To
Her Grace
the
Duchess of Newcastle,
On her Observations upon
Experimental Philosophy.

To his
Grace
the
Duke of Newcastle.

In this present Treatise, I have ventured
to make some observations
upon Experimental Philosophy,
and to examine the Opinions of
some of our Modern Microscopical
or Dioptrical Writers; and though
your grace is not onely a lover of Vertuosoes, but a
Vertuoso your self, and have as good, and as many sorts
of Optick Glasses as any one else; yet you do not busie
your self much with this brittle Art, but employ
most part of your time in the more noble and heroick
Art of Horsemanship and Weapons, as also in the sweet
and delightful Art of Poetry, and in the useful Art of b Archi- b1v
Architecture, &c. which shews that you do not believe
much in the Informations of those Optick
glasses, at least think them not so useful as others do
that spend most of their time in Dioptrical inspections.
The truth is, My Lord, That most men in these latter
times, busie themselves more with other Worlds, then
with this they live in, which to me seems strange, unless
they could find out some Art that would carry them into
those Celestial Worlds, which I doubt will never be;
nay, if they did, it would be no better then Lucian’s, or
the French-mans Art, with Bottles, Bladders, &c. or like
the mans that would scrue himself up into the Moon:
And therefore I confess, I have but little faith in such
Arts, and as little in Telescopical, Microscopical, and
the like inspections, and prefer rational and judicious
Observations before deluding Glasses and Experiments;
which, as I have more at large declared in this
following work, so I leave it to your Graces perusal
and judgment, which I know is so just, so exact, and
so wise, that I may more safely rely upon it, then all
others besides; and if your Grace do but approve of it,
I care not if all the world condemn it; for your Graces
Approbation is all that can be desired from,

To the
most famous
University
of
Cambridg.

Do not judg it an Impertinency, that now again
I presume to offer unto you another piece of
my Philosophical Works; for when I reflect
upon the honour you have done me, I am
so much sensible of it, that I am troubled I cannot make you
an acknowledgment answerable to your great Civilities.

You might, if not with scorn, with silence have passed
by, when one of our Sex, and what is more, one that never
was versed in the sublime Arts and Sciences of literature,
took upon her to write, not onely of Philosophy, the
highest of all humane Learning, but to offer it to so famous
and celebrated a University as yours; but your Goodness and b2v
and Civility being as great as your Learning, would rather
conceal, then discover or laugh at those weaknesses and imperfections
which you know our Sex is liable to; nay, so far
you were from this, that by your civil respects, and undeserved
commendations, you were pleased to cherish rather, then quite
to suppress or extinguish my weak endeavours.

For which Favour, as I found my self doubly indebted to
you, so I thought it my duty to pay you my double acknowledgments;
Thanks, you know, can never be unseasonable, when
petitions may; neither can they be unpleasing, when petitions
often are troublesome; and since there is no sacrifice, which
God is more delighted with, then that of Thanks-giving, I
live in hopes you will not refuse this repeated offer of Gratitude,
but favourably, as a due to your Merits, receive it
from her, who both of your Ingenuity, Learning and Civility
is the greatest admirer, and shall always profess her
self,

The
Preface
to the
Ensuing
Treatise.

Tis probable, some will say, that my
much writing is a disease; but what
disease they will judg it to be, I cannot
tell; I do verily believe they
will take it to be a disease of the
Brain, but surely they cannot call
it an Apoplexical or Lethargical disease: Perhaps they
will say, it is an extravagant, or at least a Fantastical
disease; but I hope they will rather call it a disease of
wit. But, let them give it what name they please,
yet of this I am sure, that if much writing be a
disease, then the best Philosophers, both Moral and c Natural, c1v
Natural, as also the best Divines, Lawyers, Physitians,
Poets, Historians, Orators, Mathematicians, Chymists,
and many more have been grievously sick, and
Seneca, Plinius, Aristotle, Cicero, Tacitus, Plutarch,
Euclid, Homer, Virgil, Ovid, St. Augustin. St. Ambrose,
Scotus, Hippocrates, Galen, Paracelsus, and
hundreds more, have been at deaths door with the disease
of writing; but to be infected with the same disease,
which the devoutest, wisest, wittiest subtilest,
most learned and eloquent men have been troubled
withal, is no disgrace, but the greatest honour, even to the
most ambitious person in the world: and next to the
honour of being thus infected, it is also a great delight
and pleasure to me, as being the onely Pastime which
imploys my idle hours; in so much, that, were I sure
no body did read my Works, yet I would not quit
my pastime for all this; for although they should not
delight others, yet they delight me; and if all Women
that have no imployment in worldly affairs, should
but spend their time as harmlesly as I do, they would
not commit such faults as many are accused of.

I confess, there are many useless and superfluous
Books, and perchance mine will add to the number of
them; especially is it to be observed, that there have
been in this latter age, as many Writers of Natural
Philosophy, as in former ages there have been of Moral
Philosophy; which multitude, I fear, will produce such
a confusion of Truth and Falshood, as the number of c2r
of Moral Writers formerly did, with their over-nice
divisions of Vertues and vices, whereby they did puzle
their Readers so, that they knew not how to distinguish
between them. The like, I doubt, will prove amongst
our Natural Philosophers, who by their extracted, or
rather distracted arguments, confound both Divinity
and Natural Philosophy, Sense and Reason, Nature and
Art, so much as in time we shall have rather a Chaos,
then a well-order’d Universe by their doctrine: Besides,
many of their Writings are but parcels taken from
the ancient; but such Writers are like those unconscionable
men in Civil Wars, which endeavour to pull
down the hereditary Mansions of Noble-men and
Gentlemen, to build a Cottage of their own; for so do
they pull down the learning of Ancient Authors, to
render themselves famous in composing Books of
their own. But though this Age does ruine Palaces,
to make Cottages; Churches, to make Conventicles;
and Universities to make private Colledges;
and endeavour not onely to wound, but to kill
and bury the Fame of such meritorious Persons as the
Ancient were, yet, I, hope God of his mercy will
preserve State, Church, and Schools, from ruine and
destruction; Nor do I think their weak works will
be able to overcome the strong wits of the Ancient; for
setting aside some few of our Moderns, all the rest are
but like dead and withered leaves, in comparison to
lovely and lively Plants; and as for Arts, I am confident,dent, c2v
that where there is one good Art found in these
latter ages, there are two better old Arts lost, both of the
Ægyptians, Grecians, Romans, and many other ancient
Nations; (when I say lost, I mean in relation to
our knowledg, not in Nature; for nothing can be lost
in Nature) Truly, the Art of Augury was far more
beneficial then the lately invented Art of Micrography;
for I cannot perceive any great advantage this Art doth
bring us. Also the Ecclipse of the Sun and Moon was not
found out by Telescopes, nor the motions of the Loadstone,
nor the Art of the Card, nor the Art of Guns
and Gun-powder, nor the Art of Printing, and the
like, by Microscopes; nay, if it be true, that Telescopes
make appear the spots in the Sun and Moon,
or discover some new Stars, what benefit is that to
us? Or if Microscopes do truly represent the exterior
parts and superficies of some minute Creatures, what
advantages it our knowledg? For unless they could discover
their interior, corporeal, figurative motions, and
the obscure actions of Nature, or the causes which make
such or such Creatures, I see no great benefit or advantage
they yield to man: Or if they discover how reflected
light makes loose and superficial Colours, such
as no sooner percieved, but are again dissolved; what
benefit is that to man? For neither Painters nor Dyers
can inclose and mix that Atomical dust, and those
reflections of light to serve them for any use. Wherefore,
in my opinion, it is both time and labour lost; for the d1r
the inspection of the exterior parts of Vegetables, doth
not give us any knowledg how to Sow, Set, Plant,
and Graft; so that a Gardener or Husbandman will
gain no advantage at all by this Art: The inspection of
a Bee, through a Microscope, will bring him no more
Honey, nor the inspection of a grain more Corn; neither
will the inspection of dusty Atomes, and reflections of
light, teach Painters how to make and mix Colours,
although it may perhaps be an advantage to a decayed
Ladies face, by placing her self in such or such a reflection
of Light, where the dusty Atomes may hide her
wrinkles. The truth is, most of these Arts are Fallacies,
rather then discoveries of Truth; for Sense deludes
more then it gives a true Information, and an exterior
inspection through an Optick glass, is so deceiving,
that it cannot be relied upon: Wherefore Regular
Reason is the best guide to all Arts, as I shall
make it appear in this following Treatise.

It may be the World will judg it a fault in me, that
I oppose so many eminent and ingenious Writers, but
I do it not out of a contradicting or wrangling nature,
but out of an endeavour to find out truth, or at least
the probability of truth, according to that proportion of
sense and reason Nature has bestowed upon me; for
as I have heard my Noble Lord say, that in the Art of
Riding and Fencing, there is but one Truth, but many
Falshoods and Fallacies: So it may be said of Natural
Philosophy and Divinity; for there is but one Fundamentald mental d1v
Truth in each, and I am as ambitious of finding
out the truth of Nature, as an honourable Dueller is
of gaining fame and repute; for as he will fight with
none but an honourable and valiant opposite, so am I
resolved to argue with none but those which have the
renown of being famous and subtil Philosophers; and
therefore as I have had the courage to argue heretofore
with some famous and eminent Writers in Speculative
Philosophy; so have I taken upon me in this
present work, to make some reflections also upon some
of our Modern Experimental and Dioptrical Writers.
They will perhaps think my self an inconsiderable opposite,
because I am not of their Sex, and therefore
strive to hit my Opinions with a side stroke, rather covertly,
then openly and directly; but if this should
chance, the impartial World, I hope, will grant me
so much Justice as to consider my honesty, and their
fallacy, and pass such a judgment as will declare them
to be Patrons, not onely to Truth, but also to Justice
and Equity; for which Heaven will grant them their
reward, and time will record their noble and worthy
Actions in the Register of Fame, to be kept in everlasting
Memory.

To the
Reader.

I do ingenioussly confess, that both for
want of learning and reading Philosophical
Authors, I have not expressed
my self in my Philosophical
Works, especially in my Philosophical
and Physical Opinions, so clearly
and plainly as I might have done, had I had the assistance of
Art, and the practice of reading other Authors: But though
my Conceptions seem not so perspicuous in the mentioned Book
of Philosophical Opinions; yet my Philosophical Letters,
and these present Observations, will, I hope, render
it more intelligible, which I have writ, not out of an ambitious
humour, to fill the World with useless Books, but
to explain and illustrate my own Opinions; For what benefit
would it be to me, if I should put forth a work, which by reason d2v
reason of its obscure and hard notions, could not be understood?
especially, it is known, that Natural Philosophy is the hardest
of all humane learning, by reason it consists onely in
Contemplation, and to make the Philosophical Conceptions
of ones mind known to others, is more diffficult then to
make them believe, that if A.B. be equal to C.D. then
E.F. is equal to A.B. because it is equal to C.D. But
as for Learning, that I am not versed in it, no body, I hope,
will blame me for it, since it is sufficiently known, that our
Sex is not bred up to it, as being not suffer’d to be instructed
in Schools and Universities; I will not say, but many of
our Sex may have as much wit, and be capable of Learning
as well as Men; but since they want Instructions, it is not
possible they should attain to it; for Learning is Artificial,
but Wit is Natural. Wherefore, when I began to read
the Philosophical Works of other Authors, I was so troubled
with their hard words and expressions at first, that had
they not been explained to me, and had I not found out some of
them by the context and connexion of the sense, I should have
been far enough to seek; for their hard words did more obstruct,
then instruct me. The truth is, if any one intends
to write Philosophy, either in English, or any other language;
he ought to consider the propriety of the language,
as much as the Subject he writes of; or else to what purpose
would it be to write? If you do write Philosophy in English,
and use all the hardest words and expressions which
none but Scholars are able to understand, you had better to
write it in Latine; but if you will write for those that do not understand e1r
understand Latin, Your reason will tell you, that you must
explain those hard words, and English them in the easiest
manner you can; What are words but marks of things?
and what are Philosophical Terms, but to express the
Conceptions of ones mind in that Science? And truly I
do not think that there is any Language so poor, which
cannot do that; wherefore those that fill their writings
with hard words, put the horses behind the Coach, and instead
of making hard things easie, make easie things hard,
which especially in our English writers is a great fault;
neither do I see any reason for it, but that they think to
make themselves more famous by those that admire all what
they do not understand, though it be Non-sense; but I
am not of their mind, and therefore although I do understand
some of their hard expressions now, yet I shun them
as much in my writings as is possible for me to do, and all
this, that they may be the better understood by all, learned
as well as unlearned; by those that are professed Philosophers
as well as by those that are none: And though I could
employ some time in studying all the hardest phrases and
words in other Authors, and write as learnedly perhaps as
they; yet will I not deceive the World, nor trouble my
Conscience by being a Mountebanck in learning, but rather
prove naturally wise then artificially foolish; for at best I
should but obscure my opinions, and render them more intricate
instead of clearing and explaining them; but if my Readers
should spie any errors slipt into my writings for want of
art and learning, I hope they’l be so just as not to censure e me e1v
me too severely for them, but express their wisdom in preferring
the kernel before the shells.

It is not possible that a young Student, when first he
comes to the University, should hope to be Master of Art
in one Month, or one Year; and so do I likewise not perswade
my self, that my Philosophy being new, and but lately
brought forth, will at first sight prove Master of Understanding,
nay, it may be not in this age; but if God
favour her, she may attain to it in after-times and if she
be slighted now and buried in silence, she may perhaps
rise more glorioussly hereafter; for her Ground being Sense
and Reason, She may meet with an age where she will
be more regarded, then she is in this.

But Courteous Reader, all what I request of you
at present, is, That if you have a mind to understand
my Philosophical Conceptions truly, You would be pleased to
read them not by parcels, here a little, and there a little,
(for I have found it by my self, that when I read
not a book thoroughly from beginning to end, I cannot
well understand the Authors design, but may easily mistake
his meaning; I mean such Books as treat of Philosophy,
History, &c. where all parts depend upon each other,)
But if you’l give an impartial judgment of my Philosophy,
read it all, or else spare your Censures; especially do I
recommend to you my Philosophical Opinions, which contain
the Grounds and Principles of my Philosophy, but
since they were published before I was versed in the reading
of other Authors, I desire you to join my Philosophicalphical e2r
Leters, and these observations to them, which will
serve as Commentaries to explain what may seem obscure
in the mentioned Opinions; but before all, read this following
Argumental Discourse wherein are contained the Principles
and grounds of Natural Philosophy, especially concerning
the constitutive parts of Nature and their properties
and actions; as also be pleas’d to peruse the later
discourse of the first part of this Book, which treats of
Perception; for Perception being the chief and general
action of Nature, has occasioned me to be more prolix in explaining
it, then any other subject; You’l find that I go
much by the way of argumentation, and framing objections
and answers; for I would fain hinder and obstruct as
many objections as could be made against the grounds of
my Opinions; but since it is impossible to resolve all, for
as Nature and her parts and actions are infinite, so there
may also endless objections be raised; I have endeavoured
onely to set down such as I thought might be most material;
but this I find, that there is no objection but one
may find an answer to it; and as soon as I have made
an answer to one objection, another offers it self again,
which shews not onely that Natures actions are infinite,
but that they are poised and ballanced so that they cannot
run into extreams.

However I do not applaud my self so much, as to think
that my works can be without errors, for Nature is not
a Deity, but her parts are often irregular, and how is it
possible that one particular Creature can know all the obscurescure e2v
and hidden infinite varieties of Nature? if the Truth
of Nature were so easily known, we had no need to take
so much pains in searching after it; but Nature being
Material, and consequently dividable, her parts have
but divided knowledges, and none can claim a Universal
infinite knowledg. Nevertheless, although I may erre
in my arguments, or for want of artificial Terms; yet I
believe the Ground of my Opinions is True, because it is
sense and reason.

I found after the perusal of this present book, that several
places therein might have been more perspicuously
delivered, and better cleared; but since it is impossible that
all things can be so exact, that they should not be subject to
faults and imperfections; for as the greatest beauties are
not without moles, so the best Books are seldom without
Errors; I intreat the ingenuous Reader to interpret them
to the best sense; for they are not so material, but that
either by the context or connexion of the whole discourse,
or by a comparing with other places, the true meaning
thereof may easily be understood; and to this end I have set
down this following explanation of such places, as
in the perusal I have observed, whereby the rest may also
easily be mended.

When I say, that “Discourse shall sooner find out Natures
Corporeal figurative Motions, then Art shall
inform the Senses.”Open note 1Back to note ¹ By Discourse, I do not mean speech,
but an Arguing of the mind, or a Rational inquiry into the
Causes of Natural effects; for Discourse is as much as Rea- f1r
Reasoning with our selves, which may very well be done
without Speech or Language, as being onely an effect or
action of Reason.

When I say, That “Art may make Pewter, Brass, &c.”Open note 2Back to note ²
I do not mean as if these Figures were Artificial, and not
Natural; but my meaning is, That if Art imitates
Nature in producing of Artificial Figures, they are most
commonly such as are of mixt Natures, which I call
Hermaphroditical.

When I say, That “Respiration is a Reception and
Emission of parts through the pores or passages proper
to each particular figure, so that when some
parts issue, others enter;”Open note 3Back to note ³ I do not mean at one and the
same time, or always through the same passages; for, as there
is variety of Natural Creatures and Figures, and of their
perceptions; so of the manner of their perceptions, and of
their passages and pores; all which no particular Creature
is able exactly to know or determine: And therefore
when I add in the following Chapter, That “Nature
has more ways of composing and dividing of parts,
then by the way of drawing in, and sending forth
by pores”; I mean, that not all parts of Nature have
the like Respirations: The truth is, it is enough to know
in general, That there is Respiration in all parts of Nature,
as a general or universal action; and that this Respiration
is nothing else but a composition and division of
Parts; but how particular Respirations are performed,
none but Infinite Nature is capable to know.

f When f1v

When I say, That “there is a difference between Respiration
and Perception; and that Perception is an
action of figuring or patterning; but Respiration an action
of Reception and Emission of Parts:”Open note 4Back to note ⁴ First, I
do not mean, that all Perceeption is made by patterning
or imitation; but I speak onely of the Perception of the
exterior senses in Animals, at least in man, which I
observe to be made by patterning or imitation; for as no
Creature can know the infinite perceptions in Nature, so
he cannot describe what they are, or how they are made.
Next, I do not mean, that Respiration is not a Perceptive
action; for if Perception be a general and universal
action in Nature, as well as Respiration, both depending
upon the composition and division of parts, it is impossible
but that all actions of Nature must be perceptive,
by reason perception is an exterior knowledg of forreign
parts and actions; and there can be no commerce or intercourse,
nor no variety of figures and actions; no productions,
dissolutions, changes and the like, without
Perception; for how shall Parts work and act, without
having some knowledg or perception of each other?
Besides, wheresoever is self-motion, there must of necessity
be also Perception; for self-motion is the cause of all
exterior Perception. But my meaning is, That the Animal,
at least Humane respiration, which is a receiveing
of forreign parts, and discharging or venting of its own
in an animal or humane Figure or Creature, is not the
action of Animal Perception, properly so call’d; that is, the f2r
the perception of its exterior senses, as Seeing, Hearing,
Tasting, Touching, Smelling; which action of Perception
is properly made by way of patterning and imitation,
by the innate, figurative motions of those Animal Creatures,
and not by receiving either the figures of the exterior
objects into the sensitive Organs, or by sending forth
some invisible rayes from the Organ to the Object; nor
by pressure and reaction. Nevertheless, as I said, every
action of Nature is a Knowing and Perceptive action;
and so is Respiration, which of necessity presupposes a
knowledg of exterior parts, especially those that are concern’d
in the same action; and can no ways be perform’d
without perception of each other.

When I say, That if “all mens Opinions and Fancies
were Rational, there would not be such variety
in Nature as we perceive there is;”Open note 5Back to note ⁵ by “Rational” I
mean Regular, according to the vulgar way of expression,
by which a Rational Opinion is call’d, That which is
grounded upon regular sense and reason; and thus Rational
is opposed to Irregular: Nevertheless, Irregular Fancies and
Opinions are made by the rational parts of matter, as well
as those that are regular; and therefore in a Philosophical
and strict sense, one may call Irregular Opinions as
well Rational, as those that are Regular; but according
to the vulgar way of expression, as I said, it is sooner
understood of Regular, then of Irregular Opinions, Fancies
or Conceptions.

When f2v

When I say, that “None of Nature’s parts can be
call’d Inanimate, or Soul-less;”Open note 6Back to note ⁶ I do not mean the constitutive
parts of Nature, which are, as it were, the
Ingredients whereof Nature consists, and is made up;
whereof there is an inanimate part or degree of matter, as
well as animate; but I mean the parts or effects of this
composed body of Nature, of which I say, that none can
be call’d inanimate; for though some Philosophers think
that nothing is animate, or has life in Nature, but Animals
and Vegetables; yet it is probable, that since Nature
consists of a commixture of animate and inanimate matter,
and is self-moving, there can be no part or particle
of this composed body of Nature, were it an Atome, that
may be call’d Inamninmate, by reason there is none that has
not its share of animate, as well as inanimate matter,
and the commixture of these degrees being so close, it is
impossible one should be without the other.

When enumerating the requisites of the Perception of
Sight in Animals, I say, that “if one of them be wanting,
there is either no perception at all, or it is an
imperfect perception;”Open note 7Back to note ⁷ I mean, there is no Animal perception
of seeing, or else an irregular perception.

When I say, that “as the sensitive perception knows
some of the other parts of Nature by their effects; so
the rational perceives some effects of the Omnipotent
Power of God;”Open note 8Back to note ⁸ My meaning is not, as if the sensitive
part of matter hath no knowledg at all of God; for since
all parts of Nature, even the inanimate, have an innate and g1r
and fixt self-knowledg, it is probable that they may also
have an interior self-knowledg of the existency of the
Eternal and Omnipotent God, as the Author of Nature:
But because the rational part is the subtilest, purest, finest
and highest degree of matter; it is most conformable to
truth, that it has also the highest and greatest knowledg
of God, as far as a natural part can have; for God
being Immaterial, it cannot properly be said, that sense
can have a perception of him, by reason he is not subject
to the sensitive perception of any Creature, or part of
Nature; and therefore all the knowledg which natural
Creatures can have of God, must be inherent in every
part of Nature; and the perceptions which we have of
the Effects of Nature, may lead us to some conceptions
of that Supernatural, Infinite, and Incomprehensible Deity,
not what it is in its Essence or Nature, but that it
is existent, and that Nature has a dependance upon it, as
an Eternal Servant has upon an Eternal Master.

But some might say, How is it possible that a Corporeal
finite part, can have a conception of an Incorporeal,
infinite Being; by reason that which comprehends,
must needs be bigger then that which is comprehended?
Besides, no part of Nature can conceive beyond it self,
that is, beyond what is Natural or Material; and this
proves, that at least the rational part, or the mind, must
be immaterial to conceive a Deity? To which I answer,
That no part of Nature can or does conceive the Essence
of God, or what God is in himself; but it conceives g onely g1v
onely, that there is such a Divine Being which is Supernatural:
And therefore it cannot be said, that a natural
Figure can comprehend God; for it is not the
comprehending of the Substance of God, or its patterning
out, (since God having no Body, is without all Figure)
that makes the knowledg of God; but I do believe,
that the knowledg of the existency of God, as I mentioned
before, is innate, and inherent in Nature, and all
her parts, as much as self-knowledg is.

Open note 9Back to note ⁹Speaking of the difference between Oil and other liquors;
for the better understanding of that place, I thought
fit to insert this Note: Flame is fluid, but not liquid,
nor wet: Oil is fluid and liquid, but not wet; but Water
is both fluid, liquid and wet. Oil will turn into
flame, and encrease it; but Water is so quite opposite to
flame, that if a sufficient quantity be poured upon it, it
will totally extinguish it.

When I say, that “Sense and Reason shall be the
Ground of my Philosophy, and not particular natural
effects;”Open note 10Back to note ¹⁰ My meaning is, that I do not intend to make
particular Creatures or Figures, the Principles of all the
infinite effects of Nature, as some other Philosophers do;
for there is no such thing as a Prime or principal Figure
of Nature, all being but effects of one Cause. But my
Ground is Sense and Reason, that is, I make self-moving
matter, which is sensitive and rational, the onely
cause and principle of all natural effects.

VVhen g2r

When ’tis said, “That Ice, Snow, Hail, &c. return
into their former Figure of Water, whensoever they
dissolve;”Open note 11Back to note ¹¹ I mean, when they dissolve their exterior Figures,
that is, change their actions.

When I say, That the “Exterior Object is the Agent,
and the Sentient Body the Patient;”Open note 12Back to note ¹² I do not
mean that the Object does chiefly work upon the Sentient,
or is the immediate cause of the Perception in the
Sentient body, and that the Sentient suffers the Agent to
act upon it; but I retain onely those words, because they
are used in Schools; But as for their actions, I am
quite of a contrary Opinion, to wit, That the sentient
body is the principal Agent, and the external body the
Patient; for the motions of the sentient in the act of perception,
do figure out or imitate the motions of the object,
so that the object is but as a Copy that is figured
out, or imitated by the sentient, which is the chiefly Agent
in all transforming and perceptive actions that are
made by way of patterning or imitation.

When I say, That “one finite part can undergo infinite
changes and alterations;”Open note 13Back to note ¹³ I do not mean one single
part, whereof there is no such thing in nature; but I
mean, one part may be infinitely divided and composed
with other parts; for as there are infinite changes,
compositions and divisions in Nature, so they must be of
parts; there being no variety but of parts; and though
parts be finite, yet the changes may be infinite; for the
finiteness of parts is but concerning the bulk or quantity of g2v
of their figures; and they are call’d finite, by reason they
have limited and circumscribed figures; nevertheless,
as for duration, their parts being the same with the body
of Nature, are as eternal, and infinite as Nature her
self, and thus are subject to infinite and eternal changes.

When I say, “A World of Gold is as active interiously,
as a world of Air is exteriously;”Open note 14Back to note ¹⁴ I mean,
it is as much subject to changes and alterations as Air; for
Gold though its motions are not perceptible by our exterior
senses, yet it has no less motion then the activest body
of Nature; onely its motions are of another kind then
the motions of Air, or of some other bodies; for Retentive
motions are as much motions, as dispersing or some
other sorts of motions, although not so visible to our perception
as these; and therefore we cannot say that Gold
is more at rest than other Creatures of Nature; for there
is no such thing as Rest in Nature; although there be
degrees of Motion.

When I say, That “the parts of Nature do not
drive or press upon each other, but that all natural
actions are free and easie, and not constrained;”Open note 15Back to note ¹⁵ My
meaning is not, as if there was no pressing or driving of
parts at all in Nature, but onely that they are not the
universal or principal actions of Natures body, as it is
the opinion of some Philosophers, who think there is no
other motion in nature, but by pressure of parts upon parts:
Nevertheless, there is pressure and reaction in Nature,
because there are infinite sorts of motions.

Also (g2)1r

Also when I say in the same place, That “Natures actions
are voluntary”; I do not mean, that all actions
are made by rote, and none by imitation; but by voluntary
actions I understand self-actions; that is, such actions
whose principle of motion is within themselves, and doth
not proceed from such an exterior Agent, as doth the motion
of the inanimate part of matter, which having no motion
of it self, is moved by the animate parts, yet so,
that it receives no motion from them, but moves by the
motion of the animate parts, and not by an infused motion
into them; for the animate parts in carrying the inanimate
along with them, lose nothing of their own motion,
nor impart no motion to the inanimate; no more than a
man who carries a stick in his hand, imparts motion to
the stick, and loses so much as he imparts; but they bear
the inanimate parts along with them, by vertue of their
own self-motion, and remain self-moving parts, as well
as the inanimate remain without motion.

Again, when I make a distinguishment between voluntaryOpen note 16Back to note ¹⁶
actions, and exterior perceptions; my meaning is
not, as if voluntary actions were not made by perceptive
parts; for whatsoever is self-moving and active, is perceptive;
and therefore since the voluntary actions of
Sense and Reason are made by self-moving parts, they
must of necessity be perceptive actions; but I speak of
Perceptions properly so call’d, which are occasioned by
Forreign parts; and to those I oppose voluntary actions,
which are not occasioned, but made by rote; as for g2 example, (g2)1v
example, the perception of sight in Animals, when outward
Objects present themselves to the Optick sense to be
perceived, the perception of the Sentient is an occasioned
perception; but whensoever, either in dreams, or in
distempers, the sensitive motions of the same Organ, make
such or such figures, without any presentation of exterior
objects, then that action cannot properly be call’d an exterior
perception; but it is a voluntary action of the sensitive
motions in the organ of sight, not made after an outward
pattern, but by rote, and of their own accord.

When I say, That “Ignorance is caused by division,
and knowledg by composition of parts;”Open note 17Back to note ¹⁷ I do
not mean an interior, innate self-knowledg, which is,
and remains in every part and particle of Nature, both
in composition and division; for wheresoever is matter,
there is life and self-knowledg; nor can a part lose self-
knowledg, any more then it can lose life, although it may
change from having such or such a particular life and knowledg;
for to change and lose, are different things; but I
mean an exterior, perceptive knowledg of forreign parts,
caused by self-motion, of which I say, that as a union or
combination of parts, makes knowledg, so a division or
separation of parts, makes Ignorance.

When I say, “There’s difference of Sense and Reason
in the parts of one composed Figure;”Open note 18Back to note ¹⁸ I mean not, as if
there were different degrees of sense, and different degrees
of Reason in their own substance or matter; for sense
is but sense, and reason is but reason; but my meaning is, That (g2)2r
That there are different, sensitive and rational motions,
which move differently in the different parts of one composed
Creature.

These are (Courteous Reader) the scruples which
I thought might puzle your understanding in this present
Work, which I have cleared in the best manner I could;
and if you should meet with any other of the like nature,
my request is, You would be pleased to consider well the
Grounds of my Philosophy; and as I desired of you before,
read all before you pass your Judgments and Censures;
for then, I hope, you’l find but few obstructions, since
one place will give you an explanation of the other. In
doing thus, you’l neither wrong your self, nor injure the
Authoress, who should be much satisfied, if she could benefit
your knowledg in the least; if not, she has done
her endeavour, and takes as much pleasure and delight
in writing and divulging the Conceptions of her mind,
as perhaps some malicious persons will do in censuring
them to the worst.

An
Argumental Discourse

Concerning some Principal Subjects in Natural Philosophy,
necessary for the better understanding, not
onely of this, but all other Philosophical Works, hitherto
written by the Authoeresse.

When I was setting forth this Book of
Experimental Observations, a Dispute
chanced to arise between the
rational Parts of my Mind concerning
some chief Points and
Principles in Natural Philosophy;
for some New Thoughts endeavouring to oppose
and call in question the Truth of my former Conceptions,
caused a war in my mind, which in time grew
to that height, that they were hardly able to compose
the differences between themselves, but were in a manner
necessitated to refer them to the Arbitration of the
impartial Reader, desiring the assistance of his judgment
to reconcile their Controversies, and, if possible,h sible, h1v
to reduce them to a setled peace and agreement.

The first difference did arise about the question, “How
it came, that Matter was of several degrees, as Animate
and Inanimate, Sensitive and Rational?” for my
latter thoughts would not believe that there was any
such difference of degrees of Matter: To which my
former coneceptions answered, That Nature, being
Eternal and Infinite, it could not be known how she
came to be such, no more than a reason could be given
how God came to be: for Nature, said they, is the
Infinite Servant of God, and her origine cannot be
described by any finite or particular Creature; for
what is infinite, has neither beginning nor end; but
that Natural Matter consisted of so many degrees as
mentioned, was evidently perceived by her effects or
actions; by which it appeared first, that Nature was a
self-moving body, and that all her parts and Creatures
were so too: Next, That there was not onely an
animate or self-moving and active, but also an inanimate,
that is, a dull and passive degree of Matter; for
if there were no animate degree, there would be no
motion, and so no action nor variety of figures; and
if no inanimate, there would be no degrees of natural figures
and actions, but all actions would be done in a moment,
and the figures would all be so pure, fine and subtil,
as not to be subject to any grosser perception such as
our humane, or other the like perceptions are. This Inanimatenimate h2r
part of Matter, said they, had no self-motion,
but was carried along in all the actions of the animate
degree, and so was not moving, but moved; which
Animate part of Matter being again of two degrees,
viz. Sensitive and Rational, the Rational being
so pure, fine and subtil, that it gave onely directions
to the sensitive, and made figures in its own degree,
left the working with and upon the Inanimate
part, to the Sensitive degree of Matter, whose Office
was to execute both the rational parts design, and
to work those various figures that are perceived in Nature;
and those three degrees were so inseparably commixt
in the body of Nature, that none could be without
the other in any part or Creature of Nature, could
it be divided to an Atome; for as in the Exstruction of
a house there is first required an Architect or Surveigher,
who orders and designs the building, and puts the
Labourers to work; next the Labourers or Workmen
themselves, and lastly the Materials of which
the House is built: so the Rational part, said they, in
the framing of Natural Effects, is, as it were, the Surveigher
or Architect; the Sensitive, the labouring or
working part, and the Inanimate, the materials, and
all these degrees are necessarily required in every composed
action of Nature.

To this, my latter thoughts excepted, that in probability
of sense and reason, there was no necessity of
introducing an inanimate degree of Matter; for all those parts h2v
parts which we call gross, said they, are no more but
a composition of self-moving parts, whereof some are
denser, and some rarer then others; and we may observe,
that the denser parts are as active, as the rarest;
for example, Earth is as active as Air or Light, and
the parts of the Body are as active, as the parts of the
Soul or Mind, being all self-moving, as it is perceiveable
by their several, various compositions, divisions,
productions and alterations; nay, we do see, that
the Earth is more active in the several productions and
alterations of her particulars, then what we name Cœlestial
Lights, which observation is a firm argument to
prove, that all Matter is animate or self-moving, onely
there are degrees of motion, that some parts move
slower, and some quicker.

Hereupon my former Thoughts answered, that the
difference consisted not onely in the grossness, but in the
dulness of the Inanimate parts; and that, since the sensitive
animate parts were labouring on, and with the
inanimate, if these had self-motion, and that their motion
was slower then that of the animate parts, they
would obstruct, cross and oppose each other in all their
actions, for the one would be too slow, and the other
too quick.

The latter Thoughts replied, that this slowness and
quickness of motion would cause no obstruction at all;
for, said they, a man that rides on a Horse is carried
away by the Horses motion, and has nevertheless also his i1r
his own motions himself; neither does the Horse and
Man transfer or exchange motion into each other, nor
do they hinder or obstruct one another.

The former Thoughts answer’d, it was True, that
Motion could not be transferred from one body into
another without Matter or substance; and that several
self-moving parts might be joined, and each act a part
without the least hinderance to one another; for not
all the parts of one composed Creature (for example
Man) were bound to one and the same action; and this
was an evident proof that all Creatures were composed
of parts, by reason of their different actions; nay,
not onely of parts, but of self-moving parts: also they
confessed, that there were degrees of motion, as quickness
and slowness, and that the slowest motion was as
much motion as the quickest. But yet, said they, this
does not prove, that Nature consists not of Inanimate
Matter as well as of Animate; for it is one thing to
speak of the parts of the composed and mixed body of
Nature, and another thing to speak of the constitutive
parts of Nature, which are, as it were, her ingredients
of which Nature is made up as one intire self-moving
body; for sense and reason does plainly perceive,
that some parts are more dull, and some more lively,
subtil and active; the Rational parts are more agil, active,
pure and subtil then the sensitive; but the Inanimate
have no activity, subtilty and agility at all, by
reason they want self-motion; nor no perception, for i self- i1v
self-motion is the cause of all perception; and this Triumvirate
of the degrees of Matter, said they, is so necessary
to ballance and poise Natures actions, that otherwise
the creatures which Nature produces, would all be
produced alike, and in an instant; for example, a
Child in the Womb would as suddenly be framed, as
it is figured in the mind; and a man would be as suddenly
dissolved as a thought: But sense and reason perceives
that it is otherwise; to wit, that such figures as
are made of the grosser parts of Matter, are made by degrees,
and not in an instant of time, which does manifestly
evince, that there is and must of necessity be such
a degree of Matter in Nature as we call Inanimate; for
surely although the parts of Nature are infinite, and
have infinite actions, yet they cannot run into extreams,
but are ballanced by their opposites, so that all
parts cannot be alike rare or dense, hard or soft,
dilating or contracting, &c. but some are dense, some
rare, some hard, some soft, some dilative, some contractive,
&c. by which the actions of Nature are kept
in an equal ballance from running into extreams. But
put the case, said they, it were so, that Natures body
consisted altogether of Animate Matter, or corporeal
self-motion, without an intermixture of the inanimate
parts, we are confident that there would be framed as
many objections against that opinion as there are now
against the inanimate degree of Matter; for disputes are
endless, and the more answers you receive, the more objections i2r
objections you will find; and the more objections you
make, the more answers you will receive; and even
shews, that Nature is ballanced by opposites: for, put
the case, the Inanimate parts of Matter were self-moving;
then first there would be no such difference between
the rational and sensitive parts as now there is;
but every part, being self-moving, would act of, and
in it self, that is, in its own substance as now the rational
part of Matter does: Next, if the inanimate part was
of a slower motion then the rational and sensitive, they
would obstruct each other in their actions, for one
would be too quick, and the other too slow; neither
would the quicker motion alter the nature of the slower,
or the slower retard the quicker; for the nature of each
must remain as it is; or else it would be thus, then the
animate part might become inanimate, and the rational
the sensitive, &c. which is impossible, and against all
sense and reason.

At this declaration of my former Thoughts, the latter
appear’d somewhat better satisfied, and had almost
yielded to them, but that they had yet some scruples
left, which hindered them from giving a full assent to
my former rational conceptions. First they asked, how
it was possible, that that part of Matter which had no
innate self-motion, could be moved? for, said they, if
it be moved, it must either be moved by its own motion,
or by the motion of the animate part of Matter:
by its own motion it cannot move, because it has none; But i2v
But if it be moved by the motion of the animate, then
the animate must of necessity transfer motion into it:
that so, being not able to move by an innate motion, it
might move by a communicated motion.

The former Thoughts answered, that they had resolved
this question heretofore by the example of a
Horse and a Man, where the Man was moved and
carried along by the Horse, without any Communication
or Translation of motion from the Horse into the
Man; also a Stick, said they, carried in a Man’s hand,
goes along with the man, without receiving any motion
from his hand.

My latter Thoughts replied, That a Man and a Stick
were parts or Creatures of Nature, which consist of a
commixture of Animate or self-moving Matter, and
that they did move by their own motions, even at the
time when they were carried along by other parts; but
with the Inanimate part of Matter it was not so; for it
having no self-motion, could no ways move.

You say well, answered my former Thoughts, that
all the parts of Nature, whensoever they move, move
by their own motions; which proves, that no particular
Creature or effect of composed Nature, can act
upon another, but that one can onely occasion another
to move thus or thus; as in the mentioned example, the
Horse does not move the man, but occasions him onely
to move after such or such a manner; also the hand
does not move the Stick, but is onely an occasion that the k1r
the Stick moves thus, for the Stick moves by its own
motion.

But as we told you before, this is to be understood of
the parts of the composed body of Nature, which as
they are Natures Creatures and Effects, so they consist
also of a commixture of the forementioned degrees
of animate and inanimate Matter; but our discourse is
now of those parts which do compose the body of Nature,
and make it what it is: And as of the former parts
none can be said moved, but all are moving, as having
self-motion within them; so the inanimate part of
Matter considered as it is an ingredient of Naure, is
no ways moving, but always moved: The former parts,
being effects of the body of Nature, for distinctions
sake may be called Effective parts; but these, that is;,
the Animate and Inanimate, may be called constitutive
parts of Nature: Those follow the composition of
Nature, but these are the Essential parts, which constitute
the body of Nature; whereof the Animate, by
reason of their self-motion, are always active and perceptive;
but the Inanimate is neither active nor perceptive,
but dull and passive; and you may plainly perceive
it, added my former thoughts, by the alledged
example; for as the Stick has no animal motion, and yet
is carried along by and with the animal wheresoever it
goes; so the Inanimate Matter, although it has no
motion at all, yet it goes along with the animate parts
wheresoever they’l have it; the onely difference is this, k as k1v
as we told you before, that the Stick being composed
of animate as well as inanimate Matter, cannot properly
be said moved, but occasioned to such a motion by
the animal that carries it, when as the inanimate part
cannot be said occasioned, but moved.

My later Thoughts replied, That the alledged example
of the carried Stick, could give them no full satisfaction
as yet; for, said they, put the case the Stick had
its own motion, yet is has not a visible, exterior, local,
progressive motion, such as Animals have, and therefore
it must needs receive that motion from the animal
that carries it; for nothing can be occasioned to that
which it has not in it self.

To which the former answered first, that although
animals had a visible exterior progressive motion, yet
not all progressive motion was an animal motion: Next,
they said, that some Creatures did often occasion others
to alter their motions from an ordinary, to an extraordinary
effect; and if it be no wonder, said they,
that Cheese, Roots, Fruits, &c. produce Worms,
why should it be a wonder for an Animal to occasion
a visible progressive motion in a vegetable or mineral, or
any other sort of Creature? For each natural action,
said they, is local, were it no more then the stirring
of a hairs breadth, nay, of an Atome; and all composition
and division, contraction, dilation, nay, even
retention, are local motions; for there is no thing in so
just a measure, but it will vary more or less; nay, if it did k2r
did not to our perception, yet we cannot from thence
infer that it does not at all; for our perception is too
weak and gross to perceive all the subtil actions of Nature;
and if so, then certainly Animals are not the
onely Creatures that have local motion, but there is local
motion in all parts of Nature.

Then my later Thoughts asked, that if every part
of Nature moved by its own inherent self-motion, and
that there was no part of the composed body of Nature
which was not self-moving, how it came, that
Children could not go so soon as born? also, if the self-
moving part of Matter was of two degrees, sensitive and
rational, how it came that Children could not speak before
they are taught? and if it was perceptive, how it
came that Children did not understand so soon as born?

To which the former answered, That although there
was no part of Matter that was figureless, yet those figures
that were composed by the several parts of Matter,
such as are named natural Creatures, were composed
by degrees, and some compositions were sooner
perfected then others, and some sorts of such figures or
Creatures were not so soon produced or strengthened
as others; for example, most of four legg’d Creatures,
said they, can go, run and skip about so soon as they
are parted from the Dam, that is, so soon as they are
born; also they can suck, understand, and know their
Dam’s, when as a Bird can neither feed it self, nor fly
so soon as it is hatched, but requires some time before it can k2v
can hop on its leggs, and be able to fly; but a Butterfly
can fly so soon as it comes out of the shell; by which
we may perceive, that all figures are not alike, either in
their composing, perfecting or dissolving, no more then
they are alike in their shapes, forms, understanding,
&c. for if they were, then little Puppies and Kitlings
would see, so soon as born, as many other Creatures
do, when as now they require nine days after
their birth before they can see; and as for speech, although
it be most proper to the shape of Man, yet he
must first know or learn a language before he can
speak it; and although when the parts of his mind, like
the parts of his body, are brought to maturity, that is,
to such a regular degree of perfection as belongs to
his figure, he may make a language of his own; yet
it requires time, and cannot be done in an instant: The
truth is, although speech be natural to man, yet language
must be learned; and as there are several self-
active parts, so there are several Languages; and by
reason the actions of some parts can be imitated by other
parts, it causes that we name learning not onely in
Speech, but in many other things.

Concerning the question why Children do not understand
so soon as born: They answered, that as the
sensitive parts of Nature did compose the bulk of Creatures,
that is, such as were usually named bodies; and
as some Creatures bodies were not finished or perfected
so soon as others, so the self-moving parts, which by l1r
by conjunction and agreement composed that which
is named the mind of Man, did not bring it to the perfection
of an Animal understanding so soon as some
Beasts are brought to their understanding, that is, to
such an understanding as was proper to their figure. But
this is to be noted, said they, that although Nature is
in a perpetual motion, yet her actions have degrees,
as well as her parts, which is the reason, that all her
productions are done in that which is vulgarly named
Time; that is, they are not executed at once, or by one
act: In short, as a House is not finished, until it be
throughly built, nor can be thorowly furnished until
it be throughly finished; so is the strength and understanding
of Man, and all other Creatures; and as perception
requires Objects, so learning requires practice;
for though Nature is self-knowing, self-moving, and
so perceptive; yet her self-knowing, self-moving, and
perceptive actions, are not all alike, but differ variously;
neither doth she perform all actions at once, otherwise
all her Creatures would be alike in their shapes,
forms, figures, knowledges, perceptions, productions,
dissolutions, &c. which is contradicted by experience.

After this my later Thoughts asked, how it came
that the Inanimate part of Matter had more degrees
then the Animate.

The former answered, That, as the Animate part had
but two degrees, to wit, the sensitive and rational, so l the l1v
the Inanimate was but grosser and purer; and as for
density, rarity, softness, hardness, &c. they were nothing
but various compositions and divisions of parts, or
particular effects; nor was it density or hardness that
made grossness; and thinness or rarity of parts that
made fineness and purity; for Gold is more dense then
dross, and yet is more pure and fine; but this is most
probable, said they, that the rarest compositions are most
suddenly altered; nor can the grossness and fineness of
the parts of Nature be without Animate and Inanimate
Matter; for the dulness of one degree poises the activity
of the other; and the grossness of one, the purity of
the other; all which keeps Nature from extreams.

But replied my later Thouught, You say that there
are infinite degrees of hardness, thickness, thinness, density,
rarity, &c.

Truly, answered the former, if you’l call them degrees,
you may; for so there may be infinite degrees
of Magnitude, as bigger and bigger, but these degrees
are nothing else but the effects of self-moving Matter,
made by a composition of parts, and cannot be attributed
to one single part, there being no such thing in
Nature; but they belong to the infinite parts of Nature,
joined in one body; and as for Matter it self, there are
no more degrees, but animate and inanimate; that is, a
self-moving, active and perceptive, and a dull, passive,
and moved degree.

My l2r

My later Thoughts asked, since Natures parts were
so closely joined in one body, how it was possible that
there could be finite, and not single parts?

The former answered, That finite and single parts
were not all one and the same; for single parts, said they,
are such as can subsist by themselves; neither can they
properly be called parts, but are rather finite wholes;
for it is a meer contradiction to say single parts, they
having no reference to each other, and consequently not
to the body of Nature; But what we call finite Parts,
are nothing else but several corporeal figurative motions,
which make all the difference that is between the
figures or parts of Nature, both in their kinds, sorts
and particulars: And thus finite and particular parts
are all one, called thus, by reason they have limited and
circumscribed figures, by which they are discerned from
each other, but not single figures, for they are all joined
in one body, and are parts of one infinite whole,
which is Nature; and these figures being all one and
the same with their parts of Matter, change according
as their parts change, that is, by composition and division;
for were Nature an Atome, and material, that
Atome would have the properties of a body, that is,
be dividable and composable, and so be subject
to infinite changes, although it were not infinite in
bulk.

My later Thoughts replied, That if a finite body could
have infinite compositions and divisions, then Nature needed l2v
need not to be infinite in bulk or quantity; besides, said
they, it is against sense and reason that a finite should
have infinite effects.

The former answered first, As for the infiniteness of
Nature, it was certain that Nature consisted of infinite
parts; which if so, she must needs also be of an
infinite bulk or quantity; for wheresoever is an infinite
number of parts or figures, there must also be an infinite
whole, since a whole and its parts differ not really,
but onely in the manner of our conception; for when
we conceive the parts of Nature as composed in one body,
and inseparable from it, the composition of them
is called a whole; but when we conceive their different
figures, actions and changes, and that they are
dividable from each other, or amongst themselves, we
call them parts; for by this one part is discerned from
the other part; as for example, a Mineral from a Vegetable,
a Vegetable from an Element, and Element
from an Animal, &c. and one part is not another part;
but yet these parts are, and remain still parts of infinite
Nature, and cannot be divided into single parts, separated
from the body of Nature, although they may be
divided amongst themselves infinite ways by the self-
moving power of Nature. In short, said they, a whole
is nothing but a composition of parts, and parts are nothing
but a division of the whole.

Next, as for the infinite compositions and divisions
of a finite whole, said they, it is not probable that a finite m1r
finite can have infinite effects, or can be actually divided
into infinite parts; but yet a body cannot but have
the proprieties of a body as long as it lasts; and therefore
if a finite body should last eternally, it would eternally
retain the effects, or rather proprieties of a body,
that is, to be dividable and composable; and if it have
self-motion, and was actually divided and composed,
then those compositions and divisions of its parts
would be eternal too; but what is eternal is infinite, and
therefore in this sense one cannot say amiss, but that
there might be eternal compositions and divisions of the
parts of a finite whole; for wheresoever is self-motion
there is no rest: But, mistake us not, for we do not mean
divisions or compositions into single or infinite parts,
but a perpetual and eternal change and self-motion of the
parts of that finite body or whole amongst themselves.

But because we speak now of the parts of Infinite
Nature, which are Infinite in number, though finite,
or rather distinguished by their figures; It is certain,
said they, that there being a perpetual and eternal self-
motion in all parts of Nature, and their number being
infinite, they must of necessity be subject to infinite
changes, compositions, and divisions; not onely as
for their duration, or eternal self-motion, but as for
the number of their parts; for parts cannot remove
but from and to parts; and as soon as they are removed
from such parts, they join to other parts, which is nothing
else but a composition and division of parts; m and m1v
and this composition and division of the Infinite parts of
Nature, hinders that there are no actual divisions or
compositions of a finite part, because the one counter-
balances the other; for if by finite you understand a
single part, there can be no such thing in Nature,
since what we call the finiteness of parts, is nothing else
but the difference and change of their figures, caused
by self-motion; and therefore when we say Infinite
Nature consists of an infinite number of finite parts, we
mean of such parts as may be distinguished or discerned
from each other by their several figures; which figures
are not constant, but change perpetually in the body
of Nature; so that there can be no constant figure allowed
to no part, although some do last longer then
others.

Then my later Thoughts desired to know, whether
there were not degrees of Motion, as well as there are
of Matter?

The former answered, That without question there
were degrees of motion; for the rational parts were
more agil, quick and subtil in their corporeal actions
then the sensitive, by reason they were of a purer and
finer degree of Matter, and free from labouring on the
inanimate parts: but withal they told them, that the
several different and opposite actions of Nature hindred
each other from running into extreams: And as
for the degrees of Matter, there could not possibly be
more then Animate and Inanimate, neither could any degree m2r
degree go beyond Matter, so as to become immaterial.
The truth is, said they, to balance the actions of Nature,
it cannot be otherwise, but there must be a Passive
degree of Matter, opposite to the active; which
passive part is that we call Inanimate; for though they
are so closely intermixt in the body of Nature, that
they cannot be separated from each other, but by the
power of God; nevertheless, sense and reason may
perceive that they are distinct degrees, by their distinct
and different actions, and may distinguish them so far,
that one part is not another part, and that the actions
of one degree are not the actions of the other. Wherefore
as several self-moving parts may be joined in one
composed body, and may either act differently without
hinderance and obstruction to each other, or may
act jointly and agreeably to one effect; so may the sensitive
parts carry or bear along with them the inanimate
parts, without either transferring and communicating
motion to them, or without any co-operation or self-
action of the inanimate parts; and as for Matter, as
there can be no fewer degrees then Animate and Inanimate,
sensitive and rational; so neither can there be
more; for as we mentioned heretofore, were there nothing
but animate or self-moving Matter in Nature,
the parts of Nature would be too active and quick in
their several productions, alterations and dissolutions,
and all things would be as soon made, as thoughts.
Again, were there no Inanimate degree of Matter, the m2v
the sensitive corporeal motions would retain the figures
or patterns of exterior objects, as the rational do;
which yet we perceive otherwise; for so soon as the
object is removed, the sensitive perception is altered;
and though the sensititve parts can work by rote, as
in dreams and some distempers, yet their voluntary
actions are not so exact, as their Exterior perceptive
actions, nor altogether and always so regular as the rational;
and the reason is, that they are bound to bear
the inanimate parts along with them in all their actions.
Also were there no degree of Inanimate Matter, Natures
actions would run into extreams; but because all
her actions are ballanced by opposites, they hinder
both extreams in Nature, and produce all that Harmonious
variety that is found in Natures parts.

But said my later Thoughts, wheresoever is such an
opposition and crossing of actions, there can be no harmony,
concord or agreement, and consequently no
orderly productions, dissolutions, changes and alterations,
as in Nature we perceive there be.

The former answered, That though the actions of
Nature were different and opposite to each other, yet
they did cause no disturbance in Nature, but they
were ruled and governed by Natures wisdom; for
Nature being peaceable in her self, would not suffer
her actions to disturb her Government; wherefore although
particulars were crossing and opposing each other,
yet she did govern them with such wisdom and moderation, n1r
moderation, that they were necessitated to obey her
and move according as she would have them; but
sometimes they would prove extravagant and refractory,
and hence came that we call Irregularities. The
truth is, said they, contrary and opposite actions are
not always at war; for example, two men may meet
each other contrary ways, and one may not onely stop
the other from going forward, but even draw him back
again the same way he came; and this may be done with
love and kindness, and with his good will, and not violently
by power and force: The like may be in some
actions of Nature. Nevertheless, we do not deny,
but there is many times force and power used between
particular parts of Nature, so that some do over-power
others, but this causes no disturbance in Nature; for if
we look upon a well-ordered Government, we find
that the particulars are often at strife and difference with
each other, when as yet the Government is as orderly
and peaceable as can be.

My later thoughts replied, That although the several
and contrary actions in Nature did not disturb her Government,
yet they moving severally in one composed
figure at one and the same time, proved that Motion,
Figure and Body could not be one and the same
thing.

The former answered, That they had sufficiently declared
heretofore that Matter was either moving, or moved:
viz. That the Animate part was self-moving, and the n Inanimate n1v
Inanimate moved, or carried along with, and by the
Animate; and these degrees or parts of Matter were
so closely intermixt in the body of Nature, that they
could not be separated from each other, but did constitute
but one body, not onely in general, but also in every
particular; so that not the least part (if least could be) nay,
not that which some call an Atome, was without this
commixture; for wheresoever was Inanimate, there
was also Animate Matter; which Animate Matter was
nothing else but corporeal self-motion, and if any difference
could be apprehended, it was, said they, between
these two degrees, to wit, the Animate and Inanimate
part of Matter, and not between the animate
part and self-motion, which was but one thing, and
could not so much as be conceived differently; and
since this Animate Matter, or corporeal self-motion is
thorowly intermixt with the Inanimate parts, they are
but as one body (like as soul and body make but one
man) or else it were impossible that any Creature
could be composed, consist, or be dissolved; for if there
were Matter without Motion, there could be no composition
or dissolution of such figures as are named
Creatures; nor any, if there were Motion without
Matter, or (which is the same) an Immaterial Motion;
For can any part of reason, that is regular, believe,
that that which naturally is nothing, should produce
a natural something? Besides, said they, Material
and Immaterial are so quite opposite to each other, as ’tis n2r
’tis impossible they should commix and work together,
or act one upon the other: nay, if they could, they
would make but a confusion, being of contrary natures:
Wherefore it is most probable, and can to the
perception of Regular sense and reason be no otherwise,
but that self-moving Matter, or corporeal figurative
self-motion, does act and govern, wisely, orderly and
easily, poising or ballancing extreams with proper and
fit oppositions, which could not be done by immaterials,
they being not capable of natural compositions
and divisions; neither of dividing Matter, nor of being
divided? In short, although there are numerous
corporeal figurative motions in one composed figure,
yet they are so far from disturbing each other, that no
Creature could be produced without them; and as the
actions of retention are different from the actions of digestion
or expulsion, and the actions of contraction
from those of dilation; so the actions of imitation or
patterning are different from the voluntary actions vulgarly
called Conceptions, and all this to make an equal
poise or ballance between the actions of Nature. Also
there is difference in the degrees of motions, in swiftness,
slowness, rarity, density, appetites, passions,
youth, age, growth, decay, &c. as also between several
sorts of perceptions: all which proves, that Nature
is composed of self-moving parts, which are the
cause of all her varieties: But this is well to be observed,
said they, that the Rational parts are the purest, and consequently n2v
consequently the most active parts of Nature, and have
the quickest actions; wherefore to ballance them, there
must be a dull part of Matter, which is the Inanimate,
or else a World would be made in an instant, and every
thing would be produced, altered and dissolved on
a sudden, as they had mentioned before.

Well, replied my later Thoughts, if there be such oppositions
between the parts of Nature, then I pray inform
us, whether they be all equally and exactly poised
and ballanced?

To which the former answered, That though it was
most certain that there was a poise and ballance of Natures
corporeal actions; yet no particular Creature was
able to know the exactness of the proportion that is
between them, because they are infinite.

Then my later Thoughts desired to know, whether
Motion could be annihilated?

The former said, no: because Nature was Infinite,
and admitted of no addition nor diminution; and consequently
of no new Creation nor annihilation of any
part of hers.

But, said the later, If Motion be an accident, it
may be annihilated.

The former answered, They did not know what
they meant by the word “Accident”.

The later said, That an Accident was something in a
body, but nothing without a body.

If o1r

If an Accident be something, answered the former,
Then certainly it must be body; for there is nothing
but what is corporeal in Nature; and if it be body,
then it cannot be nothing at no time, but it must of necessity
be something.

But it cannot subsist of, and by it self, replied my later
Thoughts, as a substance; for although it hath
its own being, yet its being is to subsist in another
body.

The former answered, That if an Accident was nothing
without a body or substance, and yet something
in a body; then they desired to know, how, being nothing,
it could subsist in another body, and be separated
from another body; for composition and division,
said they, are attributes of a body, since nothing can
be composed or divided but what has parts; and nothing
has parts but what is corporeal or has a body, and
therefore if an accident can be in a body, and be separated
from a body, it would be non-sense to call it nothing.

But then my later Thoughts asked, that when a particular
Motion ceased, what became of it?

The former answered, it was not annihilated, but
changed.

The later said, How can motion be corporeal, and
yet one thing with body? Certainly if body be material,
and motion too, they must needs be two several
substances.

o The o1v

The former answered, That motion and body
were not two several substances; but motion and matter
made one self-moving body; and so was place, colour,
figure, &c. all one and the same with body.

The later replied, That a Man, and his action were
not one and the same, but two different things.

The former answered, That a Man, and his actions
were no more different, then a man was different from
himself; for, said they, although a man may have many
different actions, yet were not that man existent, the same
actions would not be; for though many men have the
like actions, yet they are not the same.

But then replied the later, Place cannot be the same
with body, nor colour; because a man may change his
place and his colour, and yet retain his body.

Truly, said the former, If Place be changed, then
Body must change also; for wheresoever is Place, there
is Body; and though it be a vulgar phrase, That a
man changes his place when he removes, yet it is not a
proper Philosophical expression; for he removes onely
from such parts, to such parts; so that it is a change or
a division and composition of parts, and not of place:
And as for colour, though it changes, yet that proves
not that it is not a body, or can be annihilated. The
truth is, though Figure, Motion, Colour, &c. do
change, yet they remain still in Nature, and it is impossible
that Nature can give away, or lose the least of
her corporeal Attributes or Proprieties; for Nature is o2r
is infinite in power, as well as in act; we mean, for acting
naturally; and therefore whatsoever is not in present
act, is in the power of Infinite Nature.

But, said my later Thoughts, if a body be divided
into very minute parts as little as dust, where is the colour
then?

The Colour, answered the former, is divided as
well as the body; and though the parts thereof be not
subject to our sensitive perception, yet they have nevertheless
their being; for all things cannot be perceptible
by our senses.

The later said, That the Colour of a Man’s face
could change from pale to red, and from red to pale,
and yet the substance of the face remain the same; which
proved, that colour and substance was not the same.

The former answered, That although the colour of
a mans face did change without altering the substance
thereof, yet this proved no more that Colour was Immaterial,
then that Motion was Immaterial; for a man
may put his body into several postures, and have several
actions, and yet without any change of the substance
of his body; for all actions do not necessarily import
a change of the parts of a composed figure, there
being infinite sorts of actions.

We will leave Accidents, said my later Thoughts,
and return to the Inanimate part of Matter; and since
you declare, that all parts of Nature do worship and
adore God, you contradict your self in allowing an Inanimate o2v
Inanimate degree of Matter, by reason, where there is
no self-motion, there can be no perception of God, and
consequently no Worship and Adoration.

The former answered, That the knowledg of God
did not consist in exterior perception; for God, said
they, being an Infinite, Incomprehensible, supernatural
and Immaterial Essence, void of all parts, can no
ways be subject to Perception. Nevertheless, although
no part can have an exterior perception of the substance
of God, as it has of particular natural Creatures, yet
it has Conceptions of the Existence of God, to wit,
that there is a God above Nature, on which Nature
depends, and from whose Immutable and Eternal
Decree it has its Eternal Being, as God’s Eternal Servant;
but what God is in his Essence, neither Nature,
nor any of her parts or Creatures is able to conceive.
And therefore although the Inanimate part of Matter
is not perceptive, yet having an innate knowledg and
life of it self, it is not improbable but it may also have an
interior, fixt, and innate knowledg of the Existency of
God, as that he is to be adored and worshipped: And
thus the Inanimate part may after its own manner worship
and adore God, as much as the other parts in their
ways: for it is probable, that God having endued all
parts of Nature with self-knowledg, may have given
them also an Interior knowledg of himself, that is, of
his Existency, how he is the God of Nature, and ought
to be worshipped by her as his Eternal servant.

My p1r

My later Thoughts excepted, That not any Creature
did truly know it self, much less could it be capable
of knowing God.

The former answered, That this was caused
through the variety of self-motion; for all Creatures
(said they) are composed of many several parts, and
every part has its own particular self-knowledg, as
well as self-motion, which causes an ignorance between
them; for one parts knowledg is not another
parts knowledg; nor does one part know what another
knows; but all knowledg of exterior parts comes
by perception; nevertheless, each part knows it self
and its own actions; and as there is an ignorance
between parts, so there is also an acquaintance (especially
in the parts of one composed Creature) and
the rational parts being most subtile, active and free,
have a more general acquaintance then the sensitive;
besides, the sensitive many times inform the rational,
and the rational the sensitive, which causes a general
agreement of all the parts of a composed figure,
in the excecution of such actions as belong to it.

But how is it possible, replied my later Thoughts,
that the inanimate part of matter can be living and
self-knowing, and yet not self-moving? for Life
and Knowledg cannot be without self-motion; and
therefore if the inanimate parts have Life and Knowledg,
they must necessarily also have self-motion.

p The p1v

The former answered, That Life and Knowledg
did no ways depend upon self-motion; for had Nature
no motion at all, yet might she have Life and
Knowledg; so that self-motion is not the cause of Life
and Knowledg, but onely of Perception, and all
the various actions of Nature; and this is the reason
said they, that the inanimate part of matter is not
perceptive, because it is not self-moving; for though
it hath life and self-knowledg as well as the Animate
part, yet it has not an active life, nor a perceptive
knowledg. By which you may see, that a fixt and
interior self-knowedg, may very well be without
exterior perception; for though perception presupposes
an innate self-knowledg as its ground and principle,
yet self-knowledg does not necessarily require
perception, which is onely caused by self-motion;
for self-motion, as it is the cause of the variety of
Natures parts and actions, so it is also of their various
perceptions: If it was not too great a presumtion,
said they, we could give an instance of God,
who has no local self-motion, and yet is infinitely
knowing: But we’l forbear to go so high, as to draw
the Infinite, Incomprehensible God, to the proofs
of Material Nature.

My later Thoughts replied, first, That if it were
thus, then one and the same parts of matter would
have a double life, and a double knowledg.

Next they said, That if perception were an effect of p2r
of self-motion, then God himself must necessarily be
self-moving, or else he could not perceive Nature
and her parts and actions.

Concerning the first objection my former thoughts
answered, That the parts of Nature could have a
double life and knowledg no more, then one man
could be call’d double or treble: You might as well
said they, make millions of men of one particular
man, nay, call every part or action of his a peculiar
li man, as make one and the same part of matter
have a double life and knowledg.

But mistake us not, added my former thoughts,
when we say, that one and the same part cannot
have a double life and knowledg; for we mean not,
the composed creatures of Nature, which as they
consist of several degrees of matter, so they have also
several degrees of lives and knowledges; but it is
to be understood of the essential or constitutive parts
of Nature; for as the rational part is not, nor can
be the sensitive part, so it can neither have a sensitive
knowledg; no more can a sensitive part have
a rational knowledg, or either of these the knowledg
of the inanimate part; but each part retains its
own life and knowledg. Indeed it is with these parts
as it is with particular creatures; for as one man is
not another man, nor has another mans knowledg,
so it is likewise with the mentioned parts of
matter; and although the animate parts have an in- p2v
interior, innate self-knowledg, and an exterior, perceptive
knowledg; yet these are not double knowledges;
but perception is onely an effect of interior
self-knowledg, occasioned by self-motion.

And as for the second, they answered, That the
Divine Perception and Knowledg was not any ways
like a natural Perception, no more than God was
like a Creature; for Nature (said they) is material,
and her perceptions are amongst her infinite parts,
caused by their compositions and divisions; but God
is a Supernatural, Individable, and Incorporeal Being,
void of all Parts and Divisions; and therefore
he cannot be ignorant of any the least thing; but
being Infinite, he has an Infinite Knowledg, without
any Degrees, Divisions, or the like actions belonging
to Material Creatures. Nor is he naturally,
that is, locally self-moving; but he is a fixt, unalterable,
and in short, an incomprehensible Being, and
therefore no comparison can be made between Him
and Nature, He being the Eternal God, and Nature
his Eternal Servant.

Then my later Thoughts said, That as for the knowledg
of God, they would not dispute of it; but if there
was a fixt and interior, innate knowledg in all Natures
parts and Creatures, it was impossible that there could
be any error or ignorance between them.

The former answered, that although Errors belonged
to particulars as well as ignorance, yet they proceeded not q1r
not from interior self-knowledg, but either from want
of exterior particular knowledges, or from the irregularity
of motions; and Ignorance was likewise a want
not of interior, but exterior knowledg, otherwise called
Perceptive knowledg: for, said they, Parts can
know no more of other parts, but by their own perceptions;
and since no particular Creature or part of Nature
can have an Infallible, Universal, and thorow perception
of all other parts; it can neither have an infallible
and universal knowledg, but it must content it
self with such a knowledg as is within the reach of its
own perceptions; and hence it follows, that it must be
ignorant of what it does not know; for Perception has
but onely a respect to the exterior figures and actions of
other parts; and though the Rational part is more subtil
and active then the Sensitive, and may have also some
perceptions of some interior parts and actions of other
Creatures, yet it cannot have an infallible and thorow
perception of all their interior parts and motions,
which is a knowledg impossible for any particular
Creature to attain to.

Again my later Thoughts objected, That it was
impossible that the parts of one and the same degree
could be ignorant of each others actions, how various
soever, since they were capable to change their actions
to the like figures.

The former answered first, That although they
might make the like figures, yet they could not make q the q1v
the same, because the parts were not the same. Next
they said, that particular parts could not have infinite
perceptions, but that they could but perceive such objects
as were subject to that sort of perception which
they had; no not all such; for oftentimes objects were
obscured and hidden from their perceptions, that although
they could perceive them if presented, or coming
within the compass and reach of their perceptive faculty
or power; yet when they were absent, they could
not; besides, said they, the sensitive parts are not so
subtile as to make perceptions into the interior actions
of other parts, no not the rational are able to have exact
perceptions thereof; for Perception extends but to
adjoining parts and their exterior figures and actions,
and if they know any thing of their interior parts,
figures or motions, it is onely by guess or probable
conclusions, taken from their exterior actions or figures,
and made especially by the rational parts, which as they
are the most inspective, so they are the most knowing
parts of Nature.

After these and several other objections, questions
and answers between the later and former thoughts and
conceptions of my mind, at last some Rational thoughts
which were not concerned in this dispute, perceiving
that they became much heated, and fearing they would
at last cause a Faction or Civil War amongst all the
rational parts, which would breed that which is called
a Trouble of the Mind, endeavoured to make a Peace between q2r
between them, and to that end they propounded, that
the sensitive parts should publickly declare their differences
and controversies, and refer them to the Arbitration
of the judicious and impartial Reader. This
proposition was unanimously embraced by all the rational
parts, and thus by their mutual consent this Argumental
Discourse was set down and published after this
manner: In the mean time all the rational parts of my
Mind inclined to the opinion of my former conceptions,
which they thought much more probable then
those of the later; and since now it is your part, Ingenious
Readers, to give a final decision of the Cause,
consider well the subject of thier quarrel, and be impartial
in your judgment; let not Self-love or Envy corrupt
you, but let Regular Sense and Reason be your
onely Rule, that you may be accounted just Judges,
and your Equity and Justice be Remembred by all that
honour and love it.