have not? For certainly
Man cannot prove what he cannot know; but Mans
nature is so, that knowing but little of other Creatures,
he presently judges there is no more knowledg in Nature,
then what Man, at least Animals, have; and confines
all sense onely to Animal sense, and all knowledg
to Animal knowledg. Again says your Author, “That
Matter is utterly uncapable of such operations as we
find in our selves, and that therefore there is something
in us Immaterial or Incorporeal; for we find in our selves
that one and the same thing, both hears, and sees, and
tastes, and perceives all the variety of objects that Nature
manifests unto us.”
I answer, That is the reason
there is but one matter, and that all natural perception
is made by the animate part of matter; but although
there is but one matter in Nature, yet there are several
parts or degrees, and consequently several actions of
that onely matter, which causes such a variety of perceptions,
both sensitive and rational: the sensitive perception
is made by the sensitive corporeal motions, copying
out the figures of forreign objects in the sensitive organs
of the sentient; and if those sensitive motions do patternXx tern Xx1v 170
out forreign objects in each sensitive organ alike at
one and the same time, then we hear, see, taste, touch
and smell, at one and the same time: But Thoughts and
Passions, as Imagination, Conception, Fancy, Memory,
Love, Hate, Fear, Joy, and the like, are made
by the rational corporeal motions in their own degree of
matter, to wit, the rational. And thus all perception is
made by one and the same matter, through the variety
of its actions or motions, making various and several figures,
both sensitive and rational. But all this variety
in sense and reason, or of sensitive and rational perceptions,
is not made by parts pressing upon parts, but by
changing their own parts of matter into several figures
by the power of self-motion: For example, I see
a Man or Beast; that Man or Beast doth not touch my
eye in the least, neither in it self, nor by pressing the adjoyning
parts: but the sensitive corporeal motions streight
upon the sight of the Man or Beast make the like figure
in the sensitive organ, the Eye, and in the eyes own substance
or matter, as being in the eye as well as the other
degrees of matter, to wit, the rational and inanimate,
for they are all mixt together. But this is to be observed,
That the rational matter can and doth move in its
own substance, as being the purest and subtillest degree
of matter; but the sensitive being not so pure and subtil,
moves always with the inanimate Matter, and so
the perceptive figures which the rational Matter, or rational
corporeal Motions make, are made in their own
degree of Matter; but those figures which the sensitive
patterns out, are made in the organs or parts of the sentient
body proper to such or such a sense or perception:
as in an animal Creature, the perception of sight is Xx2r 171
is made by the sensitive corporeal motions in the Eye;
the perception of hearing, in the Ear, and so forth.
As for what your Author says, “That we cannot conceive
any portion of Matter, but is either hard or soft”
; I
answer, That these are but effects of Matters actions,
and so is rare, and dense, and the like; but there are
some Creatures which seem neither perfectly rare, nor
dense, nor hard, nor soft, but of mixt qualities; as for
example, Quicksilver seems rare, and yet is dense; soft,
and yet is hard; for though liquid Quicksilver is soft to
our touch, and rare to our sight, yet it is so dense and hard,
as not to be readily dissolved from its nature; and if there
be such contraries and mixtures in one particular creature
made of self-moving Matter, what will there not be in
Matter it self, according to the old saying: “If the Man such
praise shall have; What the Master that keeps the knave?”

So if a particular Creature hath such opposite qualities
and mixtures of corporeal motions, what will the Creator
have which is self-moving Matter? Wherefore
it is impossible to affirm, that self-moving MattetMatter is either
all rare, or all dense, or all hard, or all soft; because
by its self-moving power it can be either, or both,
and so by the change and variety of motion, there may
be soft and rare Points, and hard and sharp Points, hard
and contracted Globes, and soft and rare Globes; also
there may be pressures of Parts without printing, and
printing without pressures. Concerning that part of
Matter which is the Common Sensorium, your Author demands,
“Whether some point of it receive the whole Image
of the object, or whether it be wholly received into every
point of it?”
I answer, first, That all sensitive Matter
is not in Points: Next, That not any single part can subsist Xx2v 172
subsist of it self; and then that one Part doth not receive
all parts or any part into it self; but that Parts by the
power of self-motion can and do make several figures of
all sizes and sorts, and can Epitomize a great object into
a very little figure; for outward objects do not move the
body, but the sensitive and rational matter moves according
to the figures of outward objects: I do not say
always, but most commonly; “But”, says your Author;
“How can so smal a Point receive the Images of so vast or so
various objects at once, without obliteration or confusion.”

First, I answer, That, as I said before, sensitive Matter
is not bound up to a Point, nor to be a single self-
subsisting Part. Next, as for confusion, I say, that the
sensitive matter makes no more confusion, then an Engraver,
when he engraves several figures in a small
stone, and a Painter draws several figures in a small
compass; for a Carver will cut out several figures in a
Cherry-stone, and a Lady in a little black Patch; and if
gross and rude Art is able to do this, what may not Ingenious
and Wise Nature do? And as Nature is ingenious
and knowing in her self, so in her Parts, and her
Parts in her; for neither whole nor Parts are ignorant,
but have a knowledg, each according to the motion of
its own Parts; for knowledg is in Motion, and Motion in
Matter; and the diversity and variety of motion is the
diversity and variety of knowledg, so that every particular
figure and motion hath its particular knowledg,
as well as its proper and peculiar parts; and as the parts
join or divide, so doth knowledg, which many times
causes Arts to be lost and found, and memory and remembrance
in Particular Creatures: I do not say, they
are utterly lost in nature, but onely in respect to particularcular Yy1r 173
Creatures, by the dissolving and dividing of their
particular figures. For the rational matter, by reason
it moves onely in its own parts, it can change and rechange
into several figures without division of parts,
which makes memory and remembrance: But men not
considering or believing there might be such a degree of
onely matter, namely rational, it has made them erre in
their judgments. Nevertheless there is a difference between
sensitive and rational parts and motions, and yet
they are agreeable most commonly in their actions,
though not always. Also the rational can make such
figures as the sensitive cannot, by reason the rational has
a greater power and subtiler faculty in making variety,
then the sensitive; for the sensitive is bound to move
with the inanimate, but the rational moves onely in its
own parts; for though the sensitive and rational oftentimes
cause each other to move, yet they are not of one
and the same degree of matter, nor have they the same
motions. And this rational Matter is the cause of all
Notions, Conceptions, Imaginations, Deliberation,
Determination, Memory, and any thing else that belongs
to the Mind; for this matter is the mind of Nature,
and so being dividable, the mind of all Creatures,
as the sensitive is the life; and it can move, as I said, more
subtilly, and more variously then the sensitive, and make
such figures as the sensitive cannot, without outward examples
and objects. But all diversity comes by change
of motion, and motions are as sympathetical and agreeing,
as antipathetical and disagreeing; And though Nature’s
artificial motions, which are her Playing motions,
are sometimes extravagant, yet in her fundamental
actions there is no extravagancy, as we may observe Yy by Yy1v 174
by her exact rules in the various generations, the distinct
kinds and sorts, the several exact measures, times, proportions
and motions of all her Creatures, in all which her
wisdom is well exprest, and in the variety her wise pleasure:
To which I leave her, and rest,

Madam

Your faithful Friend,
and Servant

XIV

Madam

“If there be any sense and perception in Matter,” Of the Immortality
of
the Soul
, INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.l.2.
c.I.a.1,6,7.
says
your Author, “it must needs be Motion or Reaction of
one part of matter against another; and that all diversity
of sense and perception doth necessarily arise from the
diversity of the Magnitude, Figure, Posture, Vigour
and Direction of Motion in Parts of the Matter; In
which variety of perceptions, Matter hath none, but such,
as are impressed by corporeal motions, that is to say, that
are perceptions of some actions, or modificated Impressions
of parts of matter bearing one against another.”
I have
declared, Madam, my opinion concerning Perception
in my former Letters, that all Perception is not Impression
and Reaction, like as a Seal is printed on Wax:
For example, the corporeal rational motions in the
mind do not print, but move figuratively; but the sensitive
motions do carve, print, engrave, and, as it were, pencil Yy2r 175
pencil out, as also move figuratively in productions, and
do often take patterns from the rational figures, as the
rational motions make figures according to the sensitive
patterns; But the rational can move without patterns,
and so the sensitive: For surely, were a man born blind,
deaf, dumb, and had a numb palsie in his exterior
parts, the sensitive and rational motions would nevertheless
move both in body and mind according to the
nature of his figure; for though no copies were taken
from outward objects, yet he would have thoughts,
passions, appetites, and the like; and though he could
not see exterior objects, nor hear exterior sounds, yet no
question but he would see and hear interiously after the
manner of dreams, onely they might not be any thing
like to what is perceiveable by man in the World; but
if he sees not the Sun-light, yet he would see something
equivalent to it; and if he hears not such a thing as
Words, yet he would hear something equivalent to
words; for it is impossible, that his sensitive and rational
faculties should be lost for want of an Ear, or an
Eye; so that Perception may be without exterior object,
or marks, or patterns: for although the sensitive
Motions do usually pattern out the figures of exterior
objects, yet that doth not prove, but they can make interior
figures without such objects. Wherefore Perception
is not always Reaction, neither is Perception
and Reaction really one thing; for though Perception
and Action is one and the same, yet not always Reaction;
but did Perception proceed from the reaction of
outward objects, a blind and deaf man would not so
much as dream; for he would have no interior motion
in the head, having no other exterior sense but touch, which, Yy2v 176
which, if the body was troubled with a painful disease,
he would neither be sensible of, but to feel pain, and
interiously feel nothing but hunger and fulness; and his
Mind would be as Irrational as some imagine Vegetables
and Minerals are. To which opinion I leave
them, and rest,

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

XV

Madam

Your Author is pleased, in Mirth, and to disgrace
the opinion of those which hold, that Perception is
made by figuring, to bring in this following example:
“Suppose,” In INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.the second
Book
of the
Immortality
of the Soul
,
INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.ch. 6.
says he, “one Particle should shape it self
into a George on Horse-back with a Lance in his hand,
and another into an Inchanted Castle; this George on
Horse-back
must run against the Castle, to make the
Castle receive his impress and similitude: But what then?
Truly the Encounter will be very Unfortunate, for
S. George indeed may easily break his Lance, but it is
impossible that he should by justling against the Particle
in the form of a Castle, conveigh the intire shape of himself
and his Horse thereby, such as we find our selves able to
imagine of a man on Horse-back; which is a Truth as demonstrable
as any Theorem in Mathematicks.”
I answer, first, Zz1r 177
first, That there is no Particle single and alone by it self;
Next, I say, It is more easie for the rational matter to
put it self into such figures, and to make such encounters,
then for an Immaterial mind or sustancesubstance to imagine
it; for no imagination can be without figure, and
how should an Immaterial created substance present such
Figures, but by making them either in it self or upon
matter? For S. George and the Castle are figures, and
their encounters are real fighting actions, and how such
figures and actions can be in the mind or memory, and
yet not be, is impossible to conceive; for, as I said,
those figures and actions must be either in the incorporeal
mind, or in the corporeal parts of matter; and if
the figures and motions may be in an incorporeal substance,
much more is it probable for them to be in a
corporeal; nay if the figures and their actions can be in
gross corporeal matter, why should they not be in the
purest part of matter, which is the rational matter? And
as for being made known to the whole body, and every
part thereof, it is not necessary, no more then it is necessary,
that the private actions of every Man or Family
should be made known to the whole Kingdom, or
Town, or Parish: But my opinion of self-corporeal
motion and perception, may be as demonstrable as
that of Immaterial Natural Spirits, which, in my mind,
is not demonstrable at all, by reason it is not corporeal
or material; For how can that be naturally demonstrable,
which naturally is nothing? But your Author
believes the Mind or rational SoulSoul to be individable, and
therefore concludes, that the Parts of the same Matter,
although at great distance, must of necessity know each
Particular act of each several Part; but that is not necessary;Zz sary; Zz1v 178
for if there were not ignorance through the division
of Parts, every man and other creatures would know
alike; and there is no better proof, that matter, or any
particular creature in nature is not governed by a created
Immaterial Spirit, then that knowledg is in parts;
for the hand doth not know what pain the head feels,
which certainly it would do, if the mind were not
dividable into parts, but an individable substance.
But this is well to be observed, that some parts
in some actions agree generally in one body, and
some not; as for example, temperance and appetite
do not agree; for the corporeal actions of
appetite desire to join with the corporeal actions of
such or such other parts, but the corporeal actions of
temperance do hinder and forbid it; whereupon there
is a faction amongst the several parts: for example, a
Man desires to be drunk with Wine; this desire is
made by such corporeal actions as make appetite; the
rational corporeal motions or actions which make temperance,
oppose those that make appetite, and that sort
of actions which hath the better, carryes it, the hand
and other parts of the body obeying the strongest side;
and if there be no wine to satisfie the appetite, yet many
times the appetite continues; that is, the parts continue
in the same motions that make such an appetite;
but if the appetite doth not continue, then those parts
have changed their motions; or when by drinking, the
appetite is satisfied, and ceases, then those parts that made
the appetite, have altered their former motions. But
oftentimes the rational corporeal motions may so agree
with the sensitive, as there may be no opposition or crossing
at all, but a sympathetical mutual agreement betwixttwixt Zz2r 179
them, at least an approvement; so that the rational
may approve what the sensitive covet or desire: Also
some motions of the rational, as also of the sensitive matter,
may disagree amongst themselves, as we see, that a man
will often have a divided mind; for he will love and hate
the same thing, desire and not desire one and the same
thing, as to be in Heaven, and yet to be in the World:
Moreover, this is to be observed, That all rational perceptions
or cogitations, are not so perspicuous and clear
as if they were Mathematical Demonstrations, but there
is some obscurity, more or less in them, at least they are
not so well perceivable without comparing several figures
together, which proves, they are not made by an individable,
immaterial Spirit, but by dividable corporeal
parts: As for example, Man writes oftentimes false, and
seldom so exact, but he is forced to mend his hand, and
correct his opinions, and sometimes quite to alter them,
according as the figures continue or are dissolved and altered
by change of motion, and according as the actions
are quick or slow in these alterations, the humane
mind is setled or wavering; and as figures are made, or
dissolved and transformed, Opinions, Conceptions, Imaginations,
Understanding, and the like, are more
or less; And according as these figures last, so is constancy
or inconstancy, memory or forgetfulness, and as
those figures are repeated, so is remembrance; but sometimes
they are so constant and permanent, as they last
as long as the figure of the body, and sometimes it happens
not once in an age, that the like figures are repeated,
and sometimes they are repeated every moment:
As for example; a man remembers or calls to mind the
figure of another man, his friend, with all his qualities, dispositions, Zz2v 180
dispositions, actions, proprieties, and the like, several
times in an hour, and sometimes not once in a year, and
so as often as he remembers him, as often is the figure
of that man repeated; and as oft as he forgets him, so
often is his figure dissolved. But some imagine the rational
motions to be so gross as the Trotting of a Horse,
and that all the motions of Animate matter are as rude
and course as renting or tearing asunder, or that all impressions
must needs make dents or creases. But as Nature
hath degrees or corporeal matter, so she hath also
degrees or corporeal motions, Matter and Motion being
but one substance; and it is absurd to judg of the interior
motions of self-moving matter, by artificial or
exterior gross motions, as that all motions must be like
the tearing of a sheet of Paper, or that the printing and
patterning of several figures of rational and sensitive
matter must be like the printing of Books; nay, all artificial
Printings are not so hard, as to make dents and
impresses; witness Writing, Painting, and the like;
for they do not disturb the ground whereon the letters
are written, or the picture drawn, and so the curious
actions of the purest rational matter are neither rude nor
rough; but although this matter is so subtil and pure, as
not subject to exterior human senses and organs, yet
certainly it is dividable, not onely in several Creatures,
but in the several parts of one and the same Creature, as
well as the sensitive, which is the Life of Nature, as
the other is the Soul; not the Divine, but natural Soul;
neither is this Soul Immaterial, butbut Corporeal; not
composed of raggs and shreds, but it is the purest,
simplest and subtillest matter in Nature. But to conclude,
I desire you to remember, Madam, that this rational Aaa1r 181
rational and sensitive Matter in one united and finite
Figure or particular Creature, has both common
and particular actions; for as there are several
kinds and sorts of Creatures, and particulars in
every kind and sort: so the like for the actions of the
rational and sensitive matter in one particular Creature.
Also it is to be noted, That the Parts of
rational matter, can more suddenly give and take Intelligence
to and from each other, then the sensitive;
nevertheless, all Parts in Nature, at least adjoyning
parts, have Intelligence between each other, more
or less, because all parts make but one body; for it is
not with the parts of Matter, as with several Constables
in several Hundreds, or several Parishes, which
are a great way distant from each other, but they
may be as close as the combs of Bees, and yet as
partable and as active as Bees. But concerning the
Intelligence of Natures Parts, I have sufficiently spoken
in other places; and so I’le add no more, but that
I unfeignedly remain,

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

Aaa MA- Aaa1v 182

XVI

Madam

“Sensation in corporeal motion is first, and Perception
follows,” In INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.the Pref.
of the Imm.
of the Soul.
sayes your Author: to which opinion I
give no assent, but do believe that Perception and
Sensation are done both at one and the same time, as being
one and the same thing without division, either in
reason or sense, and are performed without any knocks,
or jolts, or hitting against. But let me tell you, Madam,
there arises a great mistake by many, from not
distinguishing well, sensitive Motion, and rational Motion;
for though all motions are in one onely matter,
yet that matter doth not move always in the same manner,
for then there could be no variety in Nature; and
truly, if man, who is but a part of Nature, may move
diversly, and put himself into numerous postures; Why
may not Nature? But concerning Motions, and
their variety, to avoid tedious repetitions, I must still referr
you to my Book of Philosophical Opinions; I’le add
onely this, that it is well to be observed, That all Motions
are not Impressions, neither do all Impressions
make such dents, as to disturb the adjoyning Parts:
Wherefore those, in my opinion, understand Nature
best, which say, that Sensation and Perception are really
one and the same; but they are out, that say, there
can be no communication at a distance, unless by pressing
and crowding; for the patterning of an outward
object, may be done without any inforcement or disturbance, Aaa2r 183
disturbance, jogging or crowding, as I have declared
heretofore; for the sensitive and rational motions in the
sensitive and rational parts of matter in one creature, observing
the exterior motions in outward objects, move
accordingly, either regularly or irregularly in patterns;
and if they have no exterior objects, as in dreams, they
work by rote. And so to conclude, I am absolutely
of their opinion, who believe, that there is nothing
existent in Nature, but what is purely Corporeal, for
this seems most probable in sense and reason to me,

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

XVII

Madam

Outward Objects, as I have told you before, do
not make Sense and Reason, but Sense and
Reason do perceive and judg of outward objects;
For the Sun doth not make sight, nor doth sight make
light; but sense and reason in a Man, or any other
creature, do perceive and know there are such objects
as Sun, and Light, or whatsoever objects are presented
to them. Neither doth Dumbness, Deafness, Blindness,
&c. cause an Insensibility, but Sense through irregular
actions causes them; I say, through Irregular
actions, because those effects do not properly belong to the Aaa2v 184
the nature of that kind of Creatures; for every Creature,
if regularly made, hath particular motions proper
to its figure; for natural Matters wisdom makes
distinctions by her distinct corporeal motions, giving
every particular Creature their due Portion and Proportion
according to the nature of their figures, and to
the rules of her actions, but not to the rules of Arts,
Mathematical Compasses, Lines, Figures, and the
like. And thus the Sun, Stars, Meteors, Air, Fire,
Water, Earth, Minerals, Vegetables and Animals,
may all have Sense and Reason, although it doth not
move in one kind or sort of Creatures, or in one
particular, as in another: For the corporeal motions
differ not onely in kinds and sorts, but also in Particulars,
as is perceivable by human sense and reason;
Which is the cause, that Elements have elemental sense
and knowledg, and Animals animal sense and knowledg,
and so of Vegetables, Minerals, and the like.
Wherefore the Sun and Stars may have as much sensitive
and rational life and knowledg as other Creatures,
but such as is according to the nature of their figures, and
not animal, or vegetable, or mineral sense and knowledg.
And so leaving them, I rest,

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

Ma- Bbb1r 185

XVIII

Madam

Your Author denying that Fancy, Reason and
Animadversion are seated in the Brain, and that
the Brain is figured into this or that Conception:
“I demand,” Antid. INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.lib.I.
c.II.
says he, “in what knot, loop or interval thereof
doth this faculty of free Fancy and active Reason reside?”

My answer is, that in my opinion, Fancy and Reason
are not made in the Brain, as there is a Brain, but as
there is sensitive and rational matter, which makes not
onely the Brain, but all Thoughts, Conceptions, Imaginations,
Fancy, Understanding, Memory, Remembrance,
and whatsoever motions are in the Head,
or Brain: neither doth this sensitive and rational matter
remain or act in one place of the Brain, but in every
part thereof; and not onely in every part of the Brain,
but in every part of the Body; nay, not onely in every
part of a Mans Body, but in every part of Nature. But,
Madam, I would ask those, that say the Brain has
neither sense, reason, nor self-motion, and therefore
no Perception; but that all proceeds from an Immaterial
Principle, as an Incorporeal Spirit, distinct from
the body, which moveth and actuates corporeal matter;
I would fain ask them, I say, where their Immaterial
Ideas reside, in what part or place of the Body? and
whether they be little or great? Also I would ask them,
whether there can be many, or but one Idea of God? If
they say many, then there must be several, distinct DeiticalBbb tical Bbb1v 186
Ideas; if but one, Where doth this Idea reside?
If they say in the head, then the heart is ignorant of
God; if in the heart, then the head is ignorant thereof,
and so for all parts of the body; but if they say, in every
part, then that Idea may be disfigured by a lost member;
if they say, it may dilate and contract, then I say
it is not the Idea of God, for God can neither contract
nor extend, nor can the Idea it self dilate and contract,
being immaterial; for contraction and dilation belong
onely to bodies, or material beings: Wherefore the
comparisons betwixt Nature and a particular Creature,
and between God and Nature, are improper; much
more betwixt God and Natures particular motions and
figures, which are various and changeable, although
methodical. The same I may ask of the Mind of
Man, as I do of the Idea in the Mind. Also I might
ask them, what they conceive the natural mind of man
to be, whether material or immaterial? If material,
their opinion is rational, and so the mind is dividable
and composable; if immaterial, then it is a Spirit; and
if a Spirit, it cannot possibly dilate nor contract, having
no dimension nor divisibility of parts, (although your
Author proves it by the example of Light; but I have
exprest my meaning heretofore, that light is divisible)
and if it have no dimension, how can it be confined in
a material body? Wherefore when your Author says,
the mind is a substance, it is to my reason very probable;
but not when he says, it is an immaterial substance,
which will never agree with my sense and reason; for it
must be either something, or nothing, there being no
medium between, in Nature. But pray mistake me
not, Madam, when I say Immaterial is nothing; for I Bbb2r 187
I mean nothing Natural, or so as to be a part of Nature;
for God forbid, I should deny, that God is a
Spiritual Immaterial substance, or Being; neither do I
deny that we can have an Idea, notion, conception, or
thought of the Existence of God; for I am of your Authors
opinion, That there is no Man under the cope of
Heaven, that doth not by the light of Nature, know,
and believe there is a God; but that we should have
such a perfect Idea of God, as of any thing else in the
World, or as of our selves, as your Author says, I cannot
in sense and reason conceive to be true or possible.
Neither am I against those Spirits, which the holy
Scripture mentions, as Angels and Devils, and the divine
Soul of Man; but I say onely, that no Immaterial
Spirit belongs to Nature, so as to be a part thereof; for
Nature is Material, or Corporeal; and whatsoever is
not composed of matter or body, belongs not to Nature;
nevertheless, Immaterial Spirits may be in Nature,
although not parts of Nature. But there can neither
be an Immaterial Nature, nor a Natural Immaterial;
Nay, our very thoughts and conceptions of Immaterial
are Material, as made of self-moving Matter.
Wherefore to conclude, these opinions in Men proceed
from a Vain-glory, as to have found out something
that is not in Nature; to which I leave them, and
their natural Immaterial Substances, like so many
Hobgoblins to fright Children withal, resting in the
mean time,

Madam

Your faithful Friend,
and Servant

Ma- Bbb2v 188

XIX

Madam

There are various opinions concerning the seat of
Common Sense, as your Author rehearseth them
in his Treatise of the Immortality of the Soul; INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Lib.2.c.4.
But my opinion is, That common sense hath also a
common place; for as there is not any part of the body
that hath not sense and reason, so sense and reason is in
all parts of the body, as it is observable by this, that every
part is subject to pain and pleasure, and all parts are
moveable, moving and moved; also appetites are in every
part of the body: As for example, if any part
itches, it hath an appetite to be scratched, and every part
can pattern out several objects, and so several touches;
and though the rational part of matter is mixt in all
parts of the body, yet it hath more liberty to make variety
of Motions in the head, heart, liver, spleen, stomack,
bowels, and the like, then in the other parts of
the body; nevertheless, it is in every part, together
with the sensitive: but they do not move in every part
alike, but differ in each part more or less, as it may be
observed; and although every part hath some difference
of knowledg, yet all have life and knowledg, sense
and reason, some more, some less, and the whole body
moves according to each part, and so do all the bodily
Faculties and Proprieties, and not according to one
single part; the rational Soul being in all parts of the body:
for if one part of the body should have a dead Palsie, it Ccc1r 189
it is not, that the Soul is gone from that part, but that
the sensitive and rational matter has altered its motion
and figure from animal to some other kind; for certainly,
the rational Soul, and so life, is in every part, as well
in the Pores of the skin, as in the ventricles of the brain,
and as well in the heel as in the head; and every part
of the body knows its own office, what it ought to do,
from whence follows an agreement of all the parts:
And since there is difference of knowledg in every
part of one body, well may there be difference between
several kinds and sorts, and yet there is knowledg
in all; for difference of knowledg is no argument
to prove they have no knowledg at all. Wherefore
I am not of the opinion, that that which moves the
whole body, is as a Point, or some such thing in a little
kernel or Glandula of the Brain, as an Ostrich-egge is
hung up to the roof of a Chamber; or that it is in
the stomack like a single penny in a great Purse; neither
is it in the midst of the heart, like a Lady in a
Lobster; nor in the bloud, like as a Menow, or Sprat
in the Sea; nor in the fourth Ventricle of the Brain,
as a lousie Souldier in a Watch-Tower. But you may
say, it is like a farthing Candle in a great Church: I
answer, That Light will not enlighten the by Chapels
of the Church, nor the Quest-house, nor the
Belfrey; neither doth the Light move the Church,
though it enlightens it: Wherefore the Soul after
this manner doth not move the corporeal body, no
more then the Candle moves the Church, or the
Lady moves the Lobster, or the Sprat the Sea as
to make it ebb and flow. But this I desire you to
observe, Madam, that though all the body of man Ccc or Ccc1v 190
or any other Creature, hath sense and reason, which is
life and knowledg, in all parts, yet these parts being all
corporeal, and having their certain proportions, can
have no more then what is belonging or proportionable
to each figure: As for example; if a Man should
feed, and not evacuate some ways or other, he could
not live; and if he should evacuate and not feed, he
could not subsist: wherefore in all Natures parts there
is ingress and egress, although not always perceived by
one creature, as Man; but all exterior objects do not
enter into Man, or any other Creature, but are figured
by the rational, and some by the sensitive parts or motions
in the body; wherefore it is not rational to believe,
that exterior objects take up any more room, then if
there were none presented to the sensitive organs: Nor
is there any thing which can better prove the mind to be
corporeal then that there may be several Figures in several
parts of the body made at one time, as Sight, Hearing,
Tasting, Smelling, and Touching, and all these
in each several organ, as well at one, as at several times,
either by patterns, or not; which figuring without
Pattern, may be done as well by the sensitive motions in
the organs, as by the rational in the mind, and is called
remembrance. As for example: a Man may hear or
see without an object; which is, that the sensitive and rational
matter repeat such figurative actions, or make others
in the sensitive organs, or in the mind: and Thoughts,
Memory, Imagination, as also Passion, are no less corporeal
actions then the motion of the hand or heel;
neither hath the rational matter, being naturally wise,
occasion to jumble and knock her parts together, by
reason every part knows naturally their office what they Ccc2r 191
they ought to do, or what they may do. But I conclude,
repeating onely what I have said oft before, that
all Perceptions, Thoughts, and the like, are the Effects,
and Life and Knowledg, the Nature and Essence of
self-moving Matter. And so I rest,

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

XX

Madam

I am not able to conceive how the Mind of Man can
be compared to a Table-book, in which nothing
is writ; nor how to a Musician, who being asleep,
doth not so much as dream of any Musick, but being
jogg’d and awakend by another, who tells him two or
three words of a Song, and desires him to sing it, presently
recovers himself, and sings upon so slight an Intimation:
For such intimations are nothing else but outward
objects, which the interior sense consents to, and obeys;
for interior sense and reason doth often obey outward
objects: and in my opinion there is no rest in Nature,
and so neither in the Mind or natural Soul of Man,
which is in a perpetual motion, and needs therefore no
jogging to put it into any actual motion; for it hath
actual motion and knowledg in it self, because it is a self-
moving substance, actually knowing, and Material or Corporeal Ccc2v 192
Corporeal, not Immaterial, as your Author thinks:
and this material or corporeal Mind is nothing else
but what I call the rational matter, and the corporeal
life is the sensitive matter. But this is to be observed,
that the motions of the corporeal Mind do often imitate
the motions of the sensitive Life, and these again
the motions of the mind: I say oftentimes; for they
do it not always, but each one can move without
taking any pattern from the other. And all this I understand
of the Natural Soul of Man; not of the Divine
Soul, and her powers and faculties, for I leave
that to Divines to inform us of; onely this I say, that
men not conceiving the distinction between this natural
and divine Soul, make such a confusion betwixt
those two Souls and their actions, which causes so
many disputes and opinions. But if Nature hath
power from God to produce all kinds of Vegetables,
Minerals, Elements, Animals, and other sorts of
Creatures, Why not also Man? Truly if all Creatures
are natural Creatures, Man must be so too; and
if Man is a natural Creature, he must needs have natural
sense and reason, as well as other Creatures, being
composed of the same matter they are of. Neither
is it requisite, that all Creatures, being of the same
matter, must have the same manner of sensitive and
rational knowledg; which if so, it is not necessary
for Corn to have Ears to hear the whistling or chirping
of Birds, nor for Stones to have such a touch of
feeling as animals have, and to suffer pain, as they
do, when Carts go over them; as your Author is
pleased to argue out of Æsopes Tales; or for the Heliotrope
to have eyes to see the Sun: for what necessity is Ddd1r 193
is there that they should have humane sense and reason?
which is, that the rational and sensitive matter should
act and move in them as she doth in man or animals:
Certainly if there must be any variety in nature, it is
requisite she should not; wherefore all Vegetables, Minerals,
Elements, and Animals, have their proper motions
different from each others, not onely in their
kinds and sorts, but also in their particulars. And though
Stones have no progressive motion to withdraw
themselves from the Carts going over them, which
your Author thinks they would do, if they had sense,
to avoid pain: nevertheless they have motion, and consequently
sense and reason, according to the nature and
propriety of their figure, as well as man has according
to his. But this is also to be observed, that not any
humane Creature, which is accounted to have the perfectest
sense and reason, is able always to avoid what is
hurtful or painful, for it is subject to it by Nature: Nay,
the INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Append. to
the Antid.
INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.ch. 3.
Immaterial Soul it self, according to your Author,
cannot by her self-contracting faculty withdraw her self
from pain. Wherefore there is no manner of consequence
to conclude from the sense of Animals to the
sense of Minerals, they being as much different as their
Figures are; And saying this, I have said enough to
express the opinon and mind of,

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

Ddd Ma- Ddd1v 194

XXI

Madam

Your Author endeavours very much to prove the
Existency of a “Natural Immaterial Spirit”, whom
he defines to be an “Incorporeal substance, Indivisible,
that can move it self, can penetrate, contract and
dilate it self, and can also move and alter the matter.”

Whereof, if you will have my opinion, I confess freely
to you, that in my sense and reason I cannot conceive
it to be possible, that there is any such thing in Nature;
for all that is a substance in Nature, is a body, and what
has a body, is corporeal; for though there be several
degrees of matter, as in purity, rarity, subtilty, activity;
yet there is no degree so pure, rare and subtil, that can
go beyond its nature, and change from corporeal to
incorporeal, except it could change from being something
to nothing, which is impossible in Nature. Next,
there is no substance in Nature that is not divisible; for
all that is a body, or a bodily substance, hath extension,
and all extension hath parts, and what has parts, is divisible.
As for self-motion, contraction and dilation,
these are actions onely of Natural Matter; for Matter
by the Power of God is self-moving, and all sorts of
motions, as contraction, dilation, alteration, penetration,
&c. do properly belong to Matter; so that natural
Matter stands in no need to have some Immaterial or
Incorporeal substance to move, rule, guide and govern
her, but she is able enough to do it all her self, by the free Ddd2r 195
free Gift of the Omnipotent God; for why should we
trouble our selves to invent or frame other unconceivable
substances, when there is no need for it, but Matter
can act, and move as well without them and of it self?
Is not God able to give such power to Matter, as to an
other Incorporeal substance? But I suppose this opinion
of natural Immaterial Spirits doth proceed from
Chymistry, where the extracts are vulgarly called Spirits;
and from that degree of Matter, which by reason
of its purity, subtilty and activity, is not subject to our
grosser senses; However, these are not Incorporeal, be
they never so pure and subtil. And I wonder much that
men endeavour to prove Immaterial Spirits by corporeal
Arts, when as Art is not able to demonstrate Nature
and her actions; for Art is but the effect of Nature,
and expresses rather the variety, then the truth of natural
motions; and if Art cannot do this, much less will
it be able to express what is not in Nature, or what is
beyond Nature; as to “trace the Visible” Antid. INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.lib.2.
ch.2.
(or rather Invisible)
“footsteps of the divine Councel and Providence”, or
to demonstrate things supernatural, and which go beyond
mans reach and capacity. But to return to Immaterial
Spirits, that they should rule and govern infinite
corporeal matter, like so many demy-Gods, by a
dilating nod, and a contracting frown, and cause so many
kinds and sorts of Corporeal Figures to arise, being Incorporeal
themselves, is Impossible for me to conceive; for
how can an Immaterial substance cause a Material corporeal
substance, which has no motion in it self, to form
so many several and various figures and creatures, and
make so many alterations, and continue their kinds and
sorts by perpetual successions of Particulars? But perchance Ddd2v 196
perchance the Immaterial substance gives corporeal
matter motion. I answer, My sense and reason cannot
understand, how it can give motion, unless motion be
different, distinct and separable from it; nay, if
it were, yet being no substance or body it self, according
to your Authors and others opinion, the question is,
how it can be transmitted or given away to corporeal
matter? Your Author may say, That his Immaterial
and Incorporeal spirit of Nature, having self-motion,
doth form Matter into several Figures: I answer, Then
that Immaterial substance must be transformed and metamorphosed
into as many several figures as there are
figures in Matter; or there must be as many spirits, as
there are figures; but when the figures change, what
doth become of the spirits? Neither can I imagine,
that an Immaterial substance, being without body, can
have such a great strength, as to grapple with gross, heavy,
dull, and dead Matter; Certainly, in my opinion,
no Angel, nor Devil, except God Impower him, would
be able to move corporeal Matter, were it not self-
moving, much less any Natural Spirit. But God is a
Spirit, and Immovable; and if created natural Immaterials
participate of that Nature, as they do of the
Name, then they must be Immovable also. Your Author,
Madam, may make many several degrees of
Spirits; but certainly not I, nor I think any natural
Creature else, will be able naturally to conceive them.
He may say, perchance, There is such a close conjunction
betwixt Body and Spirit, as I make betwixt rational,
sensitive, and inanimate Matter. I answer, That these
degrees are all but one Matter, and of one and the same
Nature as meer Matter, different onely in degrees of purity, Eee1r 197
purity, subtilty, and activity, whereas Spirit and Body
are things of contrary Natures. In fine, I cannot conceive,
how a Spirit should fill up a place or space, having
no body, nor how it can have the effects of a body,
being none it self; for the effects flow from the cause;
and as the cause is, so are its effects: And so confessing
my ignorance, I can say no more, but rest,

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

XXII

Madam

Your Author having assigned Indivisibility to the
Soul or Spirit that moves and actuates matter, I
desire to know, how one Indivisible Spirit can be in
so many dividable parts? For there being Infinite
parts in Nature, they must either have one Infinite Spirit
to move them, which must be dilated infinitely, or
this Spirit must move severally in every part of Nature:
If the first, then I cannot conceive, but all motion must
be uniform, or after one and the same manner; nay, I cannot
understand, how there can be any dilation and contraction,
or rather any motion of the same spirit, by reason
if it dilate, then, (being equally spread out in all the parts
of Matter,) it must dilate beyond Matter; and if it contract,
it must leave some parts of matter void, and without Eee motion. Eee1v 198
motion. But if the Spirit moves every part severally,
then he is divisible; neither can I think, that there are so
many Spirits as there are Parts in Nature; for your
Author says, there is but one Spirit of Nature; I will
give an easie and plain example: When a Worm is
cut into two or three parts, we see there is sensitive life
and motion in every part, for every part will strive and
endeavour to meet and joyn again to make up the whole
body; now if there were but one indivisible Life, Spirit,
and Motion, I would fain know, how these severed
parts could move all by one Spirit. Wherefore,
Matter, in my opinion, has self-motion in it self, which
is the onely soul and life of Nature, and is dividable
as well as composable, and full of variety of action; for
it is as easie for several parts to act in separation, as in
composition, and as easie in composition as in separation;
Neither is every part bound to one kind or sort
of Motions; for we see in exterior local motions, that
one man can put his body into several shapes and postures,
much more can Nature. But is it not strange,
Madam, that a man accounts it absurd, ridiculous,
and a prejudice to Gods Omnipotency, to attribute self-
motion to Matter, or a material Creature, when it is
not absurd, ridiculous, or any prejudice to God, to
attribute it to an Immaterial Creature? What reason of
absurdity lies herein? Surely I can conceive none, except
it be absurd and ridiculous to make that, which no
man can know or conceive what it is, viz. an immaterial
natural Spirit, (which is as much as to say, a natural
No-thing) to have motion, and not onely motion,
but self-motion; nay, not onely self-motion, but
to move, actuate, rule, govern, and guide Matter, or Eee2r 199
or corporeal Nature, and to be the cause of all the most
curious varieties and effects in nature: Was not God
able to give self-motion as well to a Material, as to an
Immaterial Creature, and endow Matter with a self-moving
power? I do not say, Madam, that Matter hath
motion of it self, so, that it is the prime cause and principle
of its own self-motion; for that were to make
Matter a God, which I am far from believing; but my opinion
is, That the self-motion of Matter proceeds from
God, as well as the self-motion of an Immaterial Spirit;
and that I am of this opinion, the last Chapter of my
Book of Philosophy will enform you, where I treat of
the Deitical Centre, as the Fountain from whence all
things do flow, and which is the supream Cause, Author,
Ruler and Governor of all. Perhaps you will
say, it is, because I make Matter Eternal. Tis true,
Madam, I do so: but I think Eternity doth not take off
the dependance upon God, for God may nevertheless
be above Matter, as I have told you before. You may
ask me how that can be? I say, As well as any thing else
that God can do beyond our understanding: For I do
but tell you my opinion, that I think it most probable
to be so, but I can give you no Mathematical Demonstrations
for it: Onely this I am sure of, That it is not
impossible for the Omnipotent God; and he that questions
the truth of it, may question Gods Omnipotency.
Truly, Madam, I wonder how man can say, God is
Omnipotent, and can do beyond our Understanding,
and yet deny all that he is not able to comprehend
with his reason. However, as I said, it is my opinion,
That Matter is self-moving by the power of God;
Neither can Animadversion, and Perception, as also the variety Eee2v 200
variety of Figures, prove, that there must be another
external Agent or Power to work all this in Matter; but
it proves rather the contrary; for were there no self-
motion in Matter, there would be no Perception, nor
no variety of Creatures in their Figures, Shapes, Natures,
Qualities, Faculties, Proprieties, as also in their
Productions, Creations or Generations, Transformations,
Compositions, Dissolutions, and the like, as
Growth, Maturity, Decay, &c. and for Animals, were
not Corporeal Matter self-moving, dividable and composable,
there could not be such variety of Passions,
Complexions, Humors, Features, Statures, Appetites,
Diseases, Infirmities, Youth, Age, &c. Neither
would they have any nourishing Food, healing
Salves, soveraign Medicines, reviving Cordials, or
deadly Poysons. In short, there is so much variety in
Nature, proceeding from the self-motion of Matter,
as not possible to be numbred, nor thorowly known
by any Creature: Wherefore I should labour in vain,
if I endeavoured to express any more thereof; and this
is the cause that I break off here, and onely subscribe my
self,

Madam

Your faithful Friend
and Servant

Ma- Fff1r 201

XXIII

Madam

Concerning the In the INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.Append.
to the
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and
Of the Immortality
of
the Soul
, INTERNAL ERROR. Please report to wwp@neu.edu that citedRange is unmatched.l.I.
c.5.
comparison, your Author makes
between an Immaterial Spirit, and Light, That,
“as Light is contractive and dilative, and yet not divisible,
so is also an Immaterial substance.”
Give me leave
to tell you, that in my opinion, all that is contractive
and dilative, is also dividable, and so is light: As for example;
when a Candle is snuff’d, the Snuffers do not
onely clip the wick, but also the light: The like when
a dark body is interposed, or crosses the rays of the Sun;
it cuts those rays asunder, which by reason they cannot
joyn together again, because of the interposed body,
the light cut off, suddenly goeth out; that is, the matter
of light is altered from the figure of light, to some other
thing, but not annihilated: And since no more
light can flow into the room from the Fountain or
Spring of Light, the Sun, because the passage is stopt
close, the room remaineth dark: For Light is somewhat
of the nature of Water; so long as the Spring is open,
the Water flows, and whatsoever is taken away, the
Spring supplies; and if another body onely presses thorow
it, it immediately joyns and closes its severed parts
again, without any difficulty or loss; The same doth
Light; onely the difference is, that the substance of
Light is extraordinary rare, and pure; for as Air is so
much rarer then Water, so Light is so much rarer and
purer then Air, and its matter may be of so dilating a Fff nature, Fff1v 202
nature, as to dilate from a point into numerous rayes.
As for ordinary Fire-light, it doth not last longer, then
it hath fuel to feed it, and so likewi