I

You have been pleased to send me the
Works of four Famous and Learned
Authors, to wit, of two most Famous
Philosophers of our Age, Des Cartes,
and Hobbs, and of that Learned
Philosopher and Divine Dr. More,
as also of that Famous Physician and
Chymist Van Helmont. Which Works you have sent
me not onely to peruse, but also to give my judgment
of them, and to send you word by the usual way of our
Correspondence, which is by Letters, how far, and
wherein I do dissent from these Famous Authors, their
Opinions in Natural Philosophy. To tell you truly,
Madam, your Commands did at first much affright
me, for it did appear, as if you had commanded me to
get upon a high Rock, and fling my self into the Sea, B where B1v 2
where neither a Ship, nor a Plank, nor any kind of help
was near to rescue me, and save my life; but that I was
forced to sink, by reason I cannot swim: So I having no
Learning nor Art to assist me in this dangerous undertaking,
thought, I must of necessity perish under the
rough censures of my Readers, and be not onely accounted
a fool for my labour, but a vain and presumptuous
person, to undertake things surpassing the ability of
my performance; but on the other side I considered
first, that those Worthy Authors, were they my censurers,
would not deny me the same liberty they take
themselves; which is, that I may dissent from their Opinions,
as well as they dissent from others, and from amongst
themselves: And if I should express more Vanity
then Wit, more Ignorance then Knowledg, more
Folly then Discretion, it being according to the Nature
of our Sex, I hoped that my Masculine Readers would
civilly excuse me, and my Female Readers could not
justly condemn me. Next I considered with my self,
that it would be a great advantage for my Book called
Philosophical Opinions, as to make it more perspicuous
and intelligible by the opposition of other Opinions,
since two opposite things placed near each other, are the
better discerned; for I must confess, that when I did
put forth my Philosophical Work at first, I was not so
well skilled in the Terms or Expressions usual in Natural
Philosophy; and therefore for want of their knowledg,
I could not declare my meaning so plainly and
clearly as I ought to have done, which may be a sufficient
argument to my Readers, that I have not read
heretofore any Natural Philosophers, and taken some
Light from them; but that my Opinions did meerly issue B2r 3
issue from the Fountain of my own Brain, without any
other help or assistance. Wherefore since for want of
proper Expressions, my named Book of Philosophy was
accused of obscurity and intricacy, I thought your Commands
would be a means to explain and clear it the better,
although not by an Artificial way, as by Logical Arguments
or Mathematical Demonstrations, yet by expressing
my Sense and Meaning more properly and clearly
then I have done heretofore: But the chief reason of all
was, the Authority of your Command, which did work
so powerfully with me, that I could not resist, although
it were to the disgrace of my own judgment and wit;
and therefore I am fully resovedresolved now to go on as far, and
as well as the Natural strength of my Reason will reach:
But since neither the strength of my Body, nor of my
understanding, or wit, is able to mark every line,
or every word of their works, and to argue upon
them, I shall onely pick out the ground Opinions of the
aforementioned Authors, and those which do directly
dissent from mine, upon which I intend to make some
few Reflections, according to the ability of my Reason;
and I shall meerly go upon the bare Ground of Natural
Philosophy, and not mix Divinity with it, as many Philosophers
use to do, except it be in those places, where I
am forced by the Authors Arguments to reflect upon it,
which yet shall be rather with an expression of my ignorance,
then a positive declaration of my opinion or judgment
thereof; for I think it not onely an absurdity, but
an injury to the holy Profession of Divinity to draw her
to the Proofs in Natural Philosophy; wherefore I shall
strictly follow the Guidance of Natural Reason, and
keep to my own ground and Principles as much as I can; which B2v 4
which that I may perform the better, I humbly desire
the help and assistance of your Favour, that according
to that real and intire Affection you bear to me, you
would be pleased to tell me unfeignedly, if I should
chance to err or contradict but the least probability of
truth in any thing; for I honor Truth so much, as I
bow down to its shadow with the greatest respect and
reverence; and I esteem those persons most, that love
and honor Truth with the same zeal and fervor, whether
they be Ancient or Modern Writers.

Thus, Madam, although I am destitute of the help of
Arts, yet being supported by your Favour and wise Directions,
I shall not fear any smiles of scorn, or words of
reproach; for I am confident you will defend me against
all the mischievous and poisonous Teeth of malitious
detractors. I shall besides, implore the assistance of the
Sacred Church, and the Learned Schools, to take me
into their Protection, and shelter my weak endeavours:
For though I am but an ignorant and simple Woman,
yet I am their devoted and honest Servant, who shall
never quit the respect and honor due to them, but live
and die theirs, as also,

II

Before I begin my Reflections upon the Opinions
of those Authors you sent me, I will answer
first your Objection concerning the Ground
of my Philosophy, which is Infinite Matter: For
you were pleased to mention, That you could not well
apprehend, how it was possible, that many Infinites
could be contained in one Infinite, since one Infinite
takes up all Place Imaginary, leaving no room for any
other; Also, if one Infinite should be contained in an
other Infinite, that which contains, must of necessity be
bigger then that which is contained, whereby the Nature
of Infinite would be lost; as having no bigger nor
less, but being of an Infinite quantity.

First of all, Madam, there is no such thing as All in
Infinite, nor any such thing as All the Place, for Infinite is
not circumscribed nor limited: Next, as for that one Infinite
cannot be in an other Infinite, I answer, as well as
one Finite can be in another Finite; for one Creature is
not onely composed of Parts, but one Part lies within another,
and one Figure within another, and one Motion
within another. As for example, Animal Kind, have
they not Internal and External Parts, and so Internal and
External Motions? And are not Animals, Vegetables
and Minerals inclosed in the Elements? But as for Infinites,
you must know, Madam, that there are several
kindes of Infinites. For there is first Infinite in quantity C or C1v 6
or bulk, that is such a big and great Corporeal substance,
which exceeds all bounds and limits of measure, and may
be called Infinite in Magnitude. Next there is Infinite
in Number, which exceeds all numeration and account,
and may be termed Infinite in Multitude; Again there
is Infinite in Quality; as for example, Infinite degrees
of softness, hardness, thickness, thinness, heat and cold, &c.
also Infinite degrees of Motion, and so Infinite Creations,
Infinite Compositions, Dissolutions, Contractions,
Dilations, Digestions, Expulsions; also Infinite
degrees of Strength, Knowledg, Power, &c. Besides
there is Infinite in Time, which is properly named Eternal.
Now, when I say, that there is but one Infinite,
and that Infinite is the Onely Matter, I mean infinite in
bulk and quantity. And this Onely matter, because it
is Infinite in bulk, must of necessity be divisible into infinite
Parts, that is, infinite in number, not in bulk or
quantity; for though Infinite Parts in number make
up one infinite in quantity, yet they considered in themselves,
cannot be said Infinite, because every Part is of
a certain limited and circumscribed Figure, Quantity and
Proportion, whereas Infinite hath no limits nor bounds:
besides it is against the nature of a single Part to be Infinite,
or else there would be no difference between the
Part and the whole, the nature of a Part requiring that
it must be less then its whole, but all what is less hath a
determined quantity, and so becomes finite. Therefore
it is no absurdity to say, that an Infinite may have
both Finite and Infinite Parts, Finite in Quantity, Infinite
in Number. But those that say, if there were an
Infinite Body, that each of its Parts must of necessity be
Infinite too, are much mistaken; for it is a contradictiondiction C2r 7
in the same Terms to say One Infinite Part, for
the very Name of a Part includes a Finiteness, but take
all parts of an Infinite Body together, then you may
rightly say they are infinite. Nay Reason will inform
you plainly, for example: Imagine an Infinite number
of grains of Corn in one heap, surely if the number of
Grains be Infinite, you must grant of necessity the
bulk or body, which contains this infinite number of
grains, to be Infinite too; to wit, Infinite in quantity,
and yet you will find each Grain in it self to be Finite.
But you will say, an Infinite Body cannot have parts,
for if it be Infinite, it must be Infinite in Quantity, and
therefore of one bulk, and one continued quantity, but
Infinite parts in number make a discrete quantity. I answer
it is all one; for a Body of a continued quantity
may be divided and severed into so many Parts either
actually, or mentally in our Conceptions or thoughts;
besides nature is one continued Body, for there is no
such Vacuum in Nature, as if her Parts did hang together
like a linked Chain; nor can any of her Parts subsist
single and by it self, but all the Parts of Infinite
Nature, although they are in one continued Piece, yet
are they several and discerned from each other by their
several Figures. And by this, I hope, you will understand
my meaning, when I say, that several Infinites may be
included or comprehended in one Infinite; for by the one
Infinite, I understand Infinite in Quantity, which includes
Infinite in Number, that is Infinite Parts; then
Infinite in Quality, as Infinite degrees of Rarity, Density,
Swiftness, Slowness, Hardness, Softness, &c. Infinite
degrees of Motions, Infinite Creations, Dissolutions,
Contractions, Dilations, Alterations, &c. Infinitefinite C2v 8
degres of Wisdom, Strength, Power, &c. and
lastly Infinite in Time or Duration, which is Eternity,
for Infinite and Eternal are inseparable; All which Infinites
are contained in the Onely Matter as many Letters
are contained in one Word, many Words in one Line,
many Lines in one Book. But you will say perhaps,
if I attribute an Infinite Wisdom, Strength,
Power, Knowledg, &c. to Nature; then Nature is in
all coequal with God, for God has the same Attributes:
I answer, Not at all; for I desire you to understand me
rightly, when I speak of Infinite Nature, and when I
speak of the Infinite Deity, for there is great difference
between them, for it is one thing a Deitical or Divine Infinite,
and another a Natural Infinte; You know, that
God is a Spirit, and not a bodily substance, again that
Nature is a Body, and not a Spirit, and therefore none of
these Infinites can obstruct or hinder each other, as being
different in their kinds, for a Spirit being no Body, requires
no place, Place being an attribute which onely
belongs to a Body, and therefore when I call Nature
Infinite, I mean an Infinite extension of Body, containing
an Infinite number of Parts; but what doth an Infinite
extension of Body hinder the Infiniteness of God,
as an Immaterial Spiritual being? Next, when I do
attribute an Infinite Power, Wisdom, Knowledg, &c.
to Nature, I do not understand a Divine, but a Natural
Infinite Wisdom and Power, that is, such as properly
belongs to Nature, and not a supernatural, as is in
God; For Nature having Infinite parts of Infinite degrees,
must also have an Infinite natural wisdom to order
her natural Infinite parts and actions and consequently
an Infinite natural power to put her wisdom into D1r 9
into act; and so of the rest of her attributes, which are
all natural: But Gods Attributes being supernatural,
transcend much these natural infinite attributes; for God,
being the God of Nature, has not onely Natures Infinite
Wisdom and Power, but besides, a Supernatural
and Incomprehensible Infinite Wisdom and Power;
which in no wayes do hinder each other, but may very
well subsist together. Neither doth Gods Infinite Justice
and his Infinite Mercy hinder each other; for Gods
Attributes, though they be all several Infinites, yet they
make but one Infinite.

But you will say, If Nature’s Wisdom and Power extends
no further then to natural things, it is not Infinite,
but limited and restrained. I answer, That doth not
take away the Infiniteness of Nature; for there may be
several kinds of Infinites, as I related before, and
one may be as perfect an Infinite as the other in its kind.
For example: Suppose a Line to be extended infinitely
in length, you will call this Line Infinite, although it
have not an Infinite breadth: Also, if an infinite length
and breadth joyn together, you will call it, an Infinite
Superficies, although it wants an infinite depth; and
yet every Infinite, in its kinde, is a Perfect Infinite, if
I may call it so: Why then shall not Nature also be said
to have an Infinite Natural Wisdom and Power, although
she has not a Divine Wisdom and Power? Can
we say, Man hath not a free Will, because he hath not
an absolute free Will, as God hath? Wherefore, a
Natural Infinite, and the Infinite God, may well stand
together, without any opposition or hinderance, or without
any detracting or derogating from the Omnipotency
and Glory of God; for God remains still the God of D Na- D1v 10
Nature, and is an Infinite Immaterial Purity, when as
Nature is an Infinite Corporeal Substance; and Immaterial
and Material cannot obstruct each other. And
though an Infinite Corporeal cannot make an Infinite
Immaterial, yet an Infinite Immaterial can make an
Infinite Corporeal, by reason there is as muchmuch difference
in the Power as in the Purity: And the disparity
between the Natural and Divine Infinite is such, as
they cannot joyn, mix, and work together, unless
you do believe that Divine Actions can have allay.

But you may say, Purity belongs onely to natural
things, and none but natural bodies can be said purified,
but God exceeds all Purity. ’Tis true: But if
there were infinite degrees of Purity in Matter, Matter
might at last become Immaterial, and so from an Infinite
Material turn to an Infinite Immaterial, and from Nature
to be God: A great, but an impossible Change.
For I do verily believe, that there can be but one Omnipotent
God, and he cannot admit of addition, or diminution;
and that which is Material cannot be Immaterial,
and what is Immaterial cannot become Material,
I mean, so, as to change their natures; for Nature
is what God was pleased she should be; and will be
what she was, until God be pleased to make her otherwise.
Wherefore there can be no new Creation of
matter, motion, or figure; nor any annihilation of any
matter, motion, or figure in Nature, unless God do create
a new Nature: For the changing of Matter into several
particular Figures, doth not prove an annihilation
of particular Figures; nor the cessation of particular Motions
an annihilation of them: Neither doth the variation
of the Onely Matter produce an annihilation of any part D2r 11
part of Matter, nor the variation of figures and motions
of Matter cause an alteration in the nature of Onely
Matter: Wherefore there cannot be new Lives, Souls
or Bodies in Nature; for, could there be any thing
new in Nature, or any thing annihilated, there would
not be any stability in Nature, as a continuance of every
kind and sort of Creatures, but there would be a
confusion between the new and old matter, motions,
and figures, as between old and new Nature; In
truth, it would be like new Wine in old Vessels, by
which all would break into disorder. Neither can
supernatural and natural effects be mixt together, no
more then material and immaterial things or beings:
Therefore it is probable, God has ordained Nature to
work in her self by his Leave, Will, and Free Gift. But
there have been, and are still strange and erroneous Opinions,
and great differences amongst Natural Philosophers,
concerning the Principles of Natural things; some
will have them Atoms, others will have the first Principles
to be Salt, Sulphur and Mercury; some will have
them to be the four Elements as Fire, Air, Water, and
Earth; and others will have but one of these Elements;
also some will have Gas and Blas, Ferments, Idea’s and
the like; but what they believe to be Principles and
Causes of natural things, are onely Effects; for in all
Probability it appears to humane sense and reason, that
the cause of every particular material Creature is the
onely and Infinite Matter, which has Motions and Figures
inseparably united; for Matter, Motion and Figure,
are but one thing, individable in its Nature. And
as for Immaterial Spirits, there is surely no such thing
in Infinite Nature, to wit, so as to be Parts of Nature; for Nature D2v 12
Nature is altogether Material, but this opinion proceeds
from the separation or abstraction of Motion formfrom Matter,
viz. that man thinks matter and motion to be dividable
from each other, and believes motion to be a thing
by it self, naming it an Imaterial thing, which has a
being, but not a bodily substance: But various and different
effects do not prove a different Matter or Cause,
neither do they prove an unsetled Cause, onely the variety
of Effects hath obscured the Cause from the several
parts, which makes Particular Creatures partly Ignorant,
and partly knowing. But in my opinion, Nature
is material, and not any thing in Nature, what belongs
to her, is immaterial; but whatsoever is Immaterial, is
Supernatural, Therefore Motions, Forms, Thoughts,
Ideas, Conceptions, Sympathies, Antipathies, Accidents,
Qualities, as also Natural Life, and Soul, are
all Material: And as for Colours, Sents, Light, Sound,
Heat, Cold, and the like, those that believe them not
to be substances or material things, surely their brain or
heart (take what place you will for the forming of Conceptions)
moves very Irregularly, and they might as
well say, Our sensitive Organs are not material; for what
Objects soever, that are subject to our senses, cannot in
sense be denied to be Corporeal, when as those things
that are not subject to our senses, can be conceived
in reason to be Immaterial? But some Philosophers
striving to express their wit, obstruct reason; and
drawing Divinity to prove Sense and Reason, weaken
Faith so, as their mixed Divine Philosophy becomes
meer Poetical Fictions, and Romantical expressions, making
material Bodies immaterial Spirits, and immaterial
Spirits material Bodies; and some have conceived some things E1r 13
things neither to be Material nor Immaterial, but between
both. Truly, Madam, I wish their Wits had
been less, and their Judgments more, as not to jumble
Natural and Supernatural things together, but to distinguish
either clearly, for such Mixtures are neither
Natural nor Divine; But as I said, the Confusion comes
from their too nice abstractions, and from the separation
of Figure and Motion from Matter, as not conceiving
them individable; but if God, and his servant
Nature were as Intricate and Confuse in their Works,
as Men in their Understandings and Words, the Universe
and Production of all Creatures would soon be
without Order and Government, so as there would be
a horrid and Eternal War both in Heaven, and in the
World, and so pittying their troubled Brains, and
wishing them the Light of Reason, that they may clearly
perceive the Truth, I rest

III

It seems you are offended at my Opinion, that Nature
is Eternal without beginning, which, you say,
is to make her God, or at least coequalcoequal with God;
But, if you apprend my meaning rightly, you will E say, E1v 14
say, I do not: For first, God is an Immaterial and Spiritual
Infinite Being, which Propriety God cannot give away
to any Creature, nor make another God in Essence like
to him, for Gods Attributes are not communicable to any
Creature; Yet this doth not hinder, that God should not
make Infinite and Eternal Matter, for that is as easie to
him, as to make a Finite Creature, Infinite Matter being
quite of another Nature then God, is to wit, Corporeal,
when God is Incorporeal, the difference whereof
I have declared in my former Letter. But as for
Nature, that it cannot be Eternal without beginning,
because God is the Creator and Cause of it, and that the
Creator must be before the Creature, as the Cause before
the Effect, so, that it is impossible for Nature to be
without a beginning; if you will speak natually, as human
reason guides you, and bring an Argument concluding
from the Priority of the Cause before the
Effect, give me leave to tell you, that God is not tied to
Natural Rules, but that he can do beyond our Understanding,
and therefore he is neither bound up to time,
as to be before, for if we will do this, we must not allow,
that the Eternal Son of God is Coeternal with the Father,
because nature requires a Father to exist before
the Son, but in God is no time, but all Eternity; and
if you allow, that God hath made some Creatures, as
Supernatural Spirits, to live Eternally, why should he
not as well have made a Creature from all Eternity? for
Gods making is not our making, he needs no Priority of
Time. But you may say, the Comparison of the Eternal
Generation of the Son of God is Mystical and Divine,
and not to be applied to natural things: I answer,
The action by which God created the World or made Nature E2r 15
Nature, was it natural or supernatual? surely you will
say it was a Supernatural and God-like action, why then
will you apply Natural Rules to a God-like and Supernatural
Action? for what Man knows, how and
when God created Nature? You will say, the Scripture
doth teach us that, for it is not Six thousand years,
when God created this World. I answer, the holy
Scripture informs us onely of the Creation of this
Visible World, but not of Nature and natural Matter;
for I firmly believe according to the Word of
God, that this World has been Created, as is described
by Mosses, but what is that to natural Matter?
There may have been worlds before, as many are of
the opinion that there have been men before Adam, and
many amongst Divines do believe, that after the destruction
of this World God will Create a new World again,
as a new Heaven, and a new Earth; and if this be
probable, or at least may be believed without any prejudice
to the holy Scripture, why may it not be probably
believed that there have been other worlds before this visible
World? for nothing is impossible with God; and
all this doth derogate nothing from the Honour and
Glory of God, but rather increases his Divine Power. But
as for the Creation of this present World, it is related,
that there was first a rude and indigested Heap, or Chaos,
without form, void and dark; and God said, “Let it be
light; Let there be a Firmament in the midst of the Waters,
and let the Waters under the Heaven be gathered
together, and let the dry Land appear; Let the Earth
bring forth Grass, the Herb yielding seed, and the
Fruit-tree yielding Fruit after its own kind; and let there
be Lights in the Firmament, the one to rule the Day, and the E2v 16
the other the Night; and let the Waters bring forth
abundantly the moving Creature that hath life; and let
the Earth bring forth living Creatures after its kinde”; and
at last God said, “Let us make Man, and all what was
made, God saw it was good.” Thus all was made by
Gods Command, and who executed his Command
but the Material servant of God, Nature? which ordered
her self-moving matter into such several Figures as
God commanded, and God approved of them. And
thus, Madam, I verily believe the Creation of the
World, and that God is the Sole and omnipotent Creator
of Heaven and Earth, and of all Creatures therein;
nay, although I believe Nature to have been from
Eternity, yet I believe also that God is the God and
Author of Nature, and has made Nature and natural
Matter in a way and manner proper to his Omnipotency
and Incomprehensible by us: I will pass by natural
Arguments and Proofs, as not belonging to such
an Omnipotent Action; as for example, how the nature
of relative terms requires, that they must both exist
at one point of Time, viz. a Master and his Servant,
and a King and his Subjects; for one bearing relation
to the other, can in no ways be considered as different
from one another in formiliness or laterness of Time;
but as I said, these being meerly natural things, I will
nor cannot apply them to Supernatural and Divine Actions;
But if you ask me, how it is possible that Nature,the
Effect and Creature of God, can be Eternal without beginning?
I will desire you to answer me first, how a
Creature can be Eternal without end, as, for example,
Supernatural Spirits are, and then I will answer you,
how a Creature can be Eternal without beginning; For F1r 17
For Eternity consists herein, that it has neither beginning
nor end: and if it be easie for God to make a Being
without end, it is not difficult for Him to make a Being
without beginning. One thing more I will add, which is,
That if Nature has not been made by God from all
Eternity, then the Title of God, as being a Creator,
which is a Title and action, upon which our Faith is
grounded, (for it is the first Article in our Creed) has
been accessory to God, as I said, not full Six thousand
years ago; but there is not any thing accessory to God,
he being the Perfection himself. But, Madam, all what
I speak, is under the liberty of Natural Philosophy, and
by the Light of Reason onely, not of Revelation; and
my Reason being not infallible, I will not declare my
Opinions for an infallible Truth: Neither do I think,
that they are offensive either to Church or State, for I
submit to the Laws of One, and believe the Doctrine
of the Other, so much, that if it were for the advantage
of either, I should be willing to sacrifice my Life, especcially
for the Church; yea, had I millions of Lives, and
every Life was either to suffer torment or to live in ease,
I would prefer torment for the benefit of the Church;
and therefore, if I knew that my Opinions should give
any offence to the Church, I should be ready every minute
to alter them: And as much as I am bound in all
duty to the obedience of the Church, as much am I particularly
bound to your Ladiship, for your entire love
and sincere affection towards me, for which I shall live
and die,

IV

I have chosen, in the first place, the Work of that
famous Philosopher Hobbs, called Leviathan, wherein
I find he says, “That the cause of sense or sensitive
perception is the external body or Object, which presses the
Organ proper to each Sense.”Open note q003-rota Part.I.
ch.1. To which I answer, according
to the ground of my own Philosophical Opinions, That all
things, and therefore outward objects as well as sensitive
organs, have both Sense and Reason, yet neither the
objects nor the organs are the cause of them; for Perception
is but the effect of the Sensitive and rational
Motions, and not the Motions of the Perception; neither
doth the pressure of parts upon parts make Perception;
for although Matter by the power of self-motion is
as much composeable as divideable, and parts do joyn to
parts, yet that doth not make perception; nay, the several
parts, betwixt which the Perception is made, may
be at such a distance, as not capable to press: As for example,
Two men may see or hear each other at a distance,
and yet there may be other bodies between them, that
do not move to those perceptions, so that no pressure can
be made, for all pressures are by some constraint and
force; wherefore, according to my Opinion, the Sensitive
and Rational Free Motions, do pattern out each
others object, as Figure and Voice in each others Eye
and Ear; for Life and Knowledge, which I name Rational
and Sensitive Matter, are in every Creature, and in F2r 19
in all parts of every Creature, and make all perceptions
in Nature, because they are the self-moving parts of
Nature, and according as those Corporeal, Rational,
and Sensitive Motions move, such or such perceptions are
made: But these self-moving parts being of different degrees
(for the Rational matter is purer than the Sensitive)
it causes a double perception in all Creatures, whereof one
is made by the Rational corporeal motions, and the
other by the Sensitive; and though both perceptions are
in all the body, and in every part of the body of a Creature,
yet the sensitive corporeal motions having their proper
organs, as Work-houses, in which they work some
sorts of perceptions, those perceptions are most commonly
made in those organs, and are double again; for the
sensitive motions work either on the inside or on the outside
of those organs, on the inside in Dreams, on the
out-side awake; and although both the Rational and the
Sensitive matter are inseparably joyned and mixed together,
yet do they not always work together, for oftentimes
the Rational works without any sensitive paterns,
and the sensitive again without any rational paterns.
But mistake me not, Madam, for I do not absolutely
confine the sensitive perception to the Organs, nor the
rational to the Brain, but as they are both in the whole
body, so they may work in the whole body according
to their own motions. Neither do I say, that there is no
other perception in the Eye but sight, in the Ear but
hearing, and so forth, but the sensitive organs have
other perceptions besides these; and if the sensitive and
rational motions be irregular in those parts, between
which the perception is made, as for example, in the
two fore-mentioned men, that see and hear each other, then F2v 20
then they both neither see nor hear each other perfectly;
and if one’s motions be perfect, but the
other’s irregular and erroneous, then one sees and
hears better then the other; or if the Sensitive and
Rational motions move more regularly and make perfecter
paterns in the Eye then in the Ear, then they
see better then they hear; and if more regularly and
perfectly in the Ear then in the Eye, they hear better then
they see: And so it may be said of each man singly, for
one man may see the other better and more perfectly,
then the other may see him; and this man may hear the
other better and more perfectly, then the other may hear
him; whereas, if perception were made by pressure,
there would not be any such mistakes; besides the hard
pressure of objects, in my opinion, would rather annoy
and obscure, then inform. But as soon as the object is removed,
the Perception of it, made by the sensitive motions
in the Organs, ceaseth, by reason the sensitive Motions
cease from paterning, but yet the Rational Motions
do not always cease so suddenly, because the sensitive
corporeal Motions work with the Inanimate Matter,
and therefore cannot retain particular figures long,
whereas the Rational Matter doth onely move in its own
substance and parts of matter, and upon none other, as
my Book of Philosophical Opinions will inform you
better. And thus Perception, in my opinion, is not
made by Pressure, nor by Species, nor by matter going
either from the Organ to the Object, or from the
Object into the Organ. By this it is also manifest, that
Understanding comes not from Exterior Objects, or
from the Exterior sensitive Organs; for as Exterior Objects
do not make Perception, so they do neither make Un- G1r 21
Understanding, but it is the rational matter that doth it,
for Understanding may be without exterior objects and
sensitive organs; And this in short is the opinion of

V

Your Authours opinion is, Open note a002-rota Leviathan,
Part.I.c.2. that “when a thing lies
still, unless somewhat else stir it, it will lie still for
ever; but when a thing is in motion, it will eternally
be in motion, unless somewhat else stay it; the reason
is,” saith he, “because nothing can change it self”; To tell
you truly, Madam, I am not of his opinion, for if
Matter moveth it self, as certainly it doth, then the
least part of Matter, were it so small as to seem Individable,
will move it self; ’Tis true, it could not desist
from motion, as being its nature to move, and no
thing can change its Nature; for God himself, who
hath more power then self-moving Matter, cannot
change himself from being God; but that Motion
should proceed from another exterior Body, joyning
with, or touching that body which it moves, is in my
opinion not probable; for though Nature is all Corporeal,
and her actions are Corporeal Motions, yet
that doth not prove, that the Motion of particular G Creat- G1v 22
Creatures or Parts is caused by the joining, touching or
pressing of parts upon parts; for it is not the several
parts that make motion, but motion makes them; and
yet Motion is not the cause of Matter, but Matter is
the cause of Motion, for Matter might subsist without
Motion, but not Motion without Matter, onely there
could be no perception without Motion, nor no Variety,
if Matter were not self-moving; but Matter, if it
were all Inanimate and void of Motion, would lie as a
dull, dead and senseless heap; But that all Motion
comes by joining or pressing of other parts, I deny, for
if sensitive and rational perceptions, which are sensitive
and rational motions, in the body, and in the mind,
were made by the pressure of outward objects, pressing
the sensitive organs, and so the brain or interior parts
of the Body, they would cause such dents and holes
therein, as to make them sore and patched in a short time;
Besides, what was represented in this manner, would
always remain, or at least not so soon be dissolved, and
then those pressures would make a strange and horrid
confusion of Figures, for not any figure would be distinct;
Wherefore my opinion is, that the sensitive and
rational Matter doth make or pattern out the figures of
several Objects, and doth dissolve them in a moment of
time; as for example, when the eye seeth the object
first of a Man, then of a Horse, then of another Creature,
the sensitive motions in the eye move first into
the figure of the Man, then straight into the figure of
the Horse, so that the Mans figure is dissolved and altered
into the figure of the Horse, and so forth; but if
the eye sees many figures at once, then so many several
figures are made by the sensitive Corporeal Motions, and G2r 23
and as many by the Rational Motions, which are Sight
and Memory, at once: But in sleep both the sensitive
and rational Motions make the figures without patterns,
that is, exterior objects, which is the cause that
they are often erroneous, whereas, if it were the former
Impressions of the Objects, there could not possibly be
imperfect Dreams or Remembrances, for fading of Figures
requires as much motion, as impression, and impression
and fading are very different and opposite motions;
nay, if Perception was made by Impression,
there could not possibly be a fading or decay of the figures
printed either in the Mind or Body, whereas yet,
as there is also an alteration of figures made by these motions.
But you will say, it doth not follow, if Perception
be made by Impression, that it must needs continue
and not decay; for if you touch and move a string, the
motion doth not continue for ever, but ceaseth by degrees;
I answer, There is great difference between
Prime self-motion, and forced or Artifical Motions;
for Artifical Motions are onely an Imitation of Natural
Motions, and not the same, but caused by Natural
Motions; for although there is no Art that is not made
by Nature, yet Nature is not made by Art; Wherefore
we cannot rationally judgjudge of Perception by comparing
it to the motion of string, and its alteration to
the ceasing of that motion, for Nature moveth not by
force, but freely. ’Tis true, ’tis the freedom in Nature
for one man to give another a box on the Ear, or
to trip up his heels, or for one or more men to fight with
each other; yet these actions are not like the actions of
loving Imbraces and Kissing each other; neither are the actions G2v 24
actions one and the same, when a man strikes himself,
and when he strikes another; and so is likewise the action
of impression, and the action of self-figuring not one
and the same, but different; for the action of impression
is forced, and the action of self-figuring is free;
Wherefore the comparison of the forced motions of a
string, rope, watch, or the like, can have no place here;
for though the rope, made of flax or hemp, may have
the perception of a Vegetable, yet not of the hand, or
the like, that touched or struck it; and although the
hand doth occasion the rope to move in such a manner,
yet it is not the motion of the hand, by which it moveth,
and when it ceases, its natural and inherent power to
move is not lessened; like as a man, that hath left off carving
or painting, hath no less skill then he had before,
neither is that skill lost when he plays upon the Lute or
Virginals, or plows, plant, and the like, but he hath
onely altered his action, as from carving to painting, or
from painting to playing, and so to plowing and planting,
which is not through disability but choice. But
you will say, it is nevertheless a cessation of such a motion.
I grant it: but the ceasing of such a motion is not
the ceasing of self-moving matter from all motions, neither
is cessation as much as annihilation, for the motion
lies in the power of the matter to repeat it, as oft it will, if
it be not overpowred, for more parts, or more strength,
or more motions may over-power the less; Wherefore
forced, or artificial and free Natural motions are different
in their effects, although they have but one Cause,
which is the self-moving matter, and though Matter is
but active and passive, yet there is great Variety, and
so great difference in force and liberty, objects and perceptions,ceptions, H1r 25
sense and reason, and the like. But to conclude,
perception is not made by the pressure of objects,
no more then hemp is made by the Rope-maker, or metal
by the Bell-foundersounder or Ringer, and yet neither
the rope nor the metal is without sense and reason,
but the natural motions of the metal, and the artificail
motions of the Ringer are different; wherefore a natural
effect in truth cannot be produced from an artificial
cause, neither can the ceasing of particular forced
or artificial motions be a proof for the ceasing of general,
natural, free motions, as that matter is self should
cease to move; for there is no such thing as rest in Nature,
but there is an alteration of motions and figures in
self-moving matter, which alteration causeth variety as
well in opinions, as in every thing else; Wherefore in
my opinion, though sense alters, yet it doth not decay,
for the rational and sensitive part of matter is as lasting as
matter it self, but that which is named decay of sense, is
onely the alteration of motions, and not an obscurity of
motions, like as the motions of memory and forgetfulness,
and the repetition of the same motions is called
remembrance. And thus much of this subject for the
present, to which I add no more but rest

VI

Your Authour discoursing of Imagination, saith,
“That as soon as any object is removed from our
Eyes, though the Impression that is made in us, remain,
yet other objects more present succeeding and working
on us, the Imagination of the past is obscured and made
weak.”Open note q006-rota Leviathan,
part.I.c.2. To which I answer, first, that he conceives Sense
and Imagination to be all one, for he says, “Imagination
is nothing else, but a fading or decaying sense;” whereas in
my opinion they are different, not onely their matter,
but their motions also being distinct and different;
for Imagination is a rational perception, and sense a sensitive
perception; wherefore as much as the rational matter
differs from the sensitive, as much doth Imagination
differ from Sense. Next I say, that Impressions do not
remain in the body of sensitive matter, but it is in its power
to make or repeat the like figures; Neither is Imagination
less, when the object is absent, then when present,
but the figure patterned out in the sensitive organs,
being altered, and remaining onely in the Rational part
of matter, is not so perspicuous and clear, as when it was
both in the Sense and in the Mind: And to prove that
Imagination of things past doth not grow weaker by distance
of time, as your Authour says, many a man in his
old age, will have as perfect an Imagination of what is past
in his younger years, as if he saw it present. And as
for your Authours opinion, that “Imagination and Memory
are one and the same”, I grant, that they are made of H2r 27
of one kind of Matter; but although the Matter is
one and the same, yet several motions in the several parts
make Imagination and Memory several things: As for
Example, a Man may Imagine that which never came
into his Senses, wherefore Imagination is not one and
the same thing with Memory. But your Authour
seems to make all Sense, as it were, one Motion, but
not all Motion Sense, whereas surely there is no Motion,
but is either Sensitive or Rational; for Reason is
but a pure and refined Sense, and Sense a grosser Reason.
Yet all sensitive and rational Motions are not one
and the same; for forced or Artificial Motions, though
they proceed from sensitive matter, yet are they so different
from the free and Prime Natural Motions, that
they seem, as it were, quite of another nature: And
this distinction neglected is the Cause, that many make
Appetites and Passions, Perceptions and Objects, and
the like, as one, without any or but little difference.
But having discoursed of the difference of these Motions
in my former Letter, I will not be tedious to you,
with repeating it again, but remain,

VII

Your Authours opinion, concerning Open note a004-rota Leviathan,
Part.I.c.2. Dreams,
seemeth to me in some part very rational and probable,
in some part not; For when he sayes, that
“Dreams are onely Imaginations of them that sleep, which
imaginations have been before either totally or by parcels
in the Sense; and that the organs of Sense, as the Brain
and the Nerves, being benumb’d in sleep, as not easily to
be moved by external objects, those Imaginations proceed
onely from the agitation of the inward parts of mans body,
which for the connexion they have with the Brain, and
other organs, when they be distemper’d, do keep the same
in motion, whereby the Imaginations there formerly made,
appear as if a man were waking”; This seems to my Reason
not very probable: For, first, Dreams are not absolutely
Imaginations, except we do call all Motions and
Actions of the Sensitive and Rational Matter, Imaginations.
Neither is it necessary, that all Imaginations
must have been before either totally or by parcels in the
Sense; neither is there any benumbing of the organs of
Sense in sleep. But Dreams, according to my opinion,
are made by the Sensitive and Rational Corporeal Motions,
by figuring several objects, as awake; onely the
difference is, that the Sensitive motions in Dreams work
by rote and on the inside of the Sensitive organs, when
as awake they work according to the patterns of outward
objects, and exteriously or on the outside of the Sensitive I1r 29
sensitive Organs, so that sleep or dreams are nothing
else but an alteration of motions, from moving exteriously
to move interiously, and from working after a
Pattern to work by rote: I do not say that the body
is without all exterior motions, when asleep, as breathing
and beating of the Pulse (although these motions
are rather interior then exterior,) but that onely the
sensitive organs are outwardly shut, so as not to receive
the patterns of outward Objects, nevertheless the sensitive
Motions do not cease from moving inwardly; or
on the inside of the sensitive Organs; But the rational
matter doth often, as awake, so asleep or in dreams,
make such figures, as the sensitive did never make either
from outward objects, or of its own accord; for
the sensitive hath sometimes liberty to work without
Objects, but the Rational much more, which is not
bound either to the patterns of Exterior objects, or
of the sensitive voluntary Figures. Wherefore it is
not divers distempers, as your Authour sayes, that
cause different Dreams, or Cold, or Heat; neither
are Dreams the reverse of our waking Imaginations,
nor all the Figures in Dreams are not made with their
heels up, and their heads downwards, though some
are; but this error or irregularity proceeds from want
of exterior Objects or Patterns, and by reason the
sensitive Motions work by rote; neither are the Motions
reverse, because they work inwardly asleep, and
outwardly awake, for Mad-men awake see several Figures
without Objects. In short, sleeping and waking
is somewhat after that manner, when men are
called either out of their doors, or stay within their
houses; or like a Ship, where the Mariners work I all I1v 30
all under hatches, whereof you will find more in
my Philosophical Opinions; and so taking my leave,
I rest

VIII

Your Author going on in his discourse of Imaginations,
says, “That, as we have no Imagination,
whereof we have not formerly had sense, in whole or in
parts; so we have not Transition from one Imagination to
another, whereof we never had the like before in our senses.”
Open note q010-rota Leviathan,
part.I.c.3. To which my answer is in short, that the Rational
part of Matter in one composed figure, as in Man, or
the like Creature, may make such figures, as the senses
did never make in that composed Figure or Creature;
And though your Authour reproves those that say,
“Imaginations rise of themselves;”Open note q011-rota part.I. c.2. yet, if the self-moving
part of Matter, which I call Rational, makes Imaginations,
they must needs rise of themselves; for the Rational
part of matter being free and self-moving, depends
upon nothing, neither Sense nor Object, I mean, so, as
not to be able to work without them. Next, when
your Author, defining Understanding, says that it is
nothing else, but “an Imagination raised by words or other I2r 31
other volutary signs,”Open note q012-rota ibid. c. 3. My Answer is, that Understanding,
and so Words and Signs are made by self-moving
Matter, that is, Sense and Reason, and not Sense and
Reason by Words and Signs; wherefore Thoughts
are not like “Water upon a plain Table, which is drawn and
guided by the finger this or that way,”Open note q013-rota ibid. for every Part of
self-moving matter is not alwayes forced, perswaded or
directed, for if all the Parts of Sense and Reason were ruled
by force or perswasion, not any wounded Creature
would fail to be healed, or any disease to be cured by
outward Applications, for outward Applications to
Wounds and Diseases might have more force, then any
Object to the Eye: But though there is great affinity
and sympathy between parts, yet there is also great difference
and antipathy betwixt them, which is the cause
that many objects cannot with all their endeavours
work such effects upon the Interiour parts, although
they are closely press’d, for Impressions of objects do
not always affect those parts they press. Wherefore,
I am not of your Author’s opinion, that all Parts of
Matter press one another; It is true, Madam, there
cannot be any part single, but yet this doth not prove,
that parts must needs press each other: And as for his
Train of Thoughts, I must confess, that Thoughts for
the most part are made orderly, but yet they do not
follow each other like Geese, for surely, man has sometimes
very different thoughts; as for Example, a man
sometime is very sad for the death of his Friend, and
thinks of his own death, and immediately thinks of a
wanton Mistress, which later thought, surely, the
thought of Death did not draw in; wherefore, though
some thought may be the Ring-leader of others, yet many I2v 32
many are made without leaders. Again, your Authour
in his description of the Mind sayes, that “the discourse
of the mind, when it it is govern’d by design, is nothing
but seeking, or the Faculty of Invention; a hunting
out of the Causes of some Effects, present or past; or
of the Effects of some present or past Cause. Sometimes a
man seeks what he has lost, and from that Place and Time
wherein he misses it, his mind runs back from place to place,
and time to time, to find where and when he had it, that
is to say, to find some certain and limited Time and Place,
in which to begin a method of Seeking. And from thence
his thoughts run over the same places and times to find
what action or other occasion might make him lose it. This
we call Remembrance or calling to mind. Sometimes a man
knows a place determinate, within the compass whereof
he is to seek, and then his thoughtsthoughts run over all the Parts
thereof in the same manner as one would sweep a room
to find a Jewel, or as a Spaniel ranges the field till he find
a sent; or as a Man should run over the Alphabet to
start a Rime.” Thus far your Author: In which discourse
I do not perceive that he defineth what the Mind
is, but I say, that if, according to his opinion, nothing
moves it self, but one thing moves another, then the
Mind must do nothing, but move backward and forward,
nay, onely forward, and if all actions were
thrusting or pressing of parts, it would be like a crowd
of People, and there would be but little or no motion,
for the crowd would make a stoppage, like water in a
glass, the mouth of the Glass being turned downwards,
no water can pass out, by reason the numerous drops
are so closely press’d, as they cannot move exteriously.
Next, I cannot conceive how the Mind can run back either K1r 33
either to Time or Place, for as for Place, the mind is inclosed
in the body, and the running about in the parts
of the body or brain will not inform it of an Exterior
place or object; besides, objects being the cause of the
minds motion, it must return to its Cause, and so move
until it come to the object, that moved it first, so that
the mind must run out of the body to that object, which
moved it to such a Thought, although that object
were removed out of the World (as the phrase is:) But
for the mind to move backward, to Time past, is more
then it can do; Wherefore in my opinion, Remembrance,
or the like, is onely a repetition of such Figures
as were like to the Objects; and for Thoughts
in Particular, they are several figures, made by the
mind, which is the Rational Part of matter, in its own
substance, either voluntarily, or by imitation, whereof
you may see more in my Book of Philosophical Opinions.
Hence I conclude, that Prudence is nothing
else, but a comparing of Figures to Figures, and of the
several actions of those Figures, as repeating former
Figures, and comparing them to others of the like nature,
qualities, proprieties, as also chances, fortunes, &c.
Which figuring and repeating is done actually, in and
by the Rational Matter, so that all the observation of
the mind on outward Objects is onely an actual repetition
of the mind, as moving in such or such figures and
actions; and when the mind makes voluntary Figures
with those repeated Figures, and compares them together,
this comparing is Examination; and when several
Figures agree and joyn, it is Conclusion or Judgment:
likewise doth Experience proceed from repeating
and comparing of several Figures in the Mind, and K the K1v 34
the more several Figures are repeated and compared, the
greater the experience is. One thing more there is in
the same Chapter, which I cannot let pass without examination;
Your Authour says, That “things Present
onely have a being in Nature, things Past onely a being
in the Memory, but things to come have no being at all;”
Which how it possibly can be, I am not able to conceive;
for certainly, if nothing in nature is lost or annihilated,
what is past, and what is to come, hath as well
a being, as what is present; and if that which is now, had
its being before, why may it not also have its being hereafter?
It might as well be said, that what is once forgot,
cannot be remembred; for whatsoever is in Nature,
has as much a being as the Mind, and there is
not any action, or motion, or figure, in Nature, but
may be repeated, that is, may return to its former Figure,
when it is altered and dissolved; But by reason
Nature delights in variety, repetitions are not so frequently
made, especially of those things or creatures,
which are composed by the sensitive corporeal motions
in the inanimate part of Matter, because they are not so
easily wrought, as the Rational matter can work upon its
own parts, being more pliant in its self, then the Inanimate
matter is; And this is the reason, that there are
so many repetitions of one and the same Figure in the
Rational matter, which is the Mind, but seldom any in
the Gross and inanimate part of Matter, for Nature
loves ease and freedom: But to conclude, Madam, I
perceive your Author confines Sense onely to Animalkind,
and Reason onely to Man-kind: Truly, it is
out of self-love, when one Creature prefers his own Excellency
before another, for nature being endued with self- K2r 35
self-love, all Creatures have self-love too, because they
are all Parts of Nature; and when Parts agree or disagree,
it is out of Interest and Self-love; but Man herein
exceeds all the rest, as having a supernatural Soul, whose
actions also are supernatural; To which I leave him;
and rest,

IX

When your Author discourseth of the use of
Speech or Words and Names, he is pleas’d to
say “That their use is to serve for marks and
notes of Remembrance;”Open note q016-rota Leviathan,
part.I.c.4. Whereof to give you my opinion,
I say, That Speech is natural to the shape of
Man; and though sometimes it serves for marks or notes
of remembrance, yet it doth not always, for all other
Animals have Memory without the help of Speech, and
so have deaf and dumb men, nay more than those that
hear and speak: Wherefore, though Words are useful
to the mind, and so to the memory, yet both can be
without them, whereas Words cannot be without Memory;
for take a Bird and teach him to speak, if he had
not Memory, before he heard the words, he could never
learn them. You will ask me, Madam, What then, is K2v 36
is Memory the Cause of Speech? I answer, Life and
Knowledg, which is Sense and Reason, as it creates and
makes all sorts of Creatures, so also amongst the rest it
makes Words: And as I said before, that Memory
may be without the help of Speech or Words, so I say
also, that there is a possibility of reckoning of numbers,
as also of magnitudes, of swiftness, of force, and other
things without words, although your Author denies it:
But some men are so much for Art, as they endeavour
to make Art, which is onely a Drudgery-maid of Nature,
the chief Mistress, and Nature her Servant, which
is as much as to prefer Effects before the Cause, Nature
before God, Discord before Unity and Concord.

Again, your Author, in his Chapter of Open note a010-rota Ch.5. Reason,
defines Reason to be nothing else but Reckoning: I answer,
That in my opinion Reckoning is not Reason it
self, but onely an effect or action of Reason; for Reason,
as it is the chiefest and purest degree of animate
matter, works variously and in divers motions, by
which it produces various and divers effects, which are
several Perceptions, as Conception, Imagination, Fancy,
Memory, Remembrance, Understanding, Judgment,
Knowledg, and all the Passions, with many more:
Wherefore this Reason is not in one undivided part,
nor bound to one motion, for it is in every Creature
more or less, and moves in its own parts variously; and
in some Creatures, as for example, in some men, it moves
more variously then in others, which is the cause that
some men are more dull and stupid, then others; neither
doth Reason always move in one Creature regularly,
which is the cause, that some men are mad or foolish:
And though all men are made by the direction of Reason, L1r 37
Reason, and endued with Reason, from the first time
of their birth, yet all have not the like Capacities, Understandings,
Imaginations, Wits, Fancies, Passions, &c.
but some more, some less, and some regular, some irregular,
according to the motions of Reason or Rational
part of animate matter; and though some rational parts
may make use of other rational Parts, as one man of another
mans Conceptions, yet all these parts cannot associate
together; as for example, all the Material parts
of several objects, no not their species, cannot enter or
touch the eye without danger of hurting or loosing it,
nevertheless the eye makes use of the objects by patterning
them out, and so doth the rational matter, by taking
patterns from the sensitive; And thus knowledg or perception
of objects, both sensitive and rational, is taken
without the pressure of any other parts; for though
parts joyn to parts, (for no part can be single) yet this
joining doth not necessarily infer the pressure of objects
upon the sensitive organs; Whereof I have already
discoursed sufficiently heretofore, to which I refer you,
and rest

X

“Understanding”, says your Author, “is nothing
else but Conception caused by speech, and therefore,
if speech be peculiar to man, (as, for ought I know, it
is) then is understanding peculiar to him also.”Open note q018-rota Leviathan,
part.I.c.4. Where he
confineth Understanding onely to speech and to Mankind;
But, by his leave, Madam, I surely believe,
that there is more understanding in Nature, then that,
which is in speech, for if there were not, I cannot conceive,
how all the exact forms in Generations could be
produced, or how there could be such distinct degrees
of several sorts and kinds of Creatures, or distinctions
of times and seasons, and so many exact motions and
figures in Nature: Considering all this, my reason
perswadeth me, that all Understanding, which is a part
of Knowledg, is not caused by speech, for all the motions
of the Celestial Orbs are not made by speech, neither
is the knowledg or understanding which a man
hath, when sick, as to know or understand he is sick,
made by speech, nor by outward objects, especially in
a disease he never heard, nor saw, nor smelt, nor tasted,
nor touched; Wherefore all Perception, Sensation,
Memory, Imagination, Appetite, Understanding,
and the like, are not made nor caused by outward
objects, nor by speech. And as for names of things,
they are but different postures of the figures in our
mind or thoughts, made by the Rational Matter; But reasoning L2r 39
Reasoning is a comparing of the several figures., with
their several postures and actions in the Mind, which
joyned with the several words, made by the sensitive motions,
inform another distinct and separate part, as an
other man, of their minds conceptions, understanding,
opinions, and the like.

Concerning Addition and Substraction, wherein
your Author sayes Reasoning consists, I grant, that it
is an act of Reasoning, yet it doth not make Sense or
Reason, which is Life and Knowledge, but Sense and
Reason which is self-motion, makes addition and substraction
of several Parts of matter; for had matter not
self-motion, it could not divide nor compose, nor make
such varieties, without great and lingring retardments,
if not confusion. Wherefore all, what is made in
Nature, is made by self-moving matter, which self-
moving matter doth not at all times move regularly, but
often irregularly, which causes false Logick, false Arithmetick,
and the like; and if there be not a certainty
in these self-motions or actions of Nature, much less in
Art, which is but a secundary action; and therefore,
neither speech, words, nor exterior objects cause Understanding
or Reason. And although many parts of
the Rational and Sensitive Matter joyned into one, may
be stronger by their association, and over-power other
parts that are not so well knit and united, yet these are
not the less pure; onely these Parts and Motions being
not equal in several Creatures, make their Knowledge
and Reason more or less: For, when a man hath more
Rational Matter well regulated, and so more Wisdom
then an other, that same man may chance to overpower
the other, whose Rational Matter is more irregulargular, L2v 40
, but yet not so much by strength of the united
Parts, as by their subtilty; for the Rational Matter
moving regularly, is more strong with subtilty, then
the sensitive with force; so that Wisdom is stronger
then Life, being more pure, and so more active; for in
my opinion, there is a degree of difference between
Life and Knowledge, as my Book of Philosophical Opinions
will inform you.

Again, your Author sayes, “That Man doth excel all
other Animals in this faculty, that when he conceives any
thing whatsoever, he is apt to enquire the Consequences of
it, and what effects he can do with it: Besides this” (sayes
he) “Man hath an other degree of Excellence, that he
can by Words reduce the Consequences he finds to General
Rules called Theoremes or Aphorisms, that is, he can
reason or reckon not onely in Number, but in all other
things, whereof one may be added unto, or substracted
from an other.” To which I answer, That according to
my Reason I cannot perceive, but that all Creatures
may do as much; but by reason they do it not after the
same manner or way as Man, Man denies, they can do
it at all; which is very hard; for what man knows,
whether Fish do not Know more of the nature of Water,
and ebbing and flowing, and the saltness of the
Sea? or whether Birds do not know more of the nature
and degrees of Air, or the cause of Tempests?
or whether Worms do not know more of the nature of
Earth, and how Plants are produced? or Bees of the
several sorts of juices of Flowers, then Men? And
whether they do not make there Aphorismes and Theoremes
by their manner of Intelligence? For, though
they have not the speech of Man, yet thence doth not follow, M1r 41
follow, that they have no Intelligence at all. But the
Ignorance of Men concerning other Creatures is the
cause of despising other Creatures, imagining themselves
as petty Gods in Nature, when as Nature is not capable
to make one God, much less so many as Mankind;
and were it not for Mans supernatural Soul, Man would
not be more Supreme, then other Creatures in Nature,
“But” (says your Author) “this Priviledge in Man is allay’d
by another, which is, No living Creature is subject
to absurdity, but onely Man.” Certainly, Madam, I
believe the contrary, to wit, that all other Creatures do
as often commit mistakes and absurdities as Man, and if
it were not to avoid tediousness, I could present sufficient
proofs to you: Wherefore I think, not onely
Man but also other Creatures may be Philosophers and
subject to absurdities as aptly as Men; for Man doth,
nor cannot truly know the Faculties, and Abilities or
Actions of all other Creatures, no not of his own
Kind as Man-Kind, for if he do measure all men by
himself he will be very much mistaken, for what he
conceives to be true or wise, an other may conceive to
be false and foolish. But Man may have one way of
Knowledge in Philosophy and other Arts, and other
Creatures another way, and yet other Creatures manner
or way may be as Intelligible and Instructive to
each other as Man’s, I mean, in those things which
are Natural. Wherefore I cannot consent to what
your Author says, “That Children are not endued with
Reason at all, till they have attained to the use of Speech”;
for Reason is in those Creatures which have not Speech,
witness Horses, especially those which are taught in
the manage, and many other Animals. And as for the M weak M1v 42
weak understanding in Children, I have discoursed
thereof in my Book of Philosophy; The rest of this
discourse, lest I tyre you too much at once, I shall reserve
for the next, resting in the mean time,

XI

I sent you word in my last, that your Author’s opinion
is, “That Children are not endued with Reason at
all, until they have attained to the use of Speech”, in
the same Open note a012-rota Ch.4. Chapter he speaks to the same purpose thus:
“Reason is not as Sense and Memory born with us, nor gotten
by experience onely, as Prudence is, but attained by
industry.” To which I reply onely this, That it might
as well be said, a Child when new born hath not flesh
and blood, because by taking in nourishment or food,
the Child grows to have more flesh and blood; or, that
a Child is not born with two legs, because he cannot go,
or with two arms and hands, because he cannot help
himself; or that he is not born with a tongue, because
he cannot speak: For although Reason doth not move
in a Child as in a Man, in Infancy as in Youth, in
Youth as in Age, yet that doth not prove that Children
are without Reason, because they cannot run and prate: I M2r 43
I grant, some other Creatures appear to have more
Knowledg when new born then others; as for example,
a young Foal has more knowledg than a young Child,
because a Child cannot run and play; besides a Foal
knows his own Dam, and can tell where to take his food,
as to run and suck his Dam, when as an Infant cannot
do so, nor all beasts, though most of them can, but
yet this doth not prove, that a Child hath no reason at
all; Neither can I perceive that man is a Monopoler of
all Reason, or Animals of all Sense, but that Sense and
Reason are in other Creatures as well as in Man and Animals;
for example, Drugs, as Vegetables and Minerals,
although they cannot slice, pound or infuse, as
man can, yet they can work upon man more subtilly,
wisely, and as sensibly either by purging, vomiting,
spitting, or any other way, as man by mincing, pounding
and infusing them, and Vegetables will as wisely
nourish Men, as Men can nourish Vegetables; Also
some Vegetables are as malicious and mischievous to
Man, as Man is to one another, witness Hemlock,
Nightshade, and many more; and a little Poppy will
as soon, nay sooner cause a Man to sleep, though silently,
then a Nurse a Child with singing and rocking; But
because they do not act in such manner or way as Man,
Man judgeth them to be without sense and reason; and
because they do not prate and talk as Man, Man believes
they have not so much wit as he hath; and because
they cannot run and go, Man thinks they are not
industrious; the like for Infants concerning Reason. But
certainly, it is not local motion or speech the makes
sense and reason, but sense and reason makes them; neither
is sense and reason bound onely to the actions of Man, M2v 44
Man, but it is free to the actions, forms, figures and
proprieties of all Creatures; for if none but Man had
reason, and none but Animals sense, the World could
not be so exact, and so well in order as it is: but Nature
is wiser then Man with all his Arts, for these are
onely produced through the variety of Natures actions,
and disputes through the superfluous varieties of Mans
follies or ignorances, not knowing Natures powerful
life and knowledg: But I wonder, Madam, your Author
says in this place, “That Reason is not born with
Man,” when as in another Open note a013-rota In his Elements
of Philosophy,

part.I.c.I.
art.I. place, he says,
“That every
man brought Philosophy, that is Natural reason with him
into the World”; Which how it agree, I will leave to others
to judg, and to him to reconcile it, remaining in the
mean time,

XII

Two sorts of motions, I find your AuthorOpen note a014-rota Leviathan,
part.I.c.6. doth
attribute to Animals, viz. “Vital and Animal, the
Vital motions,” says he, “are begun in Generation,
and continued without Interruption through their whole life,
and those are the Course of the Blood, the Pulse, the
Breathing, Conviction, Nutrition, Excretion, &c. to which N1r 45
which motions there needs no help of Imaginations; But
the animal Motions, otherwise called voluntary Motions,
are to go, to speak, to move any of our limbs, in such
manner as is first fancied in our minds: And because going,
speaking, and the like voluntary motions, depend always
upon a precedent thought of whither, which way, and what,
it is evident, that the Imagination is the first Internal beginning
of all voluntary Motion”. Thus far your Author.
Whereof in short I give you my opinion, first concerning
Vital Motions, that it appears improbable if
not impossible to me, that Generation should be the
cause and beginning of Life, because Life must of necessity
be the cause of Generation, life being the Generator
of all things, for without life motion could not be,
and without motion not any thing could be begun, increased,
perfected, or dissolved. Next, that Imagination
is not necessry to Vital Motions, it is probable
it may not, but yet there is required Knowledg, which
I name Reason; for if there were not Knowledg in all
Generations or Productions, there could not any distinct
Creature be made or produced, for then all Generations
would be confusedly mixt, neither would there be any
distinct kinds or sorts of Creatures, nor no different Faculties,
Proprieties, and the like. Thirdly, concerning
Animal Motions, which your Author names “Voluntary
Motions, as to go, to speak, to move any of our limbs,
in such manner as is first fancied in our minds, and that they
depend upon a precedent thought of whither, which way, and
what, and that Imagination is the first Internal beginning
of them”; I think, by your Authors leave, it doth
imply a contradiction, to call them Voluntary Motions,
and yet to say they are caused and depend upon our N Imagina- N1v 46
Imagination; for if the Imagination draws them this
way, or that way, how can they be voluntary motions,
being in a manner forced and necessitated to move according
to Fancy or Imagination? But when he goes
on in the same place and treats of Endeavour, Appetite,
Desire, Hunger, Thirst, Aversion, Love, Hate, and the
like, he derives one from the other, and treats well as a
Moral Philosopher; but whether it be according to the
truth or probability of Natural Pilosophy, I will leave
to others to judge, for in my opinion Passions and Appetites
are very different, Appetites being made by the
motions of the sensitive Life, and Passions, as also Imagination,
Memory, &c. by the motions of the rational
Life, which is the cause that Appetites belong more to
the actions of the Body then the Mind: ’Tis true, the
Sensitive and Rational self-moving matter doth so much
resemble each other in their actions, as it is difficult to distinguish
them. But having treated hereof at large in
my other Philosophical Work, to cut off repetitions, I
will refer you to that, and desire you to compare our
opinions together: But certainly there is so much variety
in one and the same sort of Passions, and so of Appetites,
as it cannot be easily express’d. To conclude, I do not
perceive that your Author tells or expresses what the
cause is of such or such actions, onely he mentions their
dependance, which is, as if a man should converse with
a Nobleman’s Friend or Servant, and not know the
Lord himself. But leaving him for this time, it is sufficient
to me, that I know your Ladyship, and your Ladyship
knows me, that I am,

XIII

Having obey’d your Commands in giving you
my opinion of the First Part of the Book of
that famous and learned Author you sent me, I
would go on; but seeing he treats in his following Parts
of the Politicks, I was forced to stay my Pen, because of
these following Reasons. First, That a Woman is not
imployed in State Affairs, unless an absolute Queen.
Next, That to study the Politicks, is but loss of Time,
unless a man were sure to be a Favourite to an absolute
Prince. Thirdly, That it is but a deceiving Profession,
and requires more Craft then Wisdom. All which
considered, I did not read that part of your Author: But
as for his Natural Philosophy, I will send you my opinion
so far as I understand it: For what belongs to Art,
as to Geometry, being no Scholar, I shall not trouble my
self withal. And so I’l take my leave of you, when I
have in two or three words answered the Question you
sent me last, which was, Whether Nature be the Art
of God, Man the Art of Nature, and a Politick Government
the Art of Man? To which I answer, ’Tis
probable it may be so; onely I add this, That Nature
doth not rule God, nor Man Nature, nor Politick Government
Man; for the Effect cannot rule the Cause,
but the Cause doth rule the Effect: Wherefore if men
do not naturally agree, Art cannot make unity amongst
them, or associate them into one Politick Body and so rule N2v 48
rule them; But man thinks he governs, when as it is Nature
that doth it, for as nature doth unite or divide parts
regularly or irregularly, and moves the several minds of
men and the several parts of mens bodies, so war is
made or peace kept: Thus it is not the artificial form
that governs men in a Politick Government, but a natural
power, for though natural motion can make artificial
things, yet artificial things cannot make natural power;
and we might as well say, nature is governed by
the art of nature, as to say man is ruled by the art and invention
of men. The truth is, Man rules an artificial
Government, and not the Government Man, just
like as a Watch-maker rules his Watch, and not the
Watch the Watch-maker. And thus I conclude and
rest,

XIV

Concerning the other Book of that learned Author
Hobbs you sent me, called Elements of Philosophy,
I shall likewise according to your desire,
give you my judgment and opinion of it as I have done
of the former, not that I intend to prejudice him any
ways thereby, but onely to mark those places wherein I O1r 49
I seem to dissent from his opinions, which liberty, I
hope, he will not deny me; And in order to this, I have
read over the first Chapter of the mentioned Book,
treating of Philosophy in General, wherein amongst the
rest, discoursing of the Utility of Natural Philosophy,
and relating the commodities and benefits which proceed
from so many arts and sciences, he is pleased to say,
Open note a015-rota Art.7. that they are “injoyed almost by all people of Europe, Asia,
and some of Africa, onely the Americans, and those
that live neer the Poles do want them: But why”, says he,
“have they sharper wits then these? Have not all men one
kind of soul, and the same faculties of mind?” To which,
give me leave, Madam, to add, That my opinion is, that
there is a difference between the Divine and the Natural
soul of man, and though the natural mind or soul
is of one kind, yet being made of rational matter, it is
divideable and composeable, by which division and
composition, men may have more or less wit, or quicker
and slower wit; the like for Judgments, Imaginations,
Fancies, Opinions, &c. For were the natural rational
mind individeable, all men would have the like degree
of wit or understanding, all men would be Philosophers
or fools, which by reason they are not, it proves the
natural rational mind is divideable and composeable, making
variations of its own several parts by self-motion;
for it is not the several outward objects, or forreign instructions,
that make the variety of the mind; neither
is wit or ingenuity alike in all men; for some are natural
Poets, Philosophers, and the like, without learning,
and some are far more ingenious then others, although
their breeding is obscure and mean, Neither will learning
make all men Scholars, for some will continue Dunces O all O1v 50
all their life time; Neither doth much experience make
all men wise, for some are not any ways advanced in
their wisdom by much and long experiences; And as
for Poetry, it is according to the common Proverb, a
“Poet is born, not made;” Indeed learning doth rather hurt
Fancy, for great Scholars are not always good Poets,
nor all States-men Natural Philosophers, nor all Experrienced
Men Wise Men, nor all Judges Just, nor all
Divines Pious, nor all Pleaders or Preachers Eloquent,
nor all Moral Philosophers Vertuous; But all this is
occasioned by the various Motions of the rational self-
moving matter, which is the Natural Mind. And
thus much for the present of the difference of wits and
faculties of the mind; I add no more, but rest,

XV

My Discourse for the present shall be of Infinite,
and the question shall be first Whether several
Finite parts, how many soever there be, can make an
Infinite. Your Author says Open note a016-rota Elem. of
Philos. c.7.
a.12. that “several Finite parts
when they are all put together make a whole Finite”; which,
if his meaning be of a certain determinate number, how
big soever, of finite parts, I do willingly grant, for all what O2r 51
what is determinate and limited, is not Infinite but Finite;
neither is there any such thing, as Whole or All in
Infinite; but if his meaning be, that no Infinite can be
made of finite parts, though infinite in number, I deny it;
Next he says “there can be no such thing as One in Infinite,
because No thing can be said One, except there be another
to compare it withal”; which in my opinion doth not
follow, for there is but One God, who is Infinite, and
hath none other to be compared withal, and so there
may be but one Onely Infinite in Nature, which is
Matter: But when he says, “there cannot be an Infinite
and Eternal Division”, is very true, viz, in this sense,
that one single part cannot be actually infinitely divided,
for the Compositions hinder the Divisions in Nature,
and the Divisions the Compositions, so that Nature,
being Matter, cannot be composed so, as not to have
parts, nor divided so, as that her parts should not be
composed, but there are nevertheless infinite divided
parts in Nature, and in this sense there may also be infinite
divisions, as I have declared in my Open note a017-rota P.I.c.8. Book of Philosophy.
And thus there are Infinite divisions of Infinite
parts in Nature, but not Infinite actual divisions of
one single part; But though Infinite is without end, yet
my discourse of it shall be but short and end here, though
not my affection, which shall last and continue with the
life of

XVI

“An Accident”, says your Author, “is nothing else, but
the manner of our Conception of body,”Open note q038-rota Elem. of
Philos c.8.
art.2. or “that Faculty
of any body, by which it works in us a Conception
of it self;” To which I willingly consent; but yet
I say, that these qualities cannot be separated from the
body, for as impossible it is that the essnce of Nature
should be separable from Nature, as impossible is it that
the various modes or alterations, either of Figures or
Motions, should be separable from matter or body;
Wherefore when he goes on, and says, “An accident is
not a body, but in a body, yet not so, as if any thing were
contained therein, as if for example, redness were in blood
in the same manner as blood is in a bloody cloth; but as
magnitude is in that which is great, rest in that which resteth,
motion in that which is moved;”Open note q040-rota Art.3. I answer, that in
my opinion, not any thing in Nature can be without a
body, and that redness is as well in blood, as blood is in
a bloody cloth, or any other colour in any thing else; for
there is no colour without a body, but every colour hath
as well a body as any thing else, and if Colour be a separable
accident, I would fain know, how it can be separated
from a subject, being bodiless, for that which is no
body is nothing, and nothing cannot be taken away
from any thing; Wherefore as for natural Colour it
cannot be taken away from any creature, without the
parts of its substance or body; and as for artificial Colours,lours, P1r 53
when they are taken away, it is a separation of
two bodies, which joyned together; and if Colour, or
Hardness, or Softness do change, it is nothing else but
an alteration of motions and not an annihilation, for all
changes and altertions remain in the power of Corporeal
motions, as I have said in other places; for we might
as well say, life doth not remain in nature, when a body
turns from an animal to some other figure, as believe that
those, they name accidents, do not remain in Corporeal
Motions; Wherefore I am not of your Authors mind;
when he says, Open note a020-rota Art.20. that “when a White thing is made black,
the whiteness perishes”; for it cannot perish, although it
is altered from white to black, being in the power of the
same matter, to turn it again from black to white, so as
it may make infinite Repetitions of the same thing; but
by reason nature takes delight in variety, she seldom uses
such repetitions; nevertheless that doth not take away
the Power of self-moving matter, for it doth not;
and it cannot, are two several things, and the latter
doth not necessarily follow upon the former; Wherefore
not any, the least thing, can perish in Nature, for
if this were possible, the whole body of nature might
perish also, for if so many Figures and Creatures should
be annihilated and perish without any supply or new
Creation, Nature would grow less, and at last become
nothing; besides it is as difficult for Nature to turn something
into nothing, as to Create something out of nothing;
Wherefore as there is no annihilation or perishing
in Nature, so there is neither any new Creation in
Nature. But your Author makes a difference between
bodies and accidents, saying, “that bodies are things and
not Generated, but accidents are Generated and not things: P1v 54
things.” Truly, Madam, these accidents seem to me
to be like Van Helmont’s Lights, Gases, Blazes and
Ideas; and Dr More’s Immaterial Substances or Dæmons,
onely in this Dr More’s hath the better, that his
Immaterial Substances, are beings, which subsist of
themselves, whereas accidents do not, but their existence
is in other bodies; But what they call Accidents,
are in my opinion nothing else but Corporeal Motions,
and if these accidents be generated, they must needs be
bodies, for how nothing can be Generated in nature, is
not conceivable, and yet your Author denies, Open note a021-rota Art.22. that
“Accidents are something, namely some part of a natural
thing”; But as for Generations, they are onely various
actions of self-moving matter, or a variety of Corporeal
Motions, and so are all Accidents whatsoever, so that
there is not any thing in nature, that can be made new,
or destroyed, for whatsoever was and shall be, is in
nature, though not always in act, yet in power, as in the
nature and power of Corporeal motions, which is self-
moving matter, And as there is no new Generation of
Accidents, so there is neither a new Generation of Motions;
wherefore when your Author says, “That, when
the hand, being moved, moveth the pen, the motion doth
not go out of the hand into the pen, for so the writing might
be continued, though the hand stood still, but a new motion
is generated in the pen, and is the pens motion:”Open note q044-rota Art.21. I am of his
opinion, that the motion doth not go out of the hand
into the pen, and that the motion of the pen, is the pens
own motion; but I deny, that after holding the hand a
little while still, and beginning to write again, a new
motion of the pen is generated; for it is onely a repetition,
and not a new generation, for the Hand, Pen and P2r 55
and Ink, repeat but the same motion or action of
writing: Besides, Generation is made by Connexion
or Conjunction of parts, moving by consent to such
or such Figures, but the motion of the Hand or the
Pen is always one and the same; wherefore it is but
the variation and repetition in and of the same motion
of the Hand, or Pen, which may be continued
in that manner infinitely, just as the same Corporeal
Motions can make infinite variations and repetitions
of one and the same Figure, repeating it as
oft as they please, as also making Copy of Copy;
And although I do not deny, but there are Generations
in Nature, yet not annihilations or perishings,
for if any one motion or figure should perish, the
matter must perish also; and if any one part of matter
can perish, all the matter in nature may perish
also; and if there can any new thing be made or
created in nature, which hath not been before, there
may also be a new Nature, and so by perishings and new
Creations, this World would not have continued an
age; But surely whatsoever is in Nature, hath been existent
always. Wherefore to conclude, it is not the
generation and perishing of an Accident that makes
its subject to be changed, but the production and alteration
of the Form, makes it said to be generated
or destroyed, for matter will change its motions
and figures without perishing or annihilating;
and whether there were words or not, there would
be such causes and effects; But having not the
art of Logick to dispute with artificial words, nor
the art of Geometry to demonstrate my opinions by
Mathematical Figures, I fear they will not be so well P2v 56
well received by the Learned; However, I leave
them to any mans unprejudiced Reason and Judgment,
and devote my self to your service, as becomes,

XVII

Your Author concerning Place and Magnitude
says, that “Place is nothing out of the mind, nor
Magnitude any thing within it; for Place is a meer
Phantasme of a body of such quantity and figure, and
Magnitude a peculiar accident of the body;”Open note q045-rota Part 2.0.8
S.section 5. But this doth
not well agree with my reason, for I believe that Place,
Magnitude and Body are but one thing, and that
Place is as true an extension as Magnitude, and not a
feigned one; Neither am I of his opinion, “that Place
is Immoveable”, but that place moves, according as the
body moveth, for not any body wants place, because
place and body is but one thing, and wheresoever is
body, there is also place, and wheresoever is place, there
is body, as being one and the same; Wherefore “Motion
cannot be a relinquishing of one place and acquiring another,”
Open note q047-rota Art.1C. for there is no such thing as place different from
body, but what is called change of place, is nothing but Q1r 57
but change of corporeal motions; for, say an house
stands in such a place, if the house be gone, the place is
gone also, as being impossible that the place of the house
should remain, when the house is taken away; like as
a man when he is gone out of his chamber, his place is
gone too; ’Tis true, if the ground or foundation do
yet remain, one may say, there stood such an house heretofore,
but yet the place of the house is not there really
at that present, unless the same house be built up again
as it was before, and then it hath its place as before; Nevertheless
the house being not there, it cannot be said
that either place or house are annihilated, viz, when
the materials are dissolved, no not when transformed into
millions of several other figures, for the house remains
still in the power of all those several parts of matter;
and as for space, it is onely a distance betwixt some
parts or bodies; But an Empty place signifies to my opinion
Nothing, for if place and body are one and the
same, and empty is as much as nothing, then certainly
these two words cannot consist together, but are destructive
to one another. Concerning, that your Author
says, “Two bodies cannot be together in the same place, nor
one body in two places at the same time,”Open note q048-rota Art.8. is very true, for
there are no more places then bodies, nor more bodies
then places, and this is to be understood as well of
the grosser, as the purest parts of nature, of the mind
as well as of the body, of the rational and sensitive animate
matter as well as of the inanimate, for there is no
matter, how pure and subtil soever, but is imbodied,
and all that hath body hath place. Likewise I am of
his opinion, “That one body hath always one and the same
magnitude;”Open note q049-rota Art.5. for, in my opinion, magnitude, place and Q body Q1v 58
body do not differ, and as place, so magnitude can never
be separated from body. But when he speaks of
Rest, I cannot believe there is any such thing truly in
Nature, for it is impossible to prove, that any thing is
without Motion, either consistent, or composing, or
dissolving, or transforming motions, or the like, although
not altogether perceptible by our senses, for all the
Matter is either moving or moved, and although the
moved parts are not capable to receive the nature of self-
motion from the self-moving parts, yet these self-moving
parts, being joyned and mixt with all other parts of the
moved matter, do always move the same; for the
Moved or Inanimate part of Matter, although it is a
Part of it self, yet it is so intermixt with the self-moving
Animate Matter, as they make but one Body; and
though some parts of the Inanimate may be as pure as
the Sensitive Animate Matter, yet they are never so subtil
as to be self-moving; Wherefore the Sensitive moves
in the Inanimate, and the Rational in the Sensitive, but
often the Rational moves in it self. And, although
there is no rest in nature, nevertheless Matter could
have been without Motion, when as it is impossible that
Matter could be without place or magnitude, no more
then Variety can be without motion; And thus much
at this present: I conclude, and rest,

XVIII

Passing by those Chapters of your Authors, that
treat of “Power and Act”, “IdentyIdentity and Difference”, “Analogisme,”
“Angle and Figure”, “Figures deficient”,
“dimension of Circles”, and several others, most of which
belong to art, as to Geometry, and the like; I am come
to that wherein he discourses of “Sense and Animal Motion,”
saying, “That some Natural bodies have in themselves
the patterns almost of all things, and others of none
at all;”Open note q057-rota C.25.a.I Whereof my opinion is, that the sensitive and
rational parts of Matter are the living and knowing parts
of Nature, and no part of nature can challenge them
onely to it self, nor no creature can be sure, that sense is
onely in Animal-kind, and reason in Man-kind; for
can any one think or believe that Nature is ignorant and
dead in all her other parts besides Animals? Truly
this is a very unreasonable opinion; for no man, as wise
as he thinks himself, nay were all Man-kind joyned into
one body, yet they are not able to know it, unless
there were no variety of parts in nature, but onely one
whole and individeable body, for other Creatures may
know and perceive as much as Animals, although they
have not the same Sensitive Organs, nor the same manner
or way of Perception. Next your Author says,
“The cause of Sense or Perception consists herein, that the
first organ of sense is touched and pressed; For when the
uttermost part of the organ is pressed, it no sooner yields, but Q2v 60
but the part next within it is pressed also, and in this manner
the pressure or motion is propagated through all the
parts of the organ to the innermost. And thus also the
pressure of the uttermost part proceeds from the pressure of
some more remote body, and so continually, till we come to
that, from which, as from its fountain, we derive the
Phantasme or Idea, that is made in us by our sense: And
this, whatsoever it be, is that we commonly call the object;
Sense therefore is some Internal motion in the Sentient,
Generated by some Internal motion of the Parts of the object,
and propagated through all the media to the innermost
part of the organ. Moreover there being a resistance or
reaction in the organ, by reason of its internal motion against
the motion propagated from the object, there is also
an endeavour in the organ opposite to the endeavour proceeding
from the object, and when that endeavour inwards
is the last action in the act of sense, then from the
reaction a Phantasme or Idea has its being.”Open note q058-rota Art.2. This is your
Authors opinion, which if it were so, perception could
not be effected so suddenly, nay I think the sentient by so
many pressures in so many perceptions, would at last
be pressed to death, besides the organs would take a
great deal of hurt, nay totally be removed out of their
places, so as the eye would in time be prest into the centre
of the brain; And if there were any Resistance, Reaction
or Indeavour in the organ, opposite to the Endeavour
of the object, there would, in my opinion, be always
a war between the animal senses and the objects,
the endeavour of the objects pressing one way, and the
senses pressing the other way, and if equal in their
strengths, they would make a stop, and the sensitive organs
would be very much pained; Truly, Madam, in my R1r 61
my opinion, it would be like that Custom which formerly
hath been used at Newcastle, when a man was
married, the guests divided themselves, behind and
before the Bridegroom, the one party driving him back,
the other forwards, so that one time a Bridegroom was
killed in this fashion; But certainly Nature hath a
more quick and easie way of giving intelligence and
knowledg to her Creatures, and doth not use such constraint
and force in her actions; Neither is sense or sensitive
perception a meer Phantasme or Idea, but a Corporeal
action of the sensitive and rational matter, and
according to the variation of the objects or patterns; and
the sensitive and rational motions, the perception also is
various, produced not by external pressure, but by internal
self-motion, as I have declared heretofore; and
to prove, that the sensitive and rational corporeal motions
are the onely cause of perception; I say, if those
motions in an animal move in another way, and
not to such perceptions, then that animal can neither
hear, see, taste, smell, nor touch, although all his sensitive
organs be perfect, as is evident in a man falling into
a swoon, where all the time he is in a swoon, the pressure
of the objects is made without any effect; Wherefore,
as the sensitive and rational corporeal motions
make all that is in nature, so likewise they make perception,
as being perception it self, for all self-motion is
perception, but all perception is not animal perception,
or after an animal way; and therefore sense cannot decay
nor die, but what is called a decay or death, is no
thing else but a change or alteration of those Motions.
But you will say, Madam, it may be, that one body,
as an object, leaves the print of its figure, in the next R ad- R1v 62
adjoyning body, until it comes to the organ of sense, I
answer that then sostsoft bodies onely must be pressed, and
the object must be so hard as to make a print, and as for
rare parts of matter, they are not able to retain a print
without self-motion; Wherefore it is not probable that
the parts of air should receive a print, and print the same
again upon the adjoyning part, until the last part of the
air print it upon the eye; and that the exterior parts of
the organ should print upon the interior, till it come to
the centre of the Brain, without self-motion. Wherefore
in my opinion, Perception is not caused either by
the printing of objects, nor by pressures, for pressures
would make a general stop of all natural motions, especially
if there were any reaction or resistence of sense;
but according to my reason, the sensitive and rational
corporeal motions in one body, pattern out the Figure
of another body, as of an exterior object, which may be
done easily without any pressure or reaction; I will not
say, that there is no pressure or reaction in Nature, but
pressure and reaction doth not make perception, for the
sensitive and rational parts of matter make all perception
and variety of motion, being the most subtil parts of Nature,
as self-moving, as also divideable, and composeable,
and alterable in their figurative motions, for this
Perceptive matter can change its substance into any figure
whatsoever in nature, as being not bound to one
constant figure. But having treated hereof before, and
being to say more of it hereafter, this shall suffice for
the present, remaining always,